Concept
Where Courts Apply Section 90
Promissory estoppel
Where Courts Apply Section 90
Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reaches any promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, that does induce it, and that injustice requires enforcing. Its text draws no line between a grandmother's gift and a manufacturer's commitment.1 The courts drew the line, and then moved it. Some early authority confined the doctrine to gratuitous promises and kept it out of transactions that contemplated a bargain; the trend today runs the other way.2 A survey of the case law in 1960 already concluded that the doctrine had outgrown its earlier limits and that protecting unbargained-for reliance on commercial promises had become its principal use.3
That shift poses a puzzle, because commercial dealings are bargains by nature. In the ordinary run of business and consumer transactions, consideration is present virtually by definition.4 Reliance therefore has no missing consideration to supply in those deals. It earns its place when both sides have given consideration and the transaction still cannot be enforced as a contract for some other reason, and commentators identify at least three broad situations of that kind.5 The doctrine now also rescues failing contracts whose failure has nothing to do with consideration.6
Five settings recur. Family and gift promises show reliance doing the work that consideration cannot, since no one sought anything in return. Employment and pension promises ask whether the promise or the decision to retire came first. Construction bids rest on the promisor's own stake in being relied on. Negotiation cases press hardest on whether anyone made a promise at all, and writing-requirement cases ask how far reliance can carry an oral promise past a formality the statute demands. In each setting the promisee must still satisfy the four requirements taught earlier, so the useful question is which requirement the setting strains most. The first setting is the doctrine's home ground, the family, where the bargain theory leaves the promisee nothing else to stand on.
Family and Gift Promises
Promises within a family usually spring from affection and generosity and not from any expectation of something in return, so they are gratuitous: no one bargained for them. Where the law does impose obligations between relatives, it generally rests them on the relationship, as with a parent's duty of support, and not on contract.7 A relative who rearranges a household around such a promise therefore has no consideration to point to, and reliance becomes the courts' tool for resolving intrafamily disputes equitably.8
Kirksey v. Kirksey shows the gap at its widest. A woman sued a man who had revoked a promise to her, and the court held that no contract stopped him, because nothing had been bargained for; it assumed that dealings between relatives rest on natural love and affection.9 Ricketts v. Scothorn closed the gap. A grandfather had given his granddaughter a note, and the court held his executor, sued on the note, estopped from alleging that it lacked consideration.10 The court did not ask whether the grandfather had bargained for her resignation. Whether or not he wanted her to quit, he had put her in a position to quit and to live on the interest on the money the note promised.11 She did quit at once, and she did rely on the promise as her means of living.12 She was justified in doing so, the court said, because the promise was made to her and she was warranted in assuming it would be kept.13 It was also a fair inference that she gave up her job and stopped looking for other work because of the promise.14 The court called its holding an equitable estoppel, but its question is the one § 90 later asked of every promise: did the promisor put the promisee in a position to rely, and did she rely? Kirksey asks whether the promisee's act was the price of the promise, and it stops when the answer is no.
The three versions sort cleanly on the page and look almost identical in life. In each, one relative wanted to help another toward a better future and the other trusted that goodwill, and nobody thought in terms of a price, an inducement, or a gratuity. The proof is poor as well. Nothing is in writing, so a court must reconstruct what was said across the kitchen table, often after the promisor has died; the quality of that evidence is doubtful, and selective recall is an obvious risk.15 The legal difference among bargain, induced reliance, and gratuity therefore comes down to evidence of what the promisee did because of what the promisor said. A claimant needs conduct that the promise produced, not a plan already underway.
Promises to give land form the most developed line of family cases. Courts enforced them when the donee took possession and made improvements, and they often said that possession and improvements were “good consideration in equity.” That label is anomalous under modern ideas about law and equity, because it gives consideration one meaning on the equity side of the court and another on the law side. The cases trace to the ancient practice of livery of seisin, and they are now recognized as justified by promissory estoppel.16 The reliance in them is as plain as reliance gets. A donor who watches a donee build has the best reason to know the donee is relying, and an improvement is fixed in the ground, so refusing enforcement would let the donor keep what the donee paid to create.
Harvey v. Dow offers a modern example. Teresa built a new house between the summer of 2003 and May 2004 at a cost to her of about $200,000.17 Her father, Jeffrey Sr., did a substantial amount of the construction himself, including much of the foundation work and the carpentry, and helped to get underground electrical lines installed.18 A father who joins the building does more than tolerate it. He shows that he foresaw the reliance and invited it.
Not every gift promise followed by some action is enforced. A court looks for conduct that the donor could foresee and that was reasonable for the donee, and that amounted to a definite and substantial change of position the donee would not have made without the promise. The last element joins causation to cost: a donee who would have taken the same step anyway has lost nothing to the promise. The standard is demanding for a reason rooted in the promise itself. The donor receives nothing, and the donee knows that generosity can fade or that the donor may prove unable to perform, so the donee's reliance is tempered accordingly.19 A court asked to turn a gift into a debt wants to see a real loss first.
Family trust makes reliance more natural, and courts take that into account, but it does not supply the missing facts. In Bouton v. Byers, the district court had treated the daughter's training and expertise as a bar to reasonable reliance as a matter of law. The reviewing court disagreed. Reasonableness of reliance is “quintessentially a fact question,” her training did not change that, and the familial setting made such a bar “particularly inappropriate.” A father and daughter are not “disembodied corporations undertaking a joint venture purely for business advantage”; the daughter helped partly out of fealty and devotion, and the relationship arguably led her to leave her sharper legal instincts in the classroom.20
A close relationship does not replace proof of loss. In Alden v. Presley, Presley offered to pay the expenses of the plaintiff's divorce, including an attorney, to advance her money to buy her husband's equity in the home, and to pay off the remaining mortgage.21 The Tennessee court did not decide whether the state recognizes promissory estoppel, because the plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove detrimental reliance and a loss suffered as a result of it.22 The promise was specific and the relationship close; what was missing was a cost the promise caused. Compare the house in Harvey, which sits on the land and cannot be moved.
Employment and Pension Promises
Section 90(1) treats an employer's promise of retirement income like any other promise made without a bargain. The Restatement's own illustration shows the pattern. A promises B an annuity for life, and B resigns a profitable job, as A expected he might. B collects the annuity for some years and in the meantime becomes unable to find good employment again. A's promise is binding.24 The employee has traded a working life for a promise, and where the promisor sought nothing in exchange, only reliance can account for the trade.
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. shows both the problem and its solution. The board voted to raise Mrs. Feinberg's salary from $350 to $400 a month and, on her retirement, whenever she might choose to retire, to pay her $200 a month for life, adopting the plan to give her security for the future and in the hope that her active services would continue.25 The Missouri court agreed with the company that no consideration supported the pension. Her long and faithful service lay in the past, and she had been paid in full for it, so she had no legal claim to additional compensation in the form of a pension.26 Nor had she promised anything in return. The resolution did not make the pension depend on continued work, she could have quit the day it was adopted, and she made no promise to stay.27 Her claim therefore rested on reliance, and it succeeded because her retirement was the step the promise invited. The drafting mattered. Had the resolution recited that the company wished to induce her to remain in her position, consideration would have been met, at least formally, and the case might never have arisen.28
Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc. presents the harder question of causation. Katz was struck in the head while trying to retrieve money, and when he returned to work he had an impaired walk and some memory loss and made many costly mistakes. Shopmaker, acting for the company, concluded that he would have to work out an agreeable pension to induce Katz to retire, because he did not feel he could carry Katz as an employee; Katz was then earning about $23,000 a year.29 Katz accepted an offer of $13,000 a year for life, and the board approved a resolution on May 22, 1975.30
An employer in that position will argue that the employee could have been discharged anyway and so gave up nothing by retiring. The argument fails where, as in Katz, the employer chose to secure the retirement with a promise instead of a discharge: Shopmaker could have dismissed Katz, and he decided instead to offer a pension to induce him to retire. The court enforced the pension. The structure of the rule explains the result. An at-will employee can always be dismissed, so if the bare possibility of discharge defeated reliance, no pension offer could ever induce a retirement. The employer could also invoke the threat of dismissal to obtain the retirement and then plead the same threat to avoid the pension. Reliance does fail when the employee had already decided to retire before the promise, because § 90(1) requires that the promise actually induce the action.31
Promises about the job itself meet a presumption that works against the employee. The employment relationship rests on contract, and the American rule presumes that oral contracts of indefinite duration, the most common kind, are terminable at will.32 Because either side may end an at-will relationship at any time, some courts hold that an employee cannot reasonably rely on an assurance of employment. Others let the employee try to prove reliance, particularly on a definite assurance that led the employee to resign or relocate. Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors belongs to the second group: at-will status did not by itself bar relief, and the employee could try to prove that his reliance was justified. Reliance in this setting need not be purely financial. In one decision, a jury could find detrimental reliance where an hourly worker became a salaried supervisor responsible for about fifty subordinates and absorbed additional stress and emotional trauma that cannot be measured in purely financial terms.33
Even a successful job-promise claim usually recovers less than a pension claim. A promise of at-will employment supplies no fixed period of work against which to measure lost wages, so courts that grant relief tend to award the cost of preparing for the new job, such as moving expenses, and not the wages the job would have paid. In Eby v. York-Division, Borg-Warner, for example, an employee who gave up a job and moved on a promise of employment recovered the cost of preparing for and making the move. A written deal that fixes its terms makes the contrast. The Locke–Warner agreement paid $250,000 a year for three years under a nonexclusive “first look” provision, which required Locke to show Warner any picture she wanted to develop before showing another studio and gave Warner thirty days to approve or reject it, and it added a $750,000 “pay or play” directing commitment.34 A claimant with terms like those can measure what the deal was worth; one who relied on an informal assurance usually cannot. The remedy discussion later in this chapter explains why the second sentence of § 90(1) lets a court limit relief to what the reliance cost.
Construction Bids
Construction bidding has produced some of § 90's most consequential commercial applications. A general contractor assembles its bid for a project from prices quoted to it by specialty subcontractors, and the owner's award commits the general contractor to the total. If a subcontractor then withdraws, often citing an arithmetic error, the general contractor must buy the work elsewhere, usually at a higher price. Whether the general contractor has a remedy depends on whether the quote can be made irrevocable, and the bargain theory offers no easy way to do that.
The common law starts from the premise that an offer is revocable until accepted, and a promise to keep it open does not change that unless the offeree gave consideration for the promise.36 Promissory estoppel can create an enforceable option in narrow circumstances even though no consideration was given.37 A subcontractor's quote fits neither bargained route. No one paid for an option, and the general contractor's use of the figure in its own bid accepts nothing, because the general contractor has promised the subcontractor nothing.38
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. reached that conclusion. A general contractor used a subcontractor's bid in making up its own; when the subcontractor realized that it had made a clerical error and sought to revoke the bid, the general contractor argued that its use of the bid was reliance that made the bid irrevocable.39 Judge Learned Hand rejected the argument. Promissory estoppel, he said, avoids the harsh result of letting a promisor repudiate after the promisee has relied, but an offer for an exchange does not become a promise until the stipulated consideration arrives, and holding the offeror earlier would bind it regardless of the condition it stipulated. The defendant there offered to deliver linoleum in exchange for the plaintiff's acceptance, not for its bid, which was a matter of indifference to it.40
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. went the other way on similar facts. The trial court found that the paving subcontractor made a definite offer to do the paving for $7,131.60, and that the general contractor relied on that offer in computing its own bid and in naming the subcontractor in it. It entered judgment for the general contractor for $3,817.00, the difference between the subcontractor's bid and the cost of the paving to the general contractor.41 The California Supreme Court found neither an option supported by consideration nor a bilateral contract, so the question became whether the general contractor's reliance made the offer irrevocable. The subcontractor had reason to expect its bid to be used if it proved lowest, and the bid induced action of a definite and substantial character.42
The bid said nothing about revocation, so the court looked for conditions that the law or the circumstances placed on the right to revoke, and it found a model in offers for unilateral contracts. Such an offer cannot be revoked once the offeree has begun the requested performance, because it carries an implied subsidiary promise not to revoke.43 Reasonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial change of position is an equally compelling basis for implying the same promise in an offer for a bilateral contract.44 Consideration is not needed, because the very purpose of § 90 is to make a promise binding even though nothing was bargained for, and reliance holds the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required.45
The implied promise rests on the subcontractor's own interest. The lower the quote, the lower the general contractor's bid and the greater its chance of winning, and so the greater the subcontractor's chance of getting the work. The subcontractor had reason not only to expect the general contractor to rely on its bid but to want it to, and since the general contractor is bound by its own bid, it is only fair that it should have an opportunity to accept the subcontractor's price after the award.46 The policy is plain. If the Gimbel rule were followed, general contractors might have to add a premium to their bids to cover the risk of revocation, which would raise the cost of construction without adding anything of value.47 And the loss from a mistaken quote falls more suitably on the offeror who produced the number than on the offeree who relied on it, since an offeror who blundered in calculating its costs should not be able to salvage the error by revoking once the offeree has included the offer in its bid.48
The two decisions part over what a subcontractor's quote is. Hand saw a proposed exchange and treated the quote as a revocable offer. Drennan saw the same quote as carrying an implied promise to hold it open for a reasonable time after the award, enforceable on reliance alone. Many jurisdictions have explicitly adopted Drennan's approach.49
The rule has been questioned. The analogy to offers for unilateral contracts is imperfect, because an offeree of a bilateral contract can bind the offeror simply by promising and need not rely first, so any reliance before acceptance is arguably at the offeree's own risk. Section 90 also applies only when the promisor should reasonably expect the promisee to rely, and that is hard to say of an ordinary offeror: someone who offers to sell a piano to Alice for $400 would not reasonably expect her to buy expensive accessories before replying.50 In bidding, trade practice and the subcontractor's own stake supply the expectation that the ordinary offer lacks, and outside bidding the principle has traveled little.
The protection runs in one direction. Although the subcontractor is bound, the general contractor is not bound to accept its bid, because the general contractor has made no promise on which the subcontractor relies.51 Using a subcontractor's figure does not even accept its offer, and the subcontractor cannot claim comparable reliance, since it would have spent the effort of preparing its quote even if the general contractor had used a rival's number.52
Because the general contractor holds what amounts to a free option, courts police how it uses the option. It may not delay acceptance after the award in the hope of a better price, and it may not reopen bargaining with the subcontractor while claiming a continuing right to accept the original quote.53 The period of irrevocability can be brief. If the general contractor fails to accept promptly after the award, the subcontractor is no longer bound, and further negotiation, a counteroffer, or “shopping the job around” for new bids permits the subcontractor to revoke.54 A contractor that canvasses the market after the award treats the quote as a price to beat and so is not relying on it. One court called bid shopping inequitable and a sign that the contractor was not relying on the bid.55
Drennan sits on the protected side of that line. The general contractor there promptly told the subcontractor that it had been awarded the job and that the subcontract was going to the subcontractor.56 Prompt notice, with no canvassing in between, separates the protected contractor from the one in the hospital hypothetical.
Silence about revocation is what let the Drennan court imply a promise to hold the bid open, and the court said it would have treated a bid that stated or clearly implied revocability accordingly.57 Even express words are read against the setting. In Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. Hagerman Construction Corp., a quote form stated in small print that the quotation could be withdrawn after fifteen days, but the project specifications required bids to stay open for 120 days, and the court upheld judgment for the general contractor on the reasoning that the subcontractor could be understood to mean the longer period to control. A clear statement of revocability defeats the expectation of reliance on which the rule depends, while a buried clause that conflicts with the surrounding bidding terms leaves it intact.
Reliance must also be justified. There must be something firm to rely on: an estimate is not enough, and a bid so palpably low that it signals a mistake does not support reasonable reliance.58 In one appellate decision, the trial court had held that a prime contractor who discovered an error in a subcontractor's bid should have asked the owner to release it. The court of appeals disagreed, because requiring the prime contractor to sacrifice its profit and reputation would be unjust.59 But because the subcontractor's bid differed by $425,000 from the next lowest competitor's, it remanded to decide whether the prime contractor reasonably relied on so low a quote.60
The Restatement (Second) generalized the Drennan result in § 87(2), which has four elements: an offer; the offeror's reason to expect that it will induce action or forbearance of a substantial character by the offeree before acceptance; actual inducement; and the need to recognize an option contract to avoid injustice.61 Section 87(2) does not expressly require a promise by the offeror not to revoke, but an offeror who has not at least impliedly promised to hold the offer open has little reason to foresee reliance before acceptance. The implied-promise analysis of Drennan and the foreseeability analysis of § 87(2) therefore arrive at the same place.62
Section 87(2) does not make every uncompensated option enforceable. In Berryman v. Kmoch, the $10 consideration recited in the option agreement was never paid.63 The appellant, Kmoch, pointed to the agreement's clause reciting “other valuable consideration.”64 He argued that he should have been allowed to prove the time spent and expenses incurred in trying to interest others in joining him in acquiring the land.65 He relied on the deposition testimony of Goertz and of Robert Harris, who had examined the land under option.66 The court was unpersuaded. The acts he urged as consideration conferred no special benefit on the promisor or on his land.67 His evidence did not relate to acts that could reasonably be expected from extending an option promise; it related to time, effort, and expense spent trying to interest other investors in this land.68 He had chosen the form of the contract, which was not a listing contract with someone obliged to produce a buyer, and he was not obligated to do anything.69 No basis for promissory estoppel could be shown.70 In Drennan the offeror wanted the reliance; in Berryman nothing the holder did served the optionor. That difference in the offeror's stake explains the different results.
For goods, a statute may make estoppel unnecessary. UCC § 2-205 gives certain merchants' firm offers irrevocability without consideration, and a telephoned quote for construction work falls outside it, so a claim like Drennan's still depends on reliance. Where § 2-205 is not met, the offeree may still invoke promissory estoppel or Restatement doctrine.71
Preliminary Negotiations
Section 90(1) does not ask whether the parties agreed on the terms of a deal, so it can operate at the earliest stage of a commercial relationship, while neither side has made an offer the other could accept.73 That use of the doctrine is the most expansive and the most contested. Parties at the bargaining table usually understand that nothing said there commits anyone, and the usual assumption, absent a clear understanding to the contrary, is that each side bears the cost of whatever it does to reach agreement.74 A claimant who overcomes that assumption needs a reason why the usual understanding failed, and the successful cases supply one. Promissory estoppel and a contract to bargain in good faith are two separate theories for enforcing a promise made during negotiations, and courts are very wary of both; if relief is given under either, reliance damages are the most likely form.75
These claims differ from cases in which the parties believed they had made a contract that failed for a legal defect. In preliminary negotiations the parties were still negotiating, had not reached agreement, and did not expect to be bound until some later time.76 The leading case is Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. A would-be franchisee told Red Owl that $18,000 was all the capital he had available, and Red Owl's people replied that this would be quite sufficient to set him up in business as a Red Owl store.77 At Red Owl's urging, or at least with its active encouragement, he then sold his bakery building at a $2,000 loss, bought a small grocery store to gain experience, sold the grocery for about what it had cost, put $1,000 down on land in a neighboring town, and incurred $265 in moving and rental expenses.78
Red Owl never offered him a franchise on terms definite enough to accept; no offer of any kind was made.79 The Wisconsin court nonetheless held that § 90 does not require a promise so comprehensive that it would ripen into a contract if accepted.80 A rule demanding that much detail would shut out nearly every claim of this kind, since the claim exists only because negotiations ended before the terms were settled. Whether the doctrine in such cases substitutes for consideration or stands as a theory of liability in its own right is a question worth asking of Hoffman, and of Goodman v. Dicker, with which casebooks compare it.81
What made Red Owl's assurance a promise and not mere encouragement? Hoffman knew that Red Owl had not yet signed a formal franchise contract, and he was reluctant to sell his bakery building.82 Yet he trusted Lukowitz's statement about the position of the home office, that selling the bakery was “the only hitch.”83 He probably did not think about his legal rights at that point, but he believed he had a firm commitment.84 That is the pattern to look for: a request that the other side take a specific and costly step, made when the deal appears nearly done. The court also found that Hoffman had placed faith in Red Owl's expertise and good faith and that Red Owl had been careless of his interests, so that its indifference outweighed his naiveté. Red Owl so strongly influenced his actions that a relationship of trust arose, which is not normally present when parties approach each other as adversaries.85
The most far-reaching applications protect a party who was reasonably induced to rely on general statements and indefinite promises that could not constitute offers. They arise in a commercial setting in which both parties contemplated a binding bargain. One party made promises too uncertain to support an enforceable bargain, or made without a manifestation of intent to be bound at present, and the other changed position in reasonable reliance.86 Had negotiations ended for legitimate differences of opinion or another valid reason, it is assumed that there would be no liability.87 In Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., a franchisee that left its existing location after a casino's representative told it the deal was nearly done survived summary judgment, because reliance and its reasonableness were questions for a jury. One federal court of appeals accepted a finding of a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance, and an unconscionable injury, and it approved relief under promissory estoppel.88
The breadth of the doctrine at this stage is bought with a narrow remedy. Because the parties never agreed on the subject matter or the price, a court cannot work out what profit the promisee expected from the deal, and the best it can do is compensate the promisee for past losses, the money spent or otherwise lost in reliance on the promise.89 Hoffman made no claim for expectation damages, and he almost certainly would have failed if he had.90 The jury itemized his losses at $16,735 for the sale of the Wautoma store, $2,000 for the sale of the bakery, $1,000 for taking up the option on the Chilton lot, $140 for moving expenses, and $125 for house rental, and the trial court confirmed the verdict except for the $16,735 item, as to which it ordered a new trial.91 Relief was confined to wasted expenses and did not include lost profits.92 That is the second sentence of § 90(1) at work, since the remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.93
The limits on these claims follow from the same logic, and they are sharpest when the parties are sophisticated. A party that negotiates with a banker and a lawyer, and understands that nothing binds until documents are signed, can protect itself by waiting for the signature, so its reliance in the meantime is harder to call reasonable and its loss harder to call an injustice. In Gruen Industries, Inc. v. Biller, plaintiffs who claimed a promise to sell them a controlling block of stock lost on that reasoning. Set beside Pop's Cones, the contrast shows which facts carry a claim: a direct instruction to take one step, given to a small business with no reason to doubt it, against conditional promises exchanged between advisers who understood the risk. Sophistication is a matter of degree and does not bar a claim by itself. It works through two elements covered earlier, weakening the claim that reliance was reasonable and the claim that only enforcement can avoid injustice.
The strictness of the promise requirement varies by jurisdiction, and negotiation claims are where the variation matters most. In Aceves v. U.S. Bank, a borrower alleged that her bank promised to work with her on reinstating and modifying her mortgage if she stopped pursuing relief in bankruptcy, and that it foreclosed without negotiating. The court distinguished a decision that affirmed dismissal of a claim built on a promise to make a loan, which was unclear and ambiguous because it omitted essential terms such as the identity of the borrower and the security.94 What the bank promised was a process, and the borrower relied on that promise and not on the terms of any modified loan. A strict standard therefore leaves room for claims built on a narrow promise to negotiate while it defeats claims that depend on terms nobody supplied. A related theory enforces an agreement to negotiate in good faith, as in Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, and courts approach it with the same wariness.
Oral Contracts and Writing Requirements
A statute of frauds makes contracts in certain categories, among them sales of land, unenforceable unless a signed writing evidences them. Such a contract is not void; a contract exists, but it may be unenforceable for want of a writing.96 Article 2 has its own statute of frauds.97 An oral promise in that setting may be fully bargained for, so consideration is present and the ordinary route to enforcement is open, yet the missing writing still defeats the claim. Reliance therefore stands in for a missing formality here, where earlier it stood in for a missing exchange. The comment to Restatement (Second) § 139 warns that the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing.98
The statute and the reliance principle serve opposing purposes, and the doctrine must respect both. The statute exists to prevent fraud by requiring certain contracts to be reduced to writing, but it “is not intended as an escape route for persons seeking to avoid obligations undertaken by or imposed upon them.”99 Critics reply that using alternative theories to get around the writing requirement contradicts the statute's design, and that a party suing on reliance may have to prove the very oral agreement the statute is supposed to bar.100 Applied loosely, estoppel would repeal the statute one case at a time. Courts in many jurisdictions have refused to find an estoppel where the other party relied on nothing more than the oral contract itself, for that reason.101
The older exceptions show which facts get through. Part performance of a land contract rests on conduct that corroborates the agreement, and the cases can be read as promissory estoppel cases because relief goes to a party who took concrete action in reliance.102 Equitable estoppel supplies the wrongdoing. A party who represents that a signed record of the contract exists, or that the statute will not be raised, cannot use the statute against someone who changed position because of the representation.103 Some courts have gone further and used equitable estoppel where the claimant suffered an unconscionable injury relying on an oral or insufficiently memorialized contract, and cases like these led to the widespread adoption of promissory estoppel against the statute.104
The First Restatement used the term “promissory estoppel” only for a promise to make a record, which, if relied on, may give rise to an effective promissory estoppel if the statute would otherwise operate to defraud, and courts that had not embraced the doctrine nevertheless applied it there.105 The party who promised the writing controlled whether it existed, so letting that party plead the writing's absence would reward the conduct that created the gap. The Restatement (Second) broadly enlarged the availability of the doctrine in statute of frauds cases, following the lead of cases such as Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson.106 Reliance has also carried a promise past the statute when no one promised a writing. In Monarco v. Lo Greco, a grandson who stayed to work the family farm on his grandparents' oral promise that it would pass to him by will won against a relative who raised the statute. The doctrine has been applied consistently to prevent an unconscionable injury to a party induced to change position in reliance on a promise, and money damages are not an adequate remedy for breach of a promise to leave real property by will, so a court will enforce the promise.107
Restatement (Second) § 139(1) takes the elements of § 90(1) almost word for word and makes the promise enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds when injustice can be avoided only by enforcement, with the remedy limited as justice requires.108 Because the subsection reaches any promise that induces action or forbearance, it dispenses with the traditional requirement of a misrepresentation or promise about a writing and authorizes relief for a party who relied on the oral contract itself.109 That breadth is the reason subsection (2) exists. It directs a court deciding whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement to weigh five circumstances:110
- The availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and restitution.
- The definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought.
- The extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates the making and terms of the promise, or the extent to which they are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence.
- The reasonableness of the action or forbearance.
- The extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
The five circumstances divide into two groups with different jobs. The first two measure how much repair the claimant needs. A claimant who performed under the unenforceable deal can ordinarily recover the reasonable value of that performance through restitution, which rests on preventing unjust enrichment and so leaves little for full enforcement to repair. In Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., an employee who moved to take a job promised for at least three years lost on summary judgment, because he had been paid for his work and his injury was not unconscionable. The second circumstance matches the size of the reliance to the size of the relief: a claimant demanding full performance of a long employment term needs reliance that justifies that remedy, while one seeking the cost of a move needs less. The remaining three ask whether the claim deserves to overcome the statute. Corroboration speaks to the statute's evidentiary purpose, since reliance that leaves visible traces of the deal, or other clear and convincing proof, answers the risk that the claim was invented later. Reasonableness usually works against the claimant, because in most cases a party is not justified in relying on an oral contract that it should reasonably have known must be in writing.111 Foreseeability asks the same question § 90 asks about the promisor.
The Alaska Supreme Court applied these circumstances in Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice. The party terminated Rice and, citing the writing requirement for contracts over one year, refused to pay her for the rest of her two-year oral contract.112 Whether promissory estoppel could enforce an oral contract within the statute was a question of first impression, and the court examined the policies behind both the statute and the doctrine.113 The evidence let a jury find that Rice relied on Wakefield's implicit promise that the executive committee could not derail his selection for executive or finance director.114 The party focused on the reasonableness of Rice's reliance, but that is only one factor for the jury in deciding whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the contract.115 The court also reasoned that the clear and convincing proof standard attached to the corroboration factor, § 139(2)(c), reassures that promissory estoppel will not make the statute superfluous in the employment context, and it adopted § 139 as the law of the jurisdiction.116
A claimant with less to show fares worse. A buyer who points only to a seller's repeated assurances that a written contract would follow, and whose own reliance was a small deposit with no possession and no improvements, has risked little, and no loss remains that only enforcement could repair. The equities between the parties can even shape who sues. Counsel in Bowlin v. Keifer reported that, because of previous transactions and statements between the original client, the sole heir, and the remaining heirs, the heir conveyed his interest to his brother-in-law and the suit was brought in the brother-in-law's name.117
The Restatement answers the critics through the structure of § 139. It asks for reliance that is definite and substantial relative to the relief sought, looks for corroboration or clear and convincing proof, and tells the court to consider restitution first, so a claimant whose only support is a bare oral deal usually fails.118 Most successful estoppel cases still rest on some additional statement or promise about the writing.119 Indiana states the point strongly: in Brown v. Branch, the court refused to enforce an oral contract to convey land because the plaintiff showed only a denial of the rights the contract would have given and not a substantial and independent injury.120 Remedy limits soften the objection further. A claimant who succeeds on reliance may recover only costs such as travel expenses and wages lost at the old job, and not the value of the promised performance.121
Courts have not settled on a single answer, and § 139 is the Restatement view and not a universal rule. Several positions recur:
- Some courts adopt § 139 for all contracts within the statute, as Alaska did in Rice and as Iowa did in Kolkman v. Roth.122
- Some adopt it in general but reject it for certain categories, such as employment contracts.123
- Some confine estoppel to the traditional situations, a misrepresentation that a writing exists or a promise to create one, as in Diaz-Amador v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage.124
- Some require a substantial independent injury and decline to enforce the oral bargain itself, as in Brown and in a Coca-Cola decision that found the plaintiff was seeking to enforce the very bargain the statute had rendered unenforceable.125
- Some reject any exception for all contracts, reasoning that courts should not create an exception that trumps a statute the legislature passed, as in DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC.126
The same division appears for sales of goods. A contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more is unenforceable unless a signed writing indicates that a contract for sale has been made, and the section opens with the words “Except as otherwise provided in this Section.”127 Promissory estoppel is not among the exceptions the section lists, and some courts read the opening words to rule out any unlisted one. The Montana Supreme Court observed in S&P Brake Supply, Inc. v. STEMCO LP that a majority of jurisdictions allow promissory estoppel to take an oral sales contract out of the writing requirement, reasoning that the Code keeps principles of law and equity, including estoppel, in force to supplement it unless a particular provision displaces them. The drafters of revised Article 2 deleted the opening words to confirm that estoppel may apply, but no jurisdiction has adopted the revision. An answer about goods should therefore state the majority position and note the textual argument against it.