Concept
Defining Undue Influence
Undue influence
Defining Undue Influence
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177(1) defines undue influence as “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.”1 One phrase, unfair persuasion, carries the doctrine, and two alternative descriptions of the person persuaded complete it. That person is either under the persuader’s domination or, by virtue of the relationship, justified in assuming that the persuader will not act against his welfare. Because the clauses are joined by “or,” a claimant may enter through either door.
Courts of equity built the doctrine for cases in which duress was absent but one party held a particularly strong influence over the other and abused that dominant position to win a disadvantageous contract.2 Duress relieves a party whose assent an unlawful threat induced; undue influence addresses abuse of trust.3 Most jurisdictions have kept the doctrine within those confines. It does not redress unfair persuasion in arm’s-length transactions, where expanded duress and unconscionability already regulate bargaining.4 The definition therefore sends a court first to the relationship or the weakness, since those facts separate unfair persuasion from ordinary salesmanship.
The cases sort into two classes that track the two clauses. In one, the persuader dominates the victim. In the other, the persuader uses a position of trust and confidence, rather than dominance, to persuade unfairly.5 The classes overlap whenever a person dominates by virtue of the trust the relationship engenders, and the rules stay elusive.6 Courts often state the claim as three elements: a relationship of trust and dependency, dominance arising from that relationship, and abuse of the dominant position by unfairly persuading the victim into a contract adverse to the victim’s interests.7
Proof of those elements makes the contract voidable at the victim’s election.8 A deed procured by undue influence, for example, is voidable whether the grantee or someone else exerted the influence.9 The next section develops that consequence. This section defines the wrong, taking up domination, trust and confidence, and unfair persuasion in turn.
Domination and Susceptibility
The first clause of § 177(1) reaches persuasion of a party who is under the persuader’s domination.10 Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District shows what that means in practice. A teacher alleged that, soon after his arrest, questioning, booking, and release on bail, and with almost no sleep, he was visited at his apartment by the school superintendent and his principal. They urged him to resign at once, told him there was no time to consult an attorney, and warned that otherwise he would be suspended, dismissed, and publicized. He signed a resignation. The court found the allegations insufficient for duress, menace, fraud, or mistake but sufficient for undue influence.11
Domination has two ingredients, and the first is susceptibility in the person persuaded. As Keithley v. Civil Service Board notes, California Civil Code § 1575 defines undue influence in part as “taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind” or “taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another’s necessities or distress.”12 Weakness can come from illness, advanced age, immaturity, a spouse’s recent death, excessive use of alcohol or drugs, or any circumstance that tends to deprive a person of the ability to make sound decisions.13 Physical or emotional exhaustion or anguish counts as well when it leaves a person unable to act with unencumbered volition.14
The weakness need not be total. Odorizzi describes a descending scale: a complete want of understanding, a lesser weakness that destroys the capacity to contract, and a lesser weakness still that suffices for undue influence, namely a lessened capacity to make a free contract, whether from age, physical condition, emotional anguish, or a combination. That last weakness need be neither long-lasting nor wholly incapacitating.15 The scale shows where the doctrine sits. A party who still understands the transaction may fail an incapacity defense yet be too depleted to resist someone who presses.
The second ingredient is excessive pressure by the persuader. Ordinary persuasion, even skilled persuasion, does not qualify, because undue influence cannot serve as a pretext to avoid bad bargains. A woman who buys a dress on impulse cannot undo the sale because the saleswoman used all her wiles, and a man who buys desert land that the seller glowingly described as lying in the path of the city’s growth cannot rescind when the growth never comes.16 To locate the line, Odorizzi describes a pattern that usually involves several of the following elements. When a number are present together, the persuasion may be characterized as excessive:17
- The transaction is discussed at an unusual or inappropriate time.
- The transaction is completed in an unusual place.
- The persuader insists that the business be finished at once.
- The persuader stresses the consequences of delay.
- Several persuaders work on a single person.
- The person persuaded has no third-party advisers.
- The persuaders say there is no time to consult a financial adviser or attorney.
The teacher’s allegations touch most of the list: an unusual time, his apartment as the place, two officials against one man, a demand to resign at once, threats of what delay would bring, and a warning that there was no time to call a lawyer. The list guides; it does not bind. Direct evidence of undue influence is rarely obtainable, so courts reason from the totality of the facts and circumstances. No fixed definition or inflexible formula applies. The question is whether the whole context shows that a person’s will was overborne and that he was induced to do, or to forbear, an act he would not do, or would do, if left to act freely.18
The two ingredients work only together. When susceptibility meets excessive pressure, the weaker person’s apparent will becomes in fact the will of the dominant one.19 Either ingredient alone would sweep too widely. If weakness sufficed, every bargain with a tired, grieving, or elderly person would be open to attack. If pressure sufficed, ordinary salesmanship would become grounds for rescission.
Susceptibility and pressure need not arrive in a single evening. In Howe v. Palmer, a jury found that a 2000 deed from Howe to the Palmers was the product of undue influence.20 Courts recognize that undue influence often works in veiled and secret ways, and that the power of a strong will over an irresolute character, or one weakened by disease, overindulgence, or age, may be manifest although not shown by gross or palpable instrumentalities.21 The weakness may be lasting, as with age or disease, or passing, as with exhaustion, and, as noted, direct proof of the pressure is rare.
Odorizzi did not turn on a formal tie between the teacher and the officials. Most reported undue influence cases do involve parties in a confidential relationship, but one need not be present when the persuader takes unfair advantage of another’s weakness or distress.22 The doctrine guards against a mismatch between a weakened person and the pressure applied. A label such as fiduciary or confidant neither creates nor cures that mismatch.
Trust and Confidence
The second clause of § 177(1) turns from the weakened victim to the trusting one. It reaches a party who, by virtue of the relation between the parties, is justified in assuming that the persuader will not act inconsistently with that party’s welfare.24 This victim may be fully capable and under no siege. The relationship has simply invited the victim to relax the vigilance a stranger would meet, and the persuader has used that reliance to obtain a deal that favors the persuader.
The pivotal word is justified. The doctrine protects trust that the relationship itself makes reasonable, so the victim’s private feeling of confidence settles nothing. Two groups of relationships qualify, those the law treats as fiduciary and those that become confidential in fact. Some ordinary dealings fall outside both.
Lawyer and client, and trustee and beneficiary, are the historic fiduciary relationships.25 Lists of confidential relationships add guardian and ward, administrator and legatee, physician and patient, parent and child, husband and wife, caretaker and elderly person, and pastor and parishioner.26 A fiduciary who bargains with the person who depends on that loyalty takes a one-way risk, and good motives are no defense. A lawyer who buys a farm from an estate the lawyer represents bears the loss if the farm falls in value and risks having the sale set aside if it rises.27
A fiduciary duty follows the client into dealings unrelated to the work. Suppose a lawyer who represents a builder in unrelated litigation signs a building contract with the builder. The lawyer’s fiduciary duty still requires the lawyer to safeguard the builder’s interests, so any term that is unfair to the builder and not in the builder’s best interests is presumed to be the product of undue influence and is avoidable by the builder.28 The builder’s reliance on the lawyer does not switch off when the subject changes.
Formal status is not required. A confidential relationship may exist whenever a person with justification places trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of another.29 It is not restricted to any specific association; it exists whenever the relative position of the parties gives one the power and means to take advantage of or exert undue influence over the other.30 An aunt who has often given her nephew financial advice can occupy that position, and a fiduciary relationship may be found whenever one party has reasonably accorded trust and confidence to another and relies on that person’s judgment.31 The other party must accept and foster the reliance.32 In one decision, a daughter-in-law who had long relied on her father-in-law’s advice signed a deed, which he had prepared, to her interest in a fourplex. The court found a confidential relationship because he had gained her confidence and purported to advise her with her interest in mind.33 He held no office or title. She relied on him, and he was placed to exploit that reliance.
The limits matter as much as the examples. The teacher in Odorizzi alleged a confidential relationship with the officials who obtained his resignation, and the court rejected the allegation. No presumption of a confidential relationship arises from the bare fact that parties are employer and employee, and the absence is clearest when they negotiate the end of their relationship, because each side is then expected to look after its own interests.34 His claim survived on the domination route, so the two clauses are independent doorways. Friendship alone fails as well. Mere friendship is not enough to establish a fiduciary relationship, and in Arko v. Cirou a lender’s close personal relationship with the borrowers did not create a confidential relationship.35
Both retirees were friends of the buyer, but only the second seller had reason to assume that the buyer was watching the seller’s interests in this very deal, because the buyer had accepted the role of manager of the seller’s affairs. That relationship carries the second seller through the second doorway and no further. The seller must still show that the buyer abused the position by unfair persuasion, although where dependency is intense and the terms plainly one-sided, unfairness may be inferred from those facts alone.36
Proof of a confidential relationship also does a second job. When the relationship is shown and the transaction benefits the person in whom trust is reposed, the burden shifts to that person to show that the transaction was not procured by undue influence, sometimes by clear and convincing evidence.37 The later section on proof develops that presumption. For now, the relationship opens the second route, and the shift in burden is a rule of proof that operates afterward.
Unfair Persuasion
Section 177(1) makes the persuasion itself the wrong, but only when it is unfair.39 Every negotiation persuades, so the qualifier must separate the pressure the law tolerates from the pressure it will undo. Odorizzi draws that line by contrast. Undue influence is persuasion that tends to be coercive, persuasion that overcomes the will without convincing the judgment, and its hallmark is high pressure that works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness until it approaches the boundaries of coercion.40 Courts therefore call it overpersuasion, a label Odorizzi supports with a citation to Kelly.41 A legal dictionary defines unfair persuasion in similar terms: a stronger party achieves a result by means that seriously impair the weaker party’s free and competent exercise of judgment, with the unavailability of independent advice and the susceptibility of the person persuaded as the two primary factors.42
A persuader who convinces the judgment supplies reasons, and the other party then decides, wisely or not. The law tolerates that persuasion because every bargain invites second thoughts, and undue influence cannot serve as a pretext to escape a bargain that has disappointed.43 A person temporarily persuaded against better judgment must abide the risks inherent in managing his own affairs.44 Skill and enthusiasm in selling are ordinary parts of bargaining, so the inquiry looks to how the persuasion was carried out.
The seven markers listed in the previous subsection describe how overpersuasion is carried out.45 Read by function, they fall into three groups, each stripping away a different protection that ordinarily lets a person resist.
The first two, discussion at an unusual or inappropriate time and completion in an unusual place, remove the settings in which people ordinarily deal with care. In Moore v. Moore, four members of a husband’s family approached his pregnant widow within days of his funeral and persuaded her to deed her entire interest in his estate to his children by a prior marriage. The court observed that it was the second day after her husband’s funeral, a time when she would naturally feel averse to transacting any business.46
The next two, an insistent demand that the business be finished at once and extreme emphasis on the consequences of delay, remove time, which reflection requires. Urgency can be honest, so the question is whether it left the person room to think. In Weger v. Rocha, an injured woman in a hospital bed was pressed in a long interview to release her injury claims for a small sum. She signed to end the interview, and the court held the release procured by undue influence.47
The last three, several persuaders against one person, no third-party advisers, and statements that there is no time to consult a lawyer or financial adviser, remove support. The ordinary cure for pressure is a second opinion, and these markers cut it off. In Fyan v. McNutt, a broker came to a homeowner’s house late at night with several companions and pressed her to sign a commission agreement on the spot, telling her there was no time to wait for outside advice.48 The court held the agreement invalid, pointing to the hour, her plea for time to consider, the urgency pressed on her, and the presence of the others.49 Fyan shows the pattern near full strength. Because courts read the markers inside the total context, missing markers do not defeat a claim and present markers do not decide it alone.
Courts weigh other factors too. In Gengaro v. City of New Haven, the court listed the age and physical and mental condition of the person allegedly influenced, whether he had independent or disinterested advice, the consideration or its inadequacy, his necessities and distress, his predisposition to make the transfer, the extent of the transfer in relation to his whole worth, active solicitation and persuasion by the other party, and the relationship of the parties.50
Unfair persuasion is an elastic concept. When the relationship of dependency is strong and the resulting contract is clearly disadvantageous, unfairness may be inferred from those facts alone. When the dependency is less intense or the terms are not patently unfair, evidence of improper bargaining or oppressive circumstances may be needed, such as high-pressure tactics, failure to disclose information, concealment of self-interest, failure to protect the weaker party’s interests, or discouraging recourse to other advisers.51 Courts also look to the result. The foremost indicator of undue influence is an unnatural transaction that enriches one party at the other’s expense.52
Unfair persuasion is thus a judgment about manner, measured by the pattern of pressure, the circumstances in which it was applied, and the result it produced. Establishing it shows what the persuader did. Whether that conduct produced the victim’s assent is the question of the next section.