Concept
Reliance on Oral Waivers
Statute of Frauds and oral modification
Reliance on Oral Waivers
A signed contract requires the buyer to furnish a survey by June 1. In May the seller says on the phone that the survey is no longer needed. If the Statute of Frauds covers the contract, can the seller go back on that sentence? Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 150 gives a conditional answer. Where the parties to an enforceable contract subsequently agree that all or part of a duty need not be performed or that a condition need not occur, the Statute of Frauds does not prevent enforcement of the later agreement if reinstating the original terms would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on it.1
The section's caption reads “Reliance on Oral Modification,” but its text speaks of a duty that need not be performed and a condition that need not occur.2 The later agreement leaves the contract standing and releases one side from part of what the writing required. Lawyers commonly call such a release a waiver, and this unit follows that usage.
The reliance requirement answers a specific danger. A party who takes the other side at its word may rearrange its affairs around the release. If the releasing party could then invoke the statute and insist on the written terms, it would profit from a promise the other side had already acted on. Section 150 therefore ties relief to conduct: the oral release does nothing by itself, and a material change of position in reliance on it gives it force. The reliance qualifier noted with unenforceable modifications is developed here in three steps: which later agreements § 150 covers, when reinstating the written terms counts as unjust, and how § 150 compares with the broader reliance exception in § 139.
Scope of Section 150
Section 150 covers one kind of later agreement, and two threshold requirements decide whether an oral exchange is that kind. There must be an enforceable contract, and the later agreement must relieve a party of something the contract required. Only then does the reliance test in the next subsection come into play.
The first requirement follows from what an excusal does. An agreement that a duty need not be performed acts on a deal that already binds the parties. If the underlying contract itself fails the statute and no exception saves it, no enforceable duty or condition remains to be relieved, and the question becomes whether the original deal can be enforced at all, which is the framework from the opening of this chapter. The usual fact pattern therefore starts with a signed contract that satisfies the statute and a conversation after signing. Analyse the contract first and the conversation second.
The second requirement separates an excusal from a modification. Under § 149, a court treats the second contract as containing the originally agreed terms as modified and tests that contract against the statute.3 An excusal moves in one direction only. It lifts a duty or dispenses with a condition the writing imposed, and nobody takes on anything new. The question to put to any oral statement is whether it subtracts from what a party owes or adds to it.
Some changes sit near the line. An oral extension of a deadline, for example, can be framed as a new date substituted for the old one or as an agreement that the duty need not be performed on the old date. When the facts allow both framings, say so and run both analyses.
Section 150 is complementary to §§ 84 and 89, which dispense with the requirement of consideration in similar circumstances, yet it applies as well to promises supported by consideration.4 Consideration and form are separate requirements. An excusal the other side paid for satisfies the first and can still run into the statute, so a rule confined to gratuitous excusals would leave bargained-for ones without help although the writing problem is identical.
Unjust Reinstatement
Section 150 sets a single test for an oral release: it is enforceable despite the statute if reinstatement of the original terms would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on it.6 Reinstatement means holding the released party to the written term again, and the test measures the fairness of doing so against what that party did after hearing the release. The section assumes the parties did agree to the release, so the live question is what going back would cost the party who was excused. An oral release that nobody acted on gives § 150 nothing to work with.
The test is built this way because the statute should give way only where giving way prevents a real loss. A party who relaxed a written term, watched the other side reorganize around the relaxation, and then invoked the writing would profit from reliance it invited. Where the excused party did nothing in response, a return to the written terms takes nothing it had come to depend on, and the statute does its ordinary work.
A change of position is material when the excused party has done something that cannot be undone without a loss traceable to the release. Spending money the release freed up on a nonrefundable purchase is likely to qualify, as is giving up an alternative that has since disappeared or committing to third parties on the strength of the lighter terms. A buyer excused from paying the full price in cash who spends the freed funds on a nonrefundable purchase has changed position. A buyer who leaves the same funds in a savings account has not, because that buyer can still pay on the due date and loses nothing. Readiness to perform on the new terms, planning around them, and hope that the other side will stay agreeable all fall on the savings-account side of the line, since each can be undone at no cost. The word material carries much of the section's weight. If any claim of reliance sufficed, every released party would make one, and the writing requirement would stop mattering for oral excusals.
Other reliance doctrines set their own thresholds. Part performance in response to an offer for a unilateral contract makes the offer irrevocable under Section 45 of both Restatements, and mere preparation does not, though under promissory estoppel preparation may.7 Section 150 uses a measure of its own, a change of position that makes reinstatement unjust, so apply that measure to the facts and do not import a threshold from another doctrine.
The rent-reduction lease is the classic setting for these questions, and it is the setting of Central London Property Trust v. High Trees House. Landlord-tenant law gives a parallel rule: when a landlord accepts reduced rent under a partially executed agreement, the landlord cannot recover the difference between the original rent and the reduced rent for past rental periods, but can enforce the original lease for future rent periods.8 The split tracks the reliance test. A demand for the past difference would take back money the tenant has already arranged its affairs around, while a return to full rent going forward leaves the tenant free to adjust. Because that rule comes from landlord-tenant law and § 150's text says nothing about past and future periods, treat it as a guide to how courts sort reliance already incurred from reliance still to come.
The oral release in the March call is as clear as the release in any lease. What differs is that this tenant has nothing to lose by returning to the written rent, so the statute keeps its ordinary force. On an exam, find the reliance first and ask what the excused party did that cannot be undone without loss. Then decide how much of the written term revives.
Comparing Section 139 Estoppel
Reliance offers a second route around the statute, and this one reaches further than § 150. Section 139(1) makes enforceable, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee or a third person and that does induce it, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy for breach is limited as justice requires.10 Section 150 works only after an enforceable contract exists and only on a later agreement that relieves a party of a duty or condition.11 Section 139 has no such precondition. The promise it enforces can be the oral contract itself, the very agreement the statute would otherwise leave without a remedy. That difference in reach explains most of what separates the two sections.
The two sections also start from different evidentiary positions. Under § 150 the court already has an enforceable contract, so the existence and main terms of the deal are largely settled, and the open questions are whether the parties later relaxed a duty or condition and whether going back would be unjust. Under § 139 the existence and terms of the bargain are the very things in dispute, and the claimant's own account may be the main proof. That is the risk the statute was written to control, and it is why § 139 asks whether the promisee's conduct in reliance, or other available evidence, corroborates the existence of a contract. This corroboration factor is unique to § 139 because it speaks to the evidentiary purpose of the statute, and it means that part performance, even where it does not by itself create an exception, can count in the estoppel analysis.12 The comment to § 139 adds that, like § 90, the section states a flexible principle, but that the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing.13
Courts have not all accepted § 139. Promissory estoppel has been widely applied where letting the statute defeat a meritorious claim would be inequitable, displacing an older view that such a holding was “clearly impossible of justification” in view of the statute's language. The treatise answers that the older view misunderstands the relationship between common law doctrines and legislation.14 Some jurisdictions still refuse; the Florida decision in DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC is an example of a court declining to treat promissory estoppel as an exception to the statute. An essay should therefore begin by asking which position the assumed jurisdiction follows. Where a court does adopt § 139, the clear and convincing proof standard under § 139(2)(c) is one safeguard against making the statute superfluous.15
Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice shows the doctrine succeeding. Rice claimed that, after Wakefield was elected, he confirmed his decision to hire her as executive director at $36,000 a year for at least two years, with two more years if he was re-elected, plus roughly $4,000 a year in fringe benefits.16 The court held that a jury could reasonably find that she would be a victim of injustice without damages, given her induced resignation, her move from Maryland, and her loss of money and position.17 It affirmed the superior court's treatment of the estoppel issue and adopted § 139 as the law of its jurisdiction.18 Rice rested on § 139 and not on § 150, because her claim was to enforce the promise of employment itself, with no earlier contract for a later release to act on.
Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp. supplies the failing side. The California court required either unjust enrichment of the defendant or unconscionable injury to the plaintiff before it would estop the employer from relying on the statute. An employee who had been paid for his services, had wanted to move, and was unemployed when he accepted the offer showed neither. Both employees relocated on a job promise, so the difference lies in what the move cost: Rice gave up a position and lost money and standing, while the Munoz plaintiff gave up nothing he had been unwilling to leave.
Even where § 139 is accepted, a claimant whose only reliance was on the existence of the oral contract meets resistance. Courts in many jurisdictions will not find an estoppel in that case, because it could result in a virtual judicial repeal of the statute, and most successful estoppel cases rest on reliance on some additional statement or promise.19 In Brown, a 2001 decision refusing to enforce an oral promise to convey land, the court said it was not enough to show that breach of the promise denied the plaintiff her rights under the contract. She had to show a substantial and independent injury for which justice demands relief.20
Sort these problems in order. First, ask whether an enforceable contract already exists and the later words excuse a duty or condition under it; if so, § 150 and its reliance test govern. If instead the promise the claimant wants enforced is itself unwritten and within the statute, ask whether the jurisdiction accepts § 139, and if it does, how the significant circumstances come out, including corroboration and the limits on remedy.