Concept
Mental Illness or Defect
Incapacity to contract
Mental Illness or Defect
A contract can satisfy every element of formation and still fail against a party whose mind could not support the bargain. Mental incapacity is a defense of that kind: it concedes a contract that would otherwise be valid and asks whether the party's condition undermines its enforceability.1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists mental illness or defect among the conditions that limit capacity,2 and § 15(1) states the consequence. A person incurs only voidable contractual duties if, by reason of mental illness or defect, one of two situations is present.3
Two phrases in that opening clause organize the section. Voidable means that the contract binds the counterparty while the impaired person holds the choice to undo it or keep it, an election the last subsection develops. By reason of requires a causal link between the condition and the transaction, so a diagnosis alone does not satisfy the rule. The label also separates two groups of people. A person whose property is under guardianship by an adjudication of mental illness or defect has no capacity to incur contractual duties at all.4 This section concerns the person whose impairment no court has adjudicated, whose duties are only voidable.
The qualifying conditions reach well past the “insanity” that the old heading “Contracts of Insane Persons” suggests. A significant number of the cases involve senility, Alzheimer’s disease, intellectual disability, temporary delirium from physical injury, intoxication (which has its own section below), or the side effects of medication.5 Because those conditions differ so widely in cause, severity, and duration, courts test function and not diagnosis. They ask, in general, whether the party understood the nature and consequences of what was happening at the time of the transaction. Critics call that approach unscientific, while other observers credit it with letting courts reach just results.6
Section 15(1) offers two routes to avoidance. The first is traditional: the person was unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction.7 The second reaches a person who may understand the transaction but, by reason of the illness, cannot act reasonably in relation to it, and it adds a requirement that the other party have reason to know of the condition.8 The trend seems to favor the Restatement approach,9 though one authority reports that the second route has not much been followed.10 An answer should therefore name the test the jurisdiction applies.
Two interests pull against each other. The person who cannot guard his own interests needs a way out of an improvident bargain, and the counterparty who dealt fairly and noticed nothing needs some assurance that a completed exchange will hold. The subsections follow the rule’s structure: the first route, the second route, the limit that protects innocent counterparties, the proof of incapacity, and finally who may avoid and what the impaired person still owes.
Cognitive Test
The first route asks one question: could the person understand the deal? Under § 15(1)(a), a person incurs only voidable contractual duties if, by reason of mental illness or defect, he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction.11 Each phrase does work. The inability must arise from the illness or defect, so a diagnosis supplies only the cause. The person must be unable to understand, which describes a limit on capacity and excludes mere carelessness in reading the terms. And the missing understanding is understanding in a reasonable manner of the transaction’s nature and consequences: what the deal is and what it will do to the person who made it.
This route contains no knowledge element. The second route requires that the other party have reason to know of the condition;12 the first says nothing of the kind.13 A person who cannot understand a transaction cannot protect himself against it whether or not the other side noticed, and a rule that conditioned relief on the counterparty’s awareness would leave the best-concealed impairments unprotected. The counterparty’s innocence matters later, through a separate limit on avoidance.
The inquiry is fixed at the moment of contracting. Incapacity generally exists where a party does not understand the nature and consequences of what is happening at the time of the transaction.14 In Krasner v. Berk, the court observed that the formulations of the test it had reviewed do not differ in substance from the Restatement’s statement of this route.15
Krasner shows the test applied to someone whose abilities had eroded unevenly. A neuropsychological test gave the defendant, a physician with presenile dementia, a verbal IQ of 116, which is above average, and a performance IQ of 76, which is very dangerously low. The results indicated that he was unable to reason, unable to form proper judgment, and unable to learn new material.16 The examiner expected him to function adequately in situations he knew thoroughly, where success depended on reinstating earlier learned material, and to do very poorly where a situation demanded new learning, independent judgment, or any genuine adaptation.17 Within two weeks after he signed the agreement he consulted a doctor who specialized in brain disease about giving up his practice, and within six months that doctor advised him to give it up. The court called the agreement an improvident one for a doctor about to consider that question and held that the trial judge could find him not competent to make it.18 The court therefore held that the evidence warranted a finding that he did not understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction.19 The lesson is that capacity can be uneven: a person who speaks well and handles familiar tasks may still be unable to evaluate a new commitment, and a result that serves none of his evident interests supports the inference.
Farnum v. Silvano shows why awareness that a transaction is happening falls short. At the closing the seller was, in the trial judge’s words, “aware of what was going on”: she was cheerful, engaged in pleasantries, and made instant coffee for those present, yet afterward she insisted to her sister and nephew that she still owned the property.20 The court explained that competence to contract presupposes something more than a transient surge of lucidity. It involves not merely comprehension of what is going on but an ability to comprehend the nature and quality of the transaction, together with an understanding of its significance and consequences.21 The court ultimately rested voidability on the second route, which the next subsection takes up,22 but its description of what the first route demands is exact.
An unwise bargain is not itself incapacity. The first route asks about inability to understand, and a person of limited education or poor business judgment can fully understand a sale that turns out badly. A lopsided exchange does count as circumstantial evidence of incapacity,23 and courts lean toward finding capacity when a contract is fair and beneficial to the party and incapacity when it is not. That tendency must not be confused with doctrine, however, and there must still be some arguable basis for a finding of incompetence.24
The fourth step decides most cases. A person who understood the transaction but could not act reasonably in relation to it fails this route and moves to the second.
Volitional Test
The second route covers a person who may understand the transaction and still cannot manage it. Under § 15(1)(b), a person incurs only voidable contractual duties if, by reason of mental illness or defect, he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.26 Courts call this the volitional or affective test, because competence can be lost through affective disorders that reach motivation and the exercise of will as well as through cognitive disorders.27 The idea is a person who has the requisite understanding but enters a contract under a mental compulsion, bipolar disorder for example.28 Oregon reached that result in Gore v. Gadd, reasoning that a manic-depressive psychotic, although aware of the nature and consequences of his conduct, may be incompetent because the illness impels him to act irrationally and leaves him incapable of making a rational judgment in executing the transaction.29
The route makes avoidance easier because it reaches persons who understand what they are doing but cannot control their behavior in a rational manner. It has not much been followed.30 In a jurisdiction that applies only the cognitive test, the claim fails if the person understood the transaction. In Proctor v. Classic Automotive, Inc., an Alabama court refused to let a lessee with bipolar disorder avoid a car lease despite impulsive and irrational behavior, because she understood that she was leasing a car.
The route has two elements, and the second does the limiting work. The first element, inability to act reasonably, describes the harm the route exists to remedy: a choice driven by illness that serves none of the person’s own interests. The second element, reason to know, ties relief to what the counterparty could perceive. A person whose understanding is intact may look and sound entirely competent, and without a knowledge requirement any contract signed by someone later shown to have a mood or thought disorder could be undone. No one could then rely on the apparent rationality of the person across the table.
The New York decision in Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board, which Farnum follows, anchors the route. A woman of sixty, under psychiatric care and ill with cerebral arteriosclerosis, selected a “no option” retirement even though she had always shown concern for her family. The court said the choice was so unwise and foolhardy that a factfinder might conclude it was explainable only as a product of psychosis, and it treated as a major factor that the retirement board was, or should have been, fully aware of her condition.31 The same court cautioned that nothing less serious than medically classified psychosis should suffice, since otherwise few contracts would be invulnerable to some kind of psychological attack.32
Farnum shows the second element deciding a case on different facts. The court held the deed voidable and called the decisive factor the buyer’s awareness of the seller’s inability to act reasonably.33 He knew or had reason to know of her impaired condition from conduct that concerned her relatives, her neighbors, and her physician. He knew he was paying about half the house’s value, and her nephew had warned him about both the unfairness of the deal and her mental disability.34 The court also found the result irrational on its face: she faced growing cash demands for her maintenance, and it was not rational in her circumstances to part with a major asset for a cut-rate price.35 Knowledge reached the counterparty in different ways in the two cases: through an institution’s own awareness in Ortelere and through a buyer’s observation and a family member’s warning in Farnum.
The resort never had the chance the Ortelere board had to learn of the condition or the chance the Farnum buyer had to observe it. A web form transmits a name and a card number and nothing else.
The fourth step is where most failing claims are lost, as the resort booking shows. The third is where most claims are won or lost on the facts, because courts infer the inability to act reasonably from a choice that serves none of the person’s evident interests.
Protection for Innocent Counterparties
Section 15(2) trims the power that the first two routes create. Where the contract is made on fair terms and the other party is without knowledge of the mental illness or defect, the power of avoidance terminates to the extent that the contract has been performed in whole or in part, or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be unjust, and a court may then grant relief as justice requires.37 The rule has two conditions and two triggers. The conditions identify a counterparty who deserves protection, and the triggers say when protection takes effect. The triggers matter only after both conditions are met.
Fairness drives the rule. The Restatement recognizes that unfairness might arise if the other party in fact did not know of the mental illness,38 and the first route, which has no knowledge element, makes the danger real. A buyer who dealt fairly with someone whose condition showed nothing at the counter would otherwise absorb the whole loss from an impairment it could neither detect nor prevent. Contract law protects reliance elsewhere in the same spirit. A court reasoned that a general contractor who built its own bid on a subcontractor’s offer had bound itself to perform in reliance on the subcontractor’s terms, and that the subcontractor, which made the offer for a purpose, was bound to realize the substantial possibility that its bid would be used.39
The two conditions guard against different failures. Fair terms looks at the deal: a lopsided exchange suggests that the impairment cost the person something, and a counterparty who profited from one has little claim to protection. Lack of knowledge looks at the counterparty: someone who knew of the illness cannot call later reliance innocent. Each condition is necessary and neither suffices alone, so a fair deal made with knowledge and an unfair deal made in ignorance both leave the power of avoidance intact.
Once both conditions are met, the power ends through either of two developments. The first is performance, in whole or in part. The second is a change in circumstances, such as the counterparty’s repair or resale of what it received, that would make undoing the deal unjust. The words to the extent make the cutoff proportional, so a wholly executory contract presents neither development. When performance makes a clean return to the starting position impossible, the court faces no all-or-nothing choice, because it may craft a remedy as justice requires.40
Farnum shows the limit unavailable. The price was about half the house’s value, and the buyer had been warned about the seller’s disability, so neither condition held and nothing cut off her power to avoid.41 The limit does the most work under the first route. The second route already makes the counterparty’s notice an element of avoidance, while the first has no such element, and § 15(2) supplies the check. An answer that finds incapacity under the first route and stops at “voidable” has skipped the step that can change the outcome.
Innocence is no shield against an adjudicated ward. Guardianship proceedings are treated as public notice of the ward’s incapacity and fix the ward’s status even though the other party to a particular transaction may have had no knowledge or reason to know of the guardianship.42 One court denied restitution to Kenai Chrysler because it had constructive notice of the ward’s incapacity.43
The limit also separates the impaired adult from the minor. A minor’s protection rests on the objective fact of age, so it does not matter that the contract was on fair terms or that the other party did not exploit the minor.44 For the impaired adult, fair terms and the counterparty’s ignorance are exactly what limit the power to avoid. The difference makes sense because age is a fact a party can check before dealing, while a mental condition often shows nothing at all.
The second and third steps decide most problems. A stem that gives a fair price and a counterparty who noticed nothing signals the limit, and a stem that adds a family warning or a bargain far below value signals its absence.
Proving Incapacity
Section 15(1) says what must be true for a contract to be voidable; it does not say how to prove it.46 Four questions of proof recur: who carries the burden, which moment matters, what kind of evidence suffices, and how the claim relates to fraud and undue influence. Incapacity is a defense that rebuts a prima facie case already made, so the party who raises it carries the burden of proving that the person was incapacitated at the time of the transaction.47 Capacity is presumed, as the opening sections of this chapter explained. The burden is demanding. In Rawlings v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., proof that the decedent was an alcoholic with depression and dementia did not show that she lacked capacity to understand the consequences or act reasonably when the transaction occurred.
The inquiry looks to the party’s understanding or conduct at the time of the disputed transaction.48 A diagnosis, a nursing-home address, or a history of confusion is therefore background, and the proof must still connect the condition to the act of signing. The same anchor explains why the illness need not be lasting. The recognized conditions include temporary delirium from physical injury and the side effects of medication,49 so a short episode can qualify if the evidence ties it to the transaction. Duration retains evidentiary value, since a condition shown to have developed over years makes impairment on a given day more probable. The neurologist in Krasner testified that the defendant’s dementia had been developing slowly for years and was permanent.50
Courts cannot observe a mind directly, so they infer its condition from conduct, records, and results. Incompetency may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including disparity in the value of what the parties exchanged.51 Courts lean toward finding capacity when a contract is fair and beneficial to the party and incapacity when it is not, but a tendency is not doctrine, and there must still be some arguable basis for the finding.52 Context matters too. Contract law centers on commercial exchanges, yet an enormous number of cases arise in family and social settings. There, as in undue-influence cases, an unnatural transaction that enriches the competent party at the alleged incompetent’s expense is a sign that the transaction is voidable, and courts scrutinize the parties’ past relationship to decide whether it was unnatural.53 In Farnum the buyer was not a relative or a long-term caregiver, and the seller had no lawyer who knew her and considered her overall interests. The lawyer the buyer secured and paid had the mission of effecting the transaction.54
Expert evidence carries weight where it maps onto the transaction. The Krasner testing showed an inability to handle new learning and independent judgment, which is what a commitment extending into an uncertain future required.55 In Farnum, a mental disease that had shown itself in erratic and irrational conduct was confirmed by diagnostic testing, the seller’s physician did not think she was competent to live alone, and her deficits grew so grave soon after the sale that she had to be hospitalized.56
One state court goes further and requires it. In Sparrow v. Demonico, a party claimed a mental breakdown at a mediation that produced a settlement. The Massachusetts court held that incapacity need not rest on a long-standing, permanent, or progressive illness, but that without medical or expert evidence that the condition interfered with the person’s understanding of the transaction or ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence cannot support a finding of incapacity. A lay witness may describe a person’s appearance and conduct but is not competent to give an opinion about a mental condition. The requirement is that court’s holding, not the Restatement’s text, so an answer should present it as such and note that other courts may differ.
A claim that falls short of incapacity may still survive in another form. Fraud, duress, and undue influence ask what the other party did to obtain the signature, while incapacity asks about the person’s condition at the moment of signing. A weakened mental state that does not amount to incapacity can still help show that the other party took advantage through misrepresentation, imposition, or undue influence, because a person of diminished understanding is easier to mislead or pressure. Sparrow recognized that point, though the evidence there did not support such a claim.
Avoidance and Necessaries
A person who enters a transaction by reason of mental illness or defect incurs only voidable duties when either route of § 15(1) is satisfied.58 A voidable contract is one in which a party holds the power, by manifesting an election to do so, to avoid the legal relations the contract created, or, by ratification, to extinguish that power.59 The earlier subsections asked when a person qualifies. This one asks who holds the power, how it ends, and what the person still owes after using it. The answers track the rules for minors. The power of avoidance and ratification belongs to the impaired person and, after death, to the heirs or personal representative, and if a guardian has been appointed the power vests in the guardian.60 The competent party has no power of avoidance, just as an adult who deals with an infant cannot invoke the infant’s age.61
The one-sided design follows from what the protection is for. A shield either side could pick up would become a weapon, because a counterparty who regretted a fair deal could search for evidence of the other party’s condition and use it as a free exit. Because the defense is protective, the person who holds it may also choose to enforce the contract, which lets an impaired person keep a bargain that serves him.62 The counterparty’s knowledge matters elsewhere, since the second route requires reason to know and the innocent-counterparty limit turns on lack of knowledge. In both settings it decides whether the impaired person’s power exists or survives, and it never hands the competent party a power of its own.
Standing in the impaired person’s place requires a legal basis. A guardian takes the power through appointment, and heirs or a personal representative take it by succession after death. A relative with no appointment holds nothing: a son may not contract for a parent suffering from dementia, because the son is not a substitute for a guardian.63 Where a court has adjudicated the impairment and placed the person’s property under guardianship, the person has no capacity to incur contractual duties at all.64
Ratification is the opposite ending to the election. Once the impaired person recovers, he may ratify the contract by words or by conduct, and, as with a minor’s ratification, it is irrevocable.65 Only the trigger differs from the minor’s rule: a minor ratifies at majority and the impaired person on recovery. Ratification is a decision that the bargain serves the person, and the law gives it effect only when the person can make it with capacity. Ratification does not excuse exploitation, however, because the former incompetent or the guardian may still sue for compensatory and punitive damages if the exploitation amounted to actionable fraud.66
After a valid defense is asserted, each side has a restitution claim against the other for benefits already conferred.67 How much the impaired person must give back depends on the counterparty’s conduct. When the capable party imposed on the incompetent by dealing with knowledge of the disability, the rule differs: some courts require the incompetent to restore only the consideration that remains in his hands, and others are much more critical of the counterparty who knew.68 Even where only the remaining consideration must be restored, some courts hold the incompetent liable for the value of necessaries received.69 Where the counterparty dealt fairly and without knowledge, § 15(2) lets the court adjust relief as justice requires.70
Minors follow a parallel pattern. Some jurisdictions hold an infant liable in restitution, not in contract, for the fair value of property that cannot be returned and for services or other benefits received.71 A related rule holds an infant bound where he fails to restore what he received to the extent of the benefit actually derived,72 so that a minor who sues to recover the price paid must allow the vendor reasonable compensation for use, depreciation, and willful or negligent damage. That rule does not apply if the seller committed fraud or imposition, if the contract is unfair, or if unfair advantage was taken of the minor.73 In both settings, then, the counterparty’s fairness shapes how much must be given back.
Avoidance leaves one liability in place, and it is the one the infancy rules leave in place. Even if a mentally impaired person may avoid the contract, he is liable in quasi-contract for the reasonable value of necessaries furnished to him or his dependents, and roughly the same classes of goods and services are necessaries for incompetents as for infants.74 Nursing and medical attention are the salient examples. Legal services used to obtain release from custody and guardianship are ordinarily compensable whether or not they succeed, and the legal expenses of a party who petitions to place a person under guardianship can also qualify.75
The exception and its measure each have a reason. The exception keeps care available, because a nurse or hospital that expects to go unpaid once a patient disavows the arrangement will decline to treat patients who may later disavow. The measure follows from what avoidance does: it undoes the contract’s legal relations, including its price term, so the provider’s claim rests on the value of what it furnished. In Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc. v. Pelo, a patient hospitalized for serious mental impairment was held liable in quasi-contract for the mental health services he received.
The two purchases show which fact controls. Nursing answers a basic need and a home theater answers a want, so only the first produces liability for value received, and that liability is measured by what was furnished and never by the price the person or a relative promised. An answer on an impaired person’s contract should therefore sort each item into necessary or not, apply the reasonable-value measure to necessaries, and apply the restoration rules, subject to § 15(2) relief, to everything else.