Concept
Contracts Within Article 2
UCC modification without consideration
Contracts Within Article 2
Every modification problem opens with a question that comes before assent, good faith, or writings: what kind of contract is being modified? Section 2-209(1) provides that "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding," and the words "within this Article" make the classification decisive.1 Article 2 governs transactions in goods, so the statute relieves a party of the consideration requirement when the contract being modified is one for the sale of goods.2 A modification of any other contract stays under the general common-law rule that a promise modifying a contract must be supported by consideration.3 The cases and examples below put a service contract, a land deal, and a loan on that side of the line.
The two regimes are alternatives. Inside Article 2, the relief from consideration comes with a safeguard of the Article's own making: the modification must be made in good faith, a limit taken up in the next section.4 Outside Article 2, the common-law rule applies, and the question is simply whether something new supports the change. A parallel provision, § 2A-208(1), uses similar language for leases of goods.5
Because of this sorting, an identical one-sided promise can succeed or fail depending on the classification alone.
Only one fact separates the supplier from the lender, which is what the contract is about. The same fact decides which arguments a party can raise against a hold-up. Suppose a service provider threatens not to perform unless the owner pays an extra $2,000 to finish by the originally agreed date. The owner has two arguments: the provider did no more than it was already bound to do, so nothing supports the new promise, and the threat was in bad faith, so the promise was extorted. Because a service contract falls outside § 2-209(1), both arguments are open.6 If the contract were for goods, Article 2 would dispense with consideration entirely, and only the good-faith argument would remain.7
Cases outside Article 2 show the common-law rule at work. In Recker v. Gustafson, the court held void for want of consideration a $10,000 price increase on a 155-acre purchase. It also held a separate portion of the agreement, relating to a five-acre homestead tract, invalid for lack of a writing signed by the Gustafsons.8 A land deal is not a sale of goods, so the court tested the increase under the ordinary requirement of consideration and found it lacking. In United States v. Stump Home Specialties Manufacturing, guarantors attacked a modification of a loan agreement, and the court began from the black-letter rule that a contract may not be modified without consideration. It noted in a parenthetical that the UCC abrogates that rule for sales of goods but that the case before it was not one.9 The court added that the policies behind the requirement apply with much attenuated strength to written modifications. It still declined to decide whether Indiana would abolish the requirement, because consideration was present.10
The two decisions teach different lessons. Recker shows the common-law rule defeating a modification that nothing supported. Stump shows that a contract outside Article 2 only reopens the common-law question: the modification survives if something new supports it. Falling outside Article 2 is therefore not fatal by itself.
Inside Article 2, the analysis runs in the same order. In an Illinois dispute over a carpet delivery schedule, the court first found that the contract was subject to the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Illinois. Only then did it read § 2-209(1) to mean that an agreement modifying a contract needs no consideration but must be in writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. A letter signed by Stark confirming the schedule the parties had orally agreed on the day before satisfied that requirement.11 Section 2-209(1) removes only one hurdle. In another decision, the defendant resisted an oral modification on two grounds, the statute of frauds and lack of consideration. The court rejected the first only because the defendant had not pleaded it.12 The writing requirements are taken up below.
Skipping the classification step produces two opposite errors. A student who sees a one-sided change to a service, land, or loan contract and applies § 2-209(1) will wrongly enforce a promise the common law would reject. A student who sees a one-sided change to a sale of goods and applies the preexisting duty rule will wrongly strike down a modification that Article 2 permits.