Concept
Allocation of Risk
Mutual mistake
Allocation of Risk
A party who shares a mistake about a basic assumption, and whose exchange the mistake upsets, still cannot avoid the contract if that party bears the risk of the mistake. Section 152(1) builds the limit into the rule: the adversely affected party may avoid “unless he bears the risk of the mistake under the rule stated in § 154.”1 Section 154 names three ways a party comes to bear that risk, and any one of them suffices:2
- The parties' agreement allocates the risk to that party.3
- The party was aware, when the contract was made, that its knowledge of the relevant facts was limited, yet treated that knowledge as sufficient.4
- The court allocates the risk to that party because doing so is reasonable in the circumstances.5
The risk question matters because it often decides the case. A ruling that one party did not bear the risk is a ruling that the other did, so no allocation is neutral, and when the adversely affected party bore the risk, even a serious error leaves the contract intact.8 Relief therefore requires, besides the mistake itself, that the party seeking it neither assumed the risk nor was allocated it.9
The rule reflects what contracts are for. Courts and commentators stress the limited place of mistake because contracts are devices for allocating the risks of life's uncertainties, especially economic ones. Where parties deliberately and expressly allocate such a risk, or enter a customary kind of contract that common understanding and legal doctrine treat as allocating it, little room remains for judicial relief from the resulting loss.10
Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly shows the risk question operating as a second, separate step. A predecessor in title had installed a septic tank on the property without a permit and in violation of the health code,11 and the vendors and vendees alike assumed that the property was fit for habitation and could earn rental income. The court found that assumption basic and its failure material, and it found that nothing short of rescission could remedy the mistake.12 It nonetheless reversed the Court of Appeals, because equity did not justify the remedy the vendees sought.13 The court called its inquiry bifurcated: proof of a mutual mistake does not mandate legal or equitable relief in every case.14 Rescission is unavailable to a party who assumed the risk of loss, and when two blameless parties share a mistake, the court must decide which of them should bear it.15
Section 154 answers the risk question for both rules of mistake. Its comment states that the rule determines whether a party bears the risk for purposes of § 152, the mutual-mistake rule, and § 153, the unilateral-mistake rule,16 a statement that Hart v. Arnold quotes.17 Allocation is also distinct from fault. A party who does not bear the risk may still be barred from avoidance if the mistake resulted from its failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing, a limit taken up in the next part.18 And allocation decides only whether avoidance is lost. Where both parties err in how a writing records their deal, the remedy is reformation,19 as when the court in Donohue v. Picinich reformed a contract mistakenly drafted to include an entire adjoining lot, so that the buyers received the pond they had expected and the seller kept the rest.20
The three grounds run from the parties' words, to the mistaken party's own knowledge, to the court's judgment of what is reasonable. The subsections below follow that order.
Risk Allocated by Agreement
Section 154(a) places the risk on a party when the parties' agreement allocates it to that party.21 Agreement outranks the court's own judgment, because an allocation made under § 154(c) is subject to contrary agreement and to usage.22 The ground also respects the bargain: when parties deliberately and expressly allocate a risk, or enter a customary kind of contract that by common understanding carries it, courts find little room for relief from the resulting loss.23
The clearest agreements are express clauses. An “as is” clause has been held to allocate to a purchaser the risk of a mutual mistake about the usability and legality of the vendor's sewerage system, and a disclaimer of warranty may have the same effect.24 The holding teaches something about reach. A mistake concerns something the parties did not know when they signed, so a clause that shifts the risk of a shared mistake operates on unknown facts. If the lot contract recited that the buyer took the land “as is,” the seller could argue on this authority that the clause put the unstable soil on the buyer although neither side knew of it.
A clause that names the risk leaves less to argue. Flippin Materials Co. v. United States involved a contract to quarry limestone and process it into aggregate; unexpected amounts of waste material at the quarry raised the contractor's costs. The Court of Claims held that the contractor could not claim relief for mutual mistake, because the contract clearly put the risk of unknown subsurface conditions on it. The offer had also made the government's geological findings available to bidders.25 The Flippin clause spoke to the very subject of the mistake, while the as-is clause spoke in general terms, and the more general the clause, the more its reach depends on how a court reads it.
Land sales supply a further variation. In Gibbs v. Gilleland, buyers who learned that their parcel lay below the flood elevation needed to build were held to have borne the risk, having waived inspection and taken the land as it stood at closing.
Whether a clause reaches the mistake in question is a question of interpretation. The comment to § 154 directs that it be answered under the rules on the scope of contractual obligations, including interpretation, usage, and unconscionability, with the court considering the parties' purposes and its general knowledge of human behavior in bargain transactions.26
A clause naming subsurface materials, as in Flippin, would have left no such question. Express words are not the only route, however. Where neither express words nor a particular common understanding or trade usage dictates a result, the court must allocate the risk by reasoned judgment, which is the third ground; where an understanding or usage does speak, the allocation yields to it.27
A contract silent on the risk produces the opposite result. In a dispute over land, both sides believed that adequate water supplies lay beneath the property. The court held that belief a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract, and the mistake material, so the contract was voidable and rescission was available.28 The parties had not investigated the water supply thoroughly before signing, but the court held that this did not preclude rescission, because the risk of the mistake was not allocated among them.29
The contrast teaches a discipline. Allocation by agreement asks what the contract and the usages around it say about the risk. A party's failure to investigate says nothing about who agreed to carry the loss, so reasoning that a party “should have investigated and therefore bears the risk” skips the step of finding an agreement. Whether careless investigation matters under the other two grounds is a separate question, and the mistaken party's fault belongs to the next part of the chapter.
Conscious Ignorance
Section 154(b) places the risk on a party who was aware, when the contract was made, that its knowledge of the relevant facts was limited and who treated that limited knowledge as sufficient.31 Both parts must be present: awareness of the limit, and a decision to proceed as though it did not matter. The agreement ground looks to the contract's words; this ground looks to what the party itself knew about the reach of its knowledge at signing. In the lot sale, a buyer who is told that a soil test would take three weeks and chooses not to wait knows its knowledge of the ground is limited and goes ahead anyway, so the risk falls on the buyer. A buyer who instead relies on a surveyor's flat assurance that the soil is sound acts on a belief it holds as true, and § 154(b) does not apply, although the court may still allocate the risk under § 154(c).
The rule follows from the meaning of mistake. A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts,32 and a party who knows it does not know a fact holds no belief about it to be wrong. The same idea explains why the mistake must be mutual: both parties must actually hold the mistaken belief. In Sherwood v. Walker, the court held that the defendant seller could rescind if both parties believed the cow barren,33 and the resulting jury charge directed a verdict for the sellers only if both parties held that belief.34
Two reasons leave a gambler with the loss. Information is often troublesome or costly to obtain, and the law does not seek to discourage contracts made without it. And each party to such a contract takes a calculated gamble, at a price that in some way reflects the uncertainty.35
A stone that may be glass or diamond marks the line. If the parties agree to sell and buy a stone that both know may be glass or diamond, at a price that reflects their uncertainty, the contract is enforceable whichever it proves to be. If both instead mistakenly believe it to be glass, the case is one of mutual mistake, not conscious ignorance, and the vendor may void the contract.36 The stone is the same in both versions. What differs is whether the parties knew that they did not know.
Commercial parties rarely stand at either end of that line. In a dispute over a contract with ALCOA, the defendant argued that the parties had made a calculated gamble with full awareness that the future was uncertain. The court held the argument correct within limits but not a complete defense.37 Its test asks not simply whether the parties were conscious of uncertainty about a vital fact, but whether they believed the uncertainty was effectively limited within a designated range, so that outcomes beyond the range seemed highly unlikely to them.38 A projected figure carries such a range. In the court's reading of a projected earnings figure, the parties believed there was a good chance the result would fall in a narrow band and a very high probability that it would fall in a wider one, and they regarded a loss as very highly unlikely.39 Both parties to the ALCOA contract knew that an objective price index injected a limited range of uncertainty into the projected return, and both had every reason to predict that variation would stay within three cents per pound, so awareness of some uncertainty did not bar relief.40
A land sale applies the same logic. In McMahan v. Terkhorn, the parties contracted for a tract thought to hold 133 acres at $15,000, adjusted the price to $12,000 after a survey reported 104.52 acres, and later learned the tract held 129 acres; the vendor recovered the value of the excess land. The court distinguished the normal range of survey error, which parties are deemed to expect and to risk, from gross errors, for which a remedy is available.41
Awareness is usually proved by what the party did or was told before signing. An experienced developer that agreed to buy property for $17 million without verifying that access roads could be built or water rights obtained for its planned subdivision was held to have assumed the risk of conscious uncertainty, and summary judgment denying rescission was affirmed.42 In Estate of Nelson v. Rice, an estate sold two oil paintings for $60 after its appraiser told it she was not qualified to appraise fine art; the buyer later resold them for more than $1 million, and the court held that the estate bore the risk. The appraiser's disclaimer told the estate that its knowledge was limited, and it sold anyway.
Expertise complicates the awareness question, because an expert may have no reason to doubt his own judgment. In Eisenberg v. Hall, a buyer who held himself out as an antiquities expert bought a Roman bust and an Etruscan statue that both sides believed genuine and that proved to be copies, and the court treated whether he could justifiably rely on his own expertise, rather than consult others, as a question for trial. The estate had been told in terms that its adviser lacked the needed expertise; the expert buyer's awareness of his own limits was the contested issue. Where the parties knowingly contract for a work of art of uncertain attribution and the contract makes no representation of authorship, the risk lies with the party whose judgment proves wrong.43
Knowledge of a risk can also defeat a claim that an ordinary mistake occurred. A buyer of timberland who learns that a fire destroyed the lumber the day before closing likely has a mutual mistake defense if the fire was completely unexpected and the contract said nothing about it. If the buyer knew that dry conditions had already caused several forest fires in the area, a strong argument exists that it assumed the risk of such a fire.44
Releases of personal injury claims show how much the rule depends on what the injured party knew. A party who is wholly unaware of her injuries when she signs a release may obtain relief later under the theory of mutual, material mistake.45 In Kendrick v. Barker, by contrast, the court denied rescission to a plaintiff who settled knowing that the extent of a closed head injury was uncertain and who had counsel. In Gibli v. Kadosh, a New York court said that relief would be available, to “avoid grave injustice,” if the plaintiff could show that the injury was of a different nature than both parties believed when the release was signed.46
Risk Allocated by the Court
Section 154(c) places the risk on a party when the court allocates it there “on the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.”48 This is the residual ground. It applies when neither the contract nor the party's own awareness fixes the risk. The court considers the parties' purposes and draws on its general knowledge of human behavior in bargain transactions, as it does when supplying a term under § 204, and its allocation yields to contrary agreement and to usage.49
The court cannot leave the loss unassigned, because avoiding the contract puts it on one party and enforcing the contract leaves it on the other. When two blameless parties share a mistake, the court must decide which should bear the loss.50 Where neither express words nor common understanding or trade usage dictates the result, it must allocate the risk “in some reasoned way.”51 A party who is an expert on the subject matter of the risk, or who was otherwise in the best position to investigate it, is a natural bearer.52
The Restatement's farm-land example shows the ground at work. A seller who learns after closing that the land holds valuable minerals made a mistake about a basic assumption, since the price assumed the land suited only farming, and the mistake materially affects the exchange. A court will nonetheless ordinarily allocate the risk to the seller, who must perform despite the mistake.53 The result rests on policies of high generality: contracts are generally to be enforced, and land sales are generally to be treated as final. The same policies mean that a contractor who sold fill, and who did not expressly assume the risk of adverse conditions, may still bear the risk of losing expected profits and suffering some out-of-pocket losses if part of the fill lies beneath the water table.54
Expertise explains a further group of results. A dealer decides how much to spend on appraisal, and when the cost of a further step, such as additional personnel, exceeds its expected benefit, the dealer wisely declines to take it. Having made that choice, the dealer cannot call the rare miss a mistake and rescind, because rescission would hand the dealer the proceeds of “misappraisal insurance” without his ever having paid a premium.55 The point carries over to a professional dealer who sells to an ordinary customer: experts dealing with non-experts cannot make “mistakes” as to the intrinsic value of the property being sold.56
The dealer reasoning explains why the outcome in Sherwood v. Walker leaves a reader doubtful. The transaction concerned property the parties had particularized, a cow with a glorious name, and the appraisal of its value was a function of the seller's professional expertise. Those circumstances suggest a misjudgment by the seller more than a mistake.57 Lenawee observed that the risk-of-loss analysis was absent from Sherwood and said that the result might have been different had that inquiry been made.58
Expertise points to one side only when the other side is not an expert. In a New Jersey Supreme Court case between two dealers, a coin later reported to be counterfeit had been bought at a high price on the shared supposition that it was genuine. The court found a mistake on the part of both dealers and allowed rescission.59
Because § 154(c) is open-ended, an answer should reach it last, after confirming that no clause or usage speaks to the risk and that the mistaken party was not consciously ignorant. It should then say why the allocation is reasonable: the party's expertise, its position to investigate, or the general policy that contracts and land sales are final. No neglected legal duty is required, because the text asks only whether the allocation is reasonable in the circumstances.