Concept
Capacity as a Threshold
Incapacity to contract
Incapacity to Contract
Capacity as a Threshold
Contract law binds a person to a promise only if the person was legally able to make it. The law lets parties bind themselves by their own promises on the assumption that each can size up a bargain and look after their own interests, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states what follows when that assumption fails: no one can be bound by contract who lacks legal capacity to incur at least voidable contractual duties.1 Capacity, in this sense, is the power to enter a legal relation as an ordinary person could, and it turns on legal qualifications such as age and soundness of mind.2 The question concerns the promisor, and it sits beside the familiar questions about the bargain itself: offer, acceptance, and consideration.
The phrase “at least voidable” sets a floor, and falling short of it has consequences of two strengths. A voidable contract leaves a party with the power to avoid the legal relations the contract created, by manifesting an election to do so, or to extinguish that power by ratifying the contract.3 Total incapacity does more. Any manifestation of intent to bargain is a nullity, and the purported agreement is void.4 The standard example is a person whose property is under guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental defect: any attempted contract by or with that person is void.5 Read together, the rule says that a person who can incur voidable duties can be bound, subject to the power to avoid, while a person who cannot incur even those has made no contract at all.
The rest of the chapter takes up the conditions that displace the default, each with its own test, its own consequences, and its own limits. Two ideas from this threshold govern all of them. A presumption of full capacity defines every exception by contrast, and capacity may be partial, varying with the transaction.
Presumption of Full Capacity
An adult who manifests assent starts with full capacity. Under the Restatement, a natural person (a human being, as opposed to a corporation or other entity) who manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur contractual duties by doing so, unless he is under guardianship, an infant, mentally ill or defective, or intoxicated.6 Adults generally are assumed to hold the legal power to form contracts.7 Each of the four exceptions receives its own section below, so for now the list is a roadmap and not material to master.
The presumption attaches to the outward act of assent, and that is its practical point. A counterparty can observe what a person said and signed but cannot observe how clearly the person was thinking. If any signer could escape a bargain by announcing afterward that their thinking had been clouded, no promise would be safe to rely on. The short list of exceptions confines the doctrine to situations where judgment is typically impaired or a court has already spoken, so the exception does not swallow the rule.
A presumption holds until evidence displaces it. Evidence offered to refute the assumption of capacity is what moves a case onto one of the listed categories,8 so the party who wants out of a signed contract must supply it. A statement that the signer was “not himself” does not do the job, and the party seeking enforcement need not prove capacity as part of its case. Later sections describe what evidence carries the burden in each category.
The law asks whether a person was able to decide, not whether the decision was wise. A hasty or regrettable bargain is the product of someone who still has capacity. Guardianship law draws the same line. The test is whether the individual can make responsible decisions, not whether the decisions were in fact responsible, and everyone, older persons included, keeps the right to behave foolishly without being declared incapacitated; adults are presumed capable unless a court with jurisdiction has adjudicated otherwise.9 Advanced age and physical frailty appear nowhere on the Restatement's list, so neither displaces the presumption alone. If bad judgment counted as incapacity, enforcement would turn on a judge's opinion of every deal's merits.
The two scenes show what moves a case out of the default. Marcus offers only an after-the-fact judgment about his own decision. Elena fits a category the Restatement names, and the court's adjudication supplies public proof of it.
Capacity defenses protect the person who holds them, and that purpose shapes the remedy. A party with a defense has the power to avoid the contract by asserting it, but because defenses are protective, that party may instead choose to enforce the contract against the other side.10 The voidable form fits that purpose, since an election lets the protected party decide whether the bargain serves them. The counterparty generally cannot invoke the protected party's condition to escape a bargain that has turned sour. When a party does assert a valid defense, each side has a restitution claim against the other for benefits already conferred, a subject for the sections that follow.11
Capacity Can Be Partial
Capacity is not all-or-nothing. The second sentence of § 12(1) says that capacity to contract may be partial, and that whether it exists for a particular transaction may depend on the nature of the transaction or on other circumstances.13 A court therefore does not decide once that a person has capacity or lacks it and then apply the answer to every contract the person signs. It asks whether this person, in this condition, could do what this deal required. The later discussion of mental incapacity builds on that framing.
Impairment is rarely total, and a single global label would fail in both directions. Declaring someone incapable everywhere would strip away commitments the person can manage perfectly well, while declaring someone capable everywhere would leave that person exposed once a deal outgrows what they can grasp. Guardianship practice follows the same logic. Individuals are increasingly thought of as having varying degrees or types of mental capacity, which can call for substitute decision-making in part, but not necessarily all, of their lives. An older person may handle small amounts of money yet have lost the capacity to handle complicated investments, and appointing a guardian of the estate would have been overly restrictive of that person's autonomy.14
Krasner v. Berk shows partial capacity in clinical form. The dispute concerned an agreement to renew an office lease, and the defendant, a physician, resisted on the ground that when he entered the contract he was of unsound mind and mentally incapable of making the agreement.15 The trial judge found for the defendant, the Appellate Division vacated that finding and entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the sole question before the reviewing court was whether the evidence warranted a finding of incapacity.16
The medical evidence described a mind that worked in some settings and failed in others. Neuropsychological testing put the defendant's verbal IQ at 116, above average, and his performance IQ at 76, results read to indicate that he could not reason, form proper judgment, or learn new material. The expert's conclusion was that he could probably function adequately where a situation was thoroughly familiar and success depended on reinstating earlier learned material, but would probably do very poorly where a situation demanded new learning, independent judgment, or any genuine degree of adaptation.17 His wife and brother described the same decline. From September 1967 he was absent-minded and confused, missed appointments with patients, and got lost while skiing and on a trip. By 1968 his brother no longer let him write prescriptions for patient-employees, although he continued to examine them.18 The brother's response was itself partial: it withdrew one task and left another in place.
Evidence pointing the other way made the case close. Before renewing the lease, the parties discussed moving to other offices and could not find suitable space. The defendant read the agreement before he signed it and said it was fair, and four months later he dictated a letter of complaint to the landlord that showed some understanding of the lease's terms.19 The court conceded that on the sufficiency of understanding the case was a close one, and it added that on a record like this a finding of testamentary capacity, as distinguished from capacity to contract, would be upheld.20 Competence elsewhere, and even some grasp of the lease, did not end the inquiry, which stayed tied to what this agreement demanded of this defendant.
Because capacity is measured against the transaction, the moment of the transaction matters. Mental function can fluctuate, with periods of lucidity and relative confusion that last for days or for parts of a day; mornings, for example, may be a time of maximum understanding, a pattern often called “sundowning.”21 Some courts add a further point under what is called the affective test, which the sections on the cognitive and volitional tests below develop. A person such as one who is manic-depressive psychotic may be aware of the nature and consequences of conduct and still be incompetent, because the illness impels irrational action and leaves the person incapable of making a rational judgment in the execution of the transaction.22
Timing alone cannot carry a contract, as Farnum v. Silvano shows. Viola Farnum conveyed her house to Joseph Silvano, III, for approximately half its market value. A Probate Court judge found that she enjoyed a lucid interval at the time and decided that she had capacity to execute the deed. The appellate court reversed, because a different test measures competence to enter into a contract.23
That test demands more than coherence. Competence to contract presupposes something more than a transient surge of lucidity. It involves not merely comprehension of what is “going on,” but an ability to comprehend the nature and quality of the transaction, together with an understanding of its significance and consequences.24 Farnum could be aware that she was selling her house for much less than it was worth and still fail to understand the unreasonableness of doing so when she faced serious cash demands for rent, home care, or nursing home charges. That difference between awareness of the surface of a transaction, the fact that it is happening, and comprehension of its unreasonableness and consequences is one Judge Breitel had recognized in Ortelere.25 A lucid interval answers whether a person was coherent at the moment, while the contract test asks whether the person understood what the transaction meant. The same contrast appears in Krasner, where testamentary capacity was distinguished from capacity to contract.26 One person, in one period, can therefore pass the first test and fail the second.