Concept
Mistake Defined
Mutual mistake
Mutual Mistake
Mistake Defined
In everyday speech, almost any regret is a mistake: the ugly chair, the startup that flopped, the tedious movie that wasted two hours.1 Contract law reads the word more narrowly, as an error of fact.2 Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 151, a mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts.3
The mistake is the belief itself. The Restatement’s comment reserves the word for the erroneous belief and withholds it from the improvident act, such as making the contract, that the belief may have produced.4 The belief need not be articulated: a party who merely assumes a fact, unaware of any alternative, holds a belief about it.5 A buyer who closes on a house without ever asking whether its foundation is sound still believes that it is.
Proving such a belief accomplishes little. Mistake alone has no legal consequences; those come from separate substantive rules, and proof of the mistake is only the first step toward avoiding or reforming a contract.6 The caution has a plain reason. Everyone who breaches a contract, in some sense, made a mistake by entering it, and to let any mistake justify avoidance would effectively eliminate contractual enforcement. Even so, a mistake coupled with other circumstances can sometimes constitute a defense.7
Those other circumstances come from equity. The law of mistake arose in courts of equity at a time when common law courts were disposed to enforce every bargain without regard to its “equities.” Today it forms part of the general law of contracts but is still applied as a matter of equity, so fault, good faith, unconscionability, and general fairness can all bear on the outcome, and each general rule yields to overriding considerations of fairness in the circumstances.8 Mistake can serve either as a defense that avoids the contract or as the basis for revising it.9
Fairness operates against a strong default, however. Parties contract to bind each other despite the myriad changes of circumstance that may occur before performance is due, so the ordinary answer to a party who regrets the deal is no.10 Occasionally a court finds a more particular type of mistake, one that lifts the case above the ordinary run.11 Relief for mistake is the exception, and the rest of this chapter sets out what it takes.
The route to relief runs through § 152. When both parties are mistaken at the time of contracting about a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and the mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the adversely affected party may avoid the contract unless that party bears the risk of the mistake.12 One court applying that rule held that the parties’ shared belief that adequate water lay beneath the property was a basic assumption, and that its falsity had so material an effect on the exchange as to upset the very bases of the contract. The contract was therefore voidable, and the court allowed rescission. It added that the parties’ failure to investigate the water supply thoroughly did not preclude rescission, because the risk of the mistake had not been allocated between them.13
A neighboring doctrine reaches false beliefs by a different road. A party whose assent was induced by a material false representation, on which the party was justified in relying, may rescind even if the representation was innocent; the party need not show fraud or negligence.14 Mutual mistake, the subject of this chapter, asks instead about an erroneous belief that both parties held when they made the contract.15
Two features of the definition decide what counts as a mistake at all. The first is time: the belief must concern facts as they stand when the contract is made, which excludes a forecast that later fails. The second is law: modern cases count a misunderstanding of the law as a mistake, where an older view did not. The next two subsections take them in that order.
Facts, Not Predictions
Section 151 calls a mistake a belief that is not in accord with the facts, and the question is which facts count.16 The Restatement’s comment answers that the erroneous belief must relate to the facts as they exist when the contract is made, and that a party’s prediction or judgment about future events, even if wrong, is not a “mistake” in the Restatement’s sense.17 The court in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc. called that declaration anomalous and unexplained. It preferred the definition to the comment and read the denial of relief for mistakes about future facts as resting on policies of risk allocation rather than on the meaning of “mistake.”18 On either view, a wrong guess about the future ordinarily does not support avoidance.
The reasons are practical. A contract is largely a device for allocating the risks of life’s uncertainties, particularly economic ones, and where parties deliberately and expressly allocate those risks, or enter a contract of a customary kind that by common understanding does so, there is little room for relief from the resulting losses.19 A rule that permitted rescission whenever an expectation about the future proved mistaken would destroy the stability and binding force of many contracts.20 Events that occur after formation, moreover, have doctrines of their own, namely impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose, and the law of mistake does not treat them.21
The working test asks what the belief was about.
One job can carry both kinds of error. A contractor agrees to move a pile of dirt for a set price, believing the pile holds 800 yards. If it holds 1,000 yards, the contractor was mistaken about a fact, though that mistake may or may not suffice to excuse performance. If it holds exactly 800 yards but moving it costs more than the price, there is no mistake of fact; the contractor’s error was one of judgment.22
The sale of a horse for $40,000 packs both kinds of error into one belief. The parties think the horse is sound and can win races. A broken bone in the horse’s leg falsifies the first part of that belief, a mistake of fact. A horse with no broken bones that has run its last good race falsifies only the forecast; that is a mistake of judgment about the horse’s capabilities, or a prediction of what it will do.23
The existing fact need not be known when the contract is made. In Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, the trial court found that, before the property passed to the Messerlys, their predecessor in title had installed a septic tank without a permit and in violation of the health code. The Messerlys used the building as income investment property until 1973, when they sold it on land contract to James Barnes, who likewise used it as an income-producing investment.24 A defect installed before the Messerlys took title was part of the property long before anyone discovered it. By definition, a mistake cannot be discovered until after the contract is executed; parties who knew of the error beforehand would sign with no misapprehension at all. The date on which a mistaken fact manifests itself is therefore irrelevant.25 What matters is when the condition arose, and the rule that admits an unknown present fact excludes a later one.
A belief that sounds like a forecast can still rest on a present fact, and Alcoa shows how. ALCOA and Essex signed a contract intended to bind them for many years, with a price formula tied to the WPI, an index they used because it had reliably corresponded to Alcoa’s costs of production in prior years.26 A few years later, the OPEC oil embargo and the higher cost of producing electricity in compliance with pollution regulations drove electricity prices up steeply. The WPI ceased to be an accurate predictor of Alcoa’s costs, and performance on the original terms would have cost Alcoa about $60 million over the contract term.27 ALCOA claimed a mutual mistake about the index’s suitability. Essex replied that the supposed mistake was no mistake of fact but a failed prediction of future economic conditions.28
The court held the mistake to be one of fact. It acknowledged that the mistake was not wholly isolated from predictions of the future or from painful hindsight, but it found that this was not the legal test: when the parties contracted, they knew the future was unknown, and they meant the contract to bind them for many years.29 The court treated the case as one of mistake because the parties had erroneously assumed, at the time of contracting, that the WPI was an appropriate standard for measuring Alcoa’s future costs.30 Separating fact from opinion, prediction, and desire is principally a matter of common sense rather than of law, and ALCOA and Essex simply disagreed about which label fit.31 The court added that the crucial fact was unknown, and scarcely knowable, when the contract was made, but that this did not alter its status as an existing fact. Relief has been granted both for facts that are unknown but presently knowable, as in Raffles v. Wichelhaus, and for facts that presently exist but are unknowable, as in Sherwood v. Walker.32
Leasco Corp. v. Taussig lies on the other side of the line. The parties fixed the price of a subsidiary by capitalizing its anticipated earnings of $200,000 for the year of sale. Both knew those earnings were volatile, since the civil engineering business was highly technical and extremely risky, yet they made no provision to limit their risk. The projected $200,000 in earnings turned into a $12,000 loss caused by a design error in a construction project, and the court found no mutual mistake: both parties may have hoped, but could not have been certain, that the subsidiary would earn $200,000.33 The Alcoa court read that decision as resting on two legs, the absence of a mistake of fact and the assumption of the risk of future uncertainties, and it called the decision plainly correct. The parties had bottomed their agreement on a naked prediction without conditions or limitations, and the disappointed purchaser could point to no fact existing at contracting that would justify relief.34
The two cases differ in what the error concerned. In Alcoa the error was whether the index the parties chose could do its job. In Leasco the error was the projection itself, and the parties had set no limits on their risk. Any belief that looks like a forecast therefore calls for two questions. Does it concern a condition, capacity, or quality that was already true or false when the parties contracted? If it does not, did the parties take the future uncertainty on themselves? The second question belongs to risk allocation, which later parts of this chapter address.
The existing-fact requirement also marks the border between mistake and the doctrines that excuse performance because of later events. Mutual mistake deals with a mistake as to a vital existing fact, while frustration and impracticability ordinarily relate to future events.35 A cabin on the shore shows where the line falls. Suppose a tidal wave sweeps the cabin into the sea a few hours before the contract is executed, and neither party knows. They are mutually mistaken that the cabin exists. If the wave strikes after the contract is made but before delivery, no one erred about the cabin’s existence at contracting, and the issue becomes whether that supervening event excuses the seller’s failure to deliver.36
The doctrines overlap, and the same facts can sometimes be framed either way. The Alcoa court treated its case as one of mistake, yet it discussed impracticability as an alternative basis for relief, because the oil embargo and the tougher environmental regulations were supervening events that overturned a basic assumption of the contract.37 Where no event has occurred and the parties simply discover facts that existed at formation and make performance impracticable, mistake is the defense to analyze, although some cases and the Restatement (Second) let the party assert either defense. Because the elements are sufficiently similar, the same result should be reached whichever analysis is used.38
Mistakes of Law
The common law once presumed that everyone knows the law, a notion that may have suited an age of simpler statutes.40 Modern cases treat a mistaken understanding of the law as analogous to a mistake of fact, so that the error can support relief if the other requirements are met.41 The analogy is needed because a legal error is not, strictly, an error about the facts that § 151 describes.42 It also reflects how bargains work. A buyer who pays for a building because the zoning permits a particular business depends on the ordinance as surely as on the roof.
Eligibility is not entitlement. Treating a legal error like a factual one gets the claim past the definition and no further. The party must still satisfy the voidability rule: a shared mistake about a basic assumption, with a material effect on the agreed exchange, and no risk of the mistake borne by the adversely affected party.43 The risk question has rules of its own, and a court may allocate the risk to a party on the ground that doing so is reasonable in the circumstances.44 The next part of this chapter develops those rules; for the doctrine in litigated form, see Krantz v. University of Kansas.