Concept
Duress by a Third Person
Duress
Duress by a Third Person
Section 175(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes a contract voidable when an improper threat by the other party leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.1 Section 175(2) covers the case in which someone else applies the pressure: if a party's manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim, unless the other party to the transaction, in good faith and without reason to know of the duress, either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.2
The earlier parts of this chapter assumed that the counterparty was the source of the pressure, but fear travels by other routes. An employer, a relative, or a stranger can bring the same pressure to bear on a signer, and the resulting contract may be one the counterparty had no part in coercing.
Two interests collide in that setting. An apparent manifestation of assent may be defeated if coercion that constitutes duress obtained it, and the victim's assent is as badly compromised when a stranger applied the coercion as when the counterparty did.3 Contract law, however, also protects the reliance of the other party. If no one could depend on words or conduct that signal assent, commercial exchange would lose its footing, so a person must generally answer for behavior that signifies assent.4 A counterparty who knew nothing of the coercion may have paid for the bargain or rearranged its affairs around it, and avoidance would make that innocent party absorb the cost of someone else's wrong. Section 175(2) resolves the collision with a default that favors the victim and an exception that protects the counterparty who is both innocent and invested.
Threats by Nonparties
The default favors the victim. A signer who gives in to fear for a job or a relative has had the signer's judgment overborne whether the counterparty or a stranger applied the pressure, so the threatener's identity does not cure the defect in assent. The victim therefore keeps the power to avoid even though the threatener never signed the contract, took nothing under it, and may be a stranger to everyone in the deal. The section changes who may apply the pressure and leaves untouched what the pressure must be: an improper threat of sufficient gravity to induce the victim's assent.5
A standard illustration shows the default at work. E settles his tort claim against T after an improper threat by Acme, and Acme's wrongful conduct may permit E to obtain rescission of the settlement agreement and pursue his tort claim against T.6 Suppose Acme, E's employer, had threatened to fire him unless he settled. The settlement is a contract between E and T (or T's insurance carrier), so Acme is a nonparty to it. The threat can still support duress. Many cases now hold that an employer may not discharge an at-will employee for improper reasons, so a threat to discharge unless the employee agrees to a transaction unconnected with the job is very possibly a threat of a wrongful breach of contract and in some circumstances a tort.7
What the other side knew decides how hard E's case is. The result is easier to reach if T or T's insurance carrier was aware of Acme's threat, because a party with reason to know of the duress cannot claim the protection the exception reserves for the innocent. Even a party with no reason to know is not automatically safe: authority lets the victim avoid the transaction unless that party has materially relied on it or partly performed.8
The default also has an outer boundary, because it presupposes a threat. In Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, an estate sought to recover from a museum a painting that Jewish owners had sold in 1938, and it claimed the sale was made under duress.9 The court rejected the claim. The owners sold under the severest of circumstances and had no reasonable alternative but to sell at a sacrifice price, yet Nazi persecution created those circumstances and the buyers made no wrongful threat. The economic need to sell, even need created by extreme and horrific events, was not duress.10
Commentary treats Zuckerman as an application of the principle that, when a nonparty makes the threat, the victim cannot normally avoid the contract unless the other party is implicated in the threat or knowingly took advantage of it, because outside pressure should not readily defeat the legitimate expectations of an innocent party who relied in good faith and without knowledge of the threat.11 That formulation frames the question mainly through the counterparty's innocence, while § 175(2) adds a second requirement of value or material reliance. On an exam, apply the section's two layers and read the commentary as confirming that an innocent counterparty who relied is safe.
The contrast between Acme and Zuckerman fixes the order of inquiry. In Acme's case someone demanded a particular agreement and attached a harm to refusing it. In Zuckerman, dire circumstances created the need to sell, and no wrongful threat of the buyers produced it. The counterparty's protection becomes relevant only after the victim establishes duress, meaning an improper threat that induced the assent and left no reasonable alternative.
Protected Innocent Counterparties
The exception takes back part of what the default gives the victim. A nonparty's duress makes the contract voidable unless the other party to the transaction, in good faith and without reason to know of the duress, either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.14 The clause stacks two layers. The first concerns the counterparty's state of mind: it must have acted in good faith and without reason to know that the victim was being coerced. The second concerns what the counterparty has put into the deal: it must have given value or relied materially. Both layers are required. A counterparty that paid in full but had reason to know of the threat is unprotected, and so is an innocent counterparty that has given nothing and changed nothing.
Each layer answers a different question. The innocence layer asks whether the counterparty is the kind of party the law wants to shield. It did not commit the wrong, and a rule that let any outsider's pressure undo any deal would expose every counterparty to threats it never heard of, which would erode the confidence in commercial exchange that the protection of reliance exists to preserve.15 The parties who fail this layer are those who stand close to the threat. A counterparty implicated in the threat, or one that knowingly took advantage of it, cannot claim the legitimate expectations the exception protects.16 The phrase reason to know also reaches past actual knowledge, since a party that knows or has reason to know that the other was induced by a third person's duress is exposed to avoidance.17
The value-or-reliance layer asks whether the counterparty has anything that needs protecting. A counterparty that has given nothing and relied on nothing loses nothing when the contract is avoided, because avoidance returns it to where it stood before the deal. The only interest left to weigh is then the victim's, whose will was overborne, and the victim prevails. Value and material reliance are alternatives, so either satisfies the layer, and the authority described above treats partial performance as enough as well.18
Gascho v. Scheurer Hospital shows the innocence layer protecting a counterparty. Gascho's second ground of duress was that her husband had intimidated her into entering the agreement through abuse and threats. The court recognized that such threats could amount to duress. But the hospital had not made them, had dealt fairly with Gascho in relation to the settlement, and could not be held accountable for them.19 An innocent counterparty that took no part in a nonparty's threat is exactly the party the exception protects.
The husband was the hospital's CEO, yet the court treated him as acting independently of his role as CEO and not as the hospital's agent, so his threats were not imputed to it.20 Imputation matters because an organization can act only through people. A threat by someone acting as the counterparty's agent is the counterparty's own threat, which puts the case under § 175(1) and outside the exception altogether.21 A claimant dealing with an organization therefore has to ask in what capacity the threatener acted before deciding which subsection governs, because the title on the threatener's door settles nothing.
The two buyers are equally innocent, and the deposit and the slip rental are what separate them. Material reliance gives Buyer One a loss that avoidance would shift onto an innocent party, while Buyer Two has no such loss to protect. Stopping at 'a nonparty threatened, so the contract is voidable' skips the exception, and stopping at 'the buyer is innocent, so the contract is enforceable' skips its second layer.