Concept
Duress by Improper Threat
Duress
Duress by Improper Threat
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1), a contract is voidable by the victim when the victim's manifestation of assent was induced by an improper threat from the other party that left the victim no reasonable alternative.1 The rule sets three requirements: the other party must make a threat, the threat must be improper, and it must induce the apparent assent by leaving the victim no reasonable alternative but to agree.2 The subsections below take up the threat, the inducement, and the alternatives requirement. The next two sections ask what makes a threat improper. The simplest answer is a threat to commit a crime or a tort,3 and the sections that follow map the rest.
A victim who yields to a threat still makes a choice, so the contract is voidable at the victim's election. It is not void, as it would be under physical compulsion.
The defense has widened over time. Courts gradually broadened the threats that support it, first to threats against a person's property, known as “duress of goods,” and later to “economic duress.”4 Today the general rule is that any wrongful act or threat that overcomes a party's free will constitutes duress. That simple statement conceals three questions: what “free will” means, what makes a threat “wrongful,” and whether the test is objective or subjective.5
The defense rests on a simple idea. A victim should not be held to apparent assent that was not genuine because an illegitimate threat of harm improperly induced it, and the party who made the threat has no compelling reliance interest worth protecting.6 The assent need not be fake to fail this test. Parents who pay a kidnapper to save their daughter give the most genuine, heartfelt consent. The defect is that society brands the coercion wrongful, so the law does not presume the consent to be the product of free will.7
The Threat Requirement
Every duress claim starts with a threat, and the threat must come from the other party to the transaction.8 The law defines a threat broadly: an indication of intent to do something, or to refrain from doing something, so as to inflict harm, loss, injury, or other undesirable consequences on the victim's person or on the victim's personal or economic interests.9 The definition covers explicit intimidation and subtle or even unspoken threats alike, and the threatened step may be an act or an omission.10 At this stage the court asks only whether the other side communicated an intent to cause harm. Whether the threat is wrongful is a separate question, taken up in the sections on improper threats, and a sound analysis keeps the two apart.
A threat may be expressed in words or inferred from words or other conduct, and past events often import a threat.11 The court decides whether an implied threat exists by interpretation, as it does elsewhere in contract law. It examines the transaction in context and asks whether one party's words or actions showed a reasonable intent to threaten, reasonably understood that way by the other.12 Suppose an employer admires an antique clock in the home of his employee's mother and offers $500 for it. When she refuses, he remarks on how much her reconsidering could help her son's job. He has said nothing explicit about firing anyone, yet in that setting the remark carries an implied threat to the son's employment, and the sale that follows may be voidable.13
The harm threatened may fall on the victim, on the victim's family, or on the victim's property.14 It need not fall on the person who assents. In the Restatement's illustration, A threatens to kill C, an employee of B, unless B contracts to sell A a tract of land. B, with no reasonable alternative, makes the contract. The threatened act is both a crime and a tort, and the contract is voidable by B.15
The harder line to draw separates a threat from bad circumstances. A party cornered by events the other side did not create has no duress claim, even when the other side profits. The mere fact that one party will suffer bad consequences unless the contract is made is not a threat, even if the other party realizes and takes advantage of that vulnerability.16 In Zuckerman v. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Jewish owners sold a painting under the severest of circumstances, which left them no reasonable alternative to a sacrifice sale. Those circumstances came from Nazi persecution, however, not from any wrongful threat by the buyers, and economic need, however horrific its source, did not constitute duress.17 The case shows that the absence of a reasonable alternative cannot stand in for a threat. The two requirements are separate, and the second does not supply the first.
A lender that insists on its own terms has likewise made no threat. Imagine the owner of a failing business who urgently needs funds when no mainstream bank will lend to a business in such bad condition.18 A lender who knows of the owner's plight and demands harsh terms has taken advantage of it. In a loose sense, the lender threatened not to lend unless the borrower agreed. But a threat not to contract except on nonnegotiable terms, which is often implicit in contract negotiations, does not qualify as a threat for duress purposes.19
The requirement that the threat come from the other party decided Gascho. Gascho argued that her husband had intimidated her into entering a settlement agreement through abuse and threats. The court recognized that such threats could amount to duress. But the hospital, the other party to the agreement, had not made them, had dealt fairly with her in the settlement, and could not be held accountable for them. Even though the husband was the hospital's CEO, the court treated him as acting independently of that role and not as the hospital's agent, so his threats were not imputed to the hospital.20 The later section on duress by a third person explains when pressure from a nonparty can still undo a contract.
Even a genuine threat is often proper. An auctioneer spends the entire auction threatening everyone in the room that anyone who does not bid quickly will lose the goods to someone else, and no one would call that an improper threat.21 It is likewise not duress to threaten consequences, even dire ones, that may lawfully be pursued without agreement. An employee who has become indispensable may threaten not to renew an employment contract unless the employer agrees to a substantial raise, and a person with a colorable tort claim may threaten to sue unless the tortfeasor settles.22 The threat requirement is therefore only the first filter. It establishes that the other party communicated an intent to cause harm, and the sections on improper threats decide whether that communication is the kind the law condemns.
Inducement of Assent
Duress makes a contract voidable only if the improper threat in fact induced the victim's assent.24 The threat must be a cause of the assent and not merely an event that happened nearby. The question is whether, under all the circumstances, the duress substantially overcame the victim's free will.25 A threat that played no part in the decision left the victim's judgment untouched, and a party who would have signed anyway lost nothing to the threat.
The threat need not be the only reason for assenting. It is enough that it substantially contributed to the victim's decision, and the victim may have had other reasons for agreeing.26 A sole-cause rule would defeat nearly every claim, because people rarely act on a single motive.
The more contested question is whose resolve the inducement test measures. The early books held that there could be no duress unless the threat would put a brave man in fear. A later standard asked whether it would overcome a person of “ordinary firmness.” The modern cases ask whether unlawful threats in fact overcame the will of the person threatened, with age, sex, capacity, the relation of the parties, and all attendant circumstances considered.27 The test has become whether the will of the person induced by the threat was overcome, not that of a reasonably firm person.28 The Restatement completes the shift. It omits any requirement that the threat arouse such fear as precludes free will, or that it induce assent from a brave person or one of ordinary firmness, because such a requirement is vague and impracticable. It is enough that the threat actually induces assent on the part of one who has no reasonable alternative.29 Because the test takes the victim's subjective attributes into account, a bully cannot enforce a bargain merely because the victim is easily intimidated.30
Because the question is whether this victim was moved, the victim's own circumstances enter the analysis. In Holler v. Holler, a wife who was an immigrant with little English, had no means of financial support, was pregnant, and held a visa about to expire signed the prenuptial agreement her husband demanded as a condition of marrying. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that she stated a good claim for duress.31 Each of those facts added to the force the demand exerted on her in particular, and the same demand made of a financially secure spouse with settled immigration status might have moved that spouse far less. Inducement is thus judged not in the abstract but in light of the victim's needs, personality, and circumstances.32
A victim who weighs the options and signs has still been induced. Justice Holmes made the point in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission: it is always in the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils, and the fact that the choice served that interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called.33 A coerced choice is still a choice, which is why duress yields a voidable contract rather than the void result of physical compulsion.
Evidence about what an ordinary person would have feared has not vanished from these cases. It remains relevant as circumstantial evidence of whether this victim's will was in fact overcome.34 A threat that would terrify almost anyone makes the victim's claimed fear more believable, and a threat most people would shrug off invites doubt that it drove the decision. The evidence informs the factfinder's judgment about this victim. It does not set a standard the victim must meet.
Inducement is not purely subjective, however. The objective discipline enters through the requirement that the victim have no reasonable alternative, which applies an objective standard while still taking account of the victim's attributes.35 Vulnerability can make a threat more effective, but it cannot excuse a party who had an obvious way out. The next subsection takes up that requirement.
No Reasonable Alternative
A contract is voidable for duress only if the improper threat leaves the victim no reasonable alternative to assenting.37 The Restatement's commentary draws the corollary: improper threats do not constitute duress if the victim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it.38 A threat can therefore be improper, and can even have induced the assent, and still fail to support the defense. The law asks a further question about what the victim could have done instead of giving in. A victim who could have escaped the harm by a feasible alternative and did not is not the victim duress was built to protect.
This element also restores an objective check. When the coercion is economic pressure rather than a threat of physical injury, courts ask whether the person threatened, facing an “either . . . or,” had some reasonable third alternative, such as a judicial proceeding that could have produced prompt and adequate relief. If so, the case for duress is not made out.39 Economic interests, in other words, receive less protection than interests of personality.
What counts as a reasonable alternative is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of each case. Two kinds of alternatives come up most often.40
- A legal remedy, such as an action for breach of contract, is an alternative when the victim can pursue it and still be protected.
- Another source of goods, services, or funds is an alternative when the threat is to withhold such things and a comparable supplier or lender is available on the market.
Neither counts merely because it exists on paper. The Restatement's commentary calls the standard “a practical one under which account must be taken of the exigencies in which the victim finds himself.”41 An alternative is reasonable only if it is a feasible and practical means of evading the consequences of the threat. One that would be unduly burdensome or risky, or would not likely avoid those consequences, is no alternative at all.42 In one treatise example, a buyer of industrial equipment owes the seller $2 million, invents a defect claim, and offers $1.25 million in full settlement.43 Whether the seller had a reasonable alternative depends on what rejecting the offer would cost that seller.
Decided cases draw the same line for the legal-action alternative. In Uniwill v. City of Los Angeles, a developer alleged that a city and an electric company wrongfully threatened to stop its shopping-mall project unless it granted an easement. It stated a viable economic duress claim because resort to legal proceedings would have led to financial ruin.44 In Dunes Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Country Kitchen International, Inc., the claimant had sophisticated principals and the help of counsel, and the court found no duress because filing a lawsuit was a reasonable alternative to signing the settlement agreement.45 The difference lies in the practicality of suit. For the developer, litigating meant ruin. For the counseled company, it was an available path that went unused.
Delay is the usual reason a legal remedy fails the practical test. An available remedy may be inadequate where the time needed to pursue it would cause immediate and irreparable loss to the victim's economic or business interest.46 In Merry Gentleman, LLC v. George and Leona Productions, Inc., a production company with millions invested in a film settled with its director after the Sundance festival selected the film for screening and required the director, Michael Keaton, to attend. He refused to attend unless his cut of the film was shown, and the company settled with him, releasing its claims against him. The court held that the company had made out a sufficient case of duress to go to trial, because suing him for breach at that stage was the only other course and, given the investment, the opportunity, and the attendance requirement, it was no reasonable alternative.47 A judgment for breach would have arrived after the opportunity had passed.
When the threat is to withhold goods or services unless the other side accepts new terms, Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp. supplies the two-part inquiry: could the victim obtain what was withheld from another source, and was the legal remedy for breach adequate? There a subcontractor threatened to halt deliveries unless the contractor agreed to modified terms. The contractor could not get the materials elsewhere without delay, and without them it would default on its main contract with the government, with grave economic consequences. The court found both suit and substitute purchase inadequate, so the modification was voidable.48 The case returns in the section on coerced contract modifications.
Steps two and three carry most of the weight in the decided cases. Austin Instrument and Merry Gentleman turn on timing, the cash-strapped seller turns on cost, and the counseled claimant in Dunes Hospitality faced neither problem.