Concept
Charitable Subscriptions and Marriage Settlements
Promissory estoppel
Charitable Subscriptions and Marriage Settlements
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(2) lightens the reliance rule for two kinds of promise: “A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.”1 A charitable subscription is a pledge to give money or property to a charity, and a marriage settlement is a promise of property made in connection with a marriage. The subsection excuses one showing only: that the promise in fact moved the promisee to act or refrain. Because the promises are binding “under Subsection (1),” the rest of the general rule still governs them, injustice requirement included.
The carve-out answers a mismatch between gift promises and the doctrines that ordinarily enforce promises. The consideration doctrine makes a promise to give a gift in the future unenforceable. Promissory estoppel can make a gift promise binding, but only when the promisee’s reliance was expected and detrimental. Section 90(2) goes further and binds charitable pledges without consideration or reliance.2 A charity that has been promised money often has done nothing differently because of the promise, so it can often prove neither a bargain nor reliance.
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown shows how courts managed before the subsection existed. Mary Yates Johnston signed an “Estate Pledge” promising Allegheny College $5,000, to be known as the Mary Yates Johnston memorial fund and used to educate students preparing for the ministry. The sum was not payable until thirty days after her death, but $1,000 was paid during her life and the college set it aside for the stated purpose. She later repudiated the promise, and after her death the college sued her executor for the balance.3 Writing for the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo found consideration in a return promise by the college to set up the memorial fund, a promise that arose “by implication” from its acceptance of the $1,000.4
Cardozo did not stop with consideration. He allowed that the transaction might in the end fit the mold of consideration “without recourse to the innovation of promissory estoppel.”5 He also observed that the state had “adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions,” so that the question was not merely whether enforcement could be squared with consideration “in all its ancient rigor.”6 Because the court found consideration, that observation was dictum, a statement the decision did not need. It nonetheless suggested that promissory estoppel could have supplied an alternative basis for enforcing the gift.7
Neither basis fit the facts well. The underlying motivation was the court’s belief that a charitable pledge should be upheld as a matter of public policy, and to reach that result it strained to fit the facts into a theory of recovery.8 Courts have bent consideration in other gift cases for the same reason. In enforcing promises to give land, they often said that taking possession and making improvements were “good consideration in equity.”9 The true ancestry of those cases is the ancient practice of “livery of seisin,” and the decisions are now recognized as justified by promissory estoppel.10
Reliance alone does not repair the difficulty, because the reliance § 90 requires is demanding. It must not be confused with the legal detriment of consideration. Legal detriment need not be harmful, can be of any magnitude, and must be bargained for. Detrimental reliance under § 90 arises outside any bargain and must involve adverse consequences such that justice cries out for enforcement.11 A charity that merely expects to receive a gift has often suffered no such consequence. Marriage settlements pose the same problem from another side, since proving inducement would require showing that the couple would not have married without the promise. Subsection (2) removes the need to prove inducement for both kinds of promise, so a court can enforce them on the policy ground that motivated the stretched cases.
The relief is not unconditional. Although § 90(2) dispenses with a strict requirement of consideration or reasonable reliance for a charitable subscription, the official comments keep consideration and reliance relevant to whether the promise must be enforced to avoid injustice.12 A pledge backed by a bargain, or by commitments the charity made in response, makes the case for enforcement easy. A pledge that left the charity no worse off gives a court little reason to say that only enforcement can avoid injustice.
Very few courts have adopted the subsection.13 The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. is among those that have. Maryland went the other way. Its court was “not persuaded” that it should, “by judicial fiat,” adopt a policy of favoring charities at the expense of its long-established law of contracts.14 It declined to disregard or modify that law to bestow a preferred status on charitable organizations.15 And it conceded that judgments according to law may not always serve the purposes of justice, which courts ordinarily may not remedy.16
A court that declines § 90(2) can still enforce a charitable promise on the traditional footing, as the King litigation shows. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s papers had been housed in the library of Boston University since they were delivered at his request in July 1964. His estate sued the university for conversion, claiming that the estate, not the university, held title.17 The jury found that a letter Dr. King signed on July 16, 1964, promised the papers to the university, that the letter was not a contract, and that the promise was enforceable as a charitable pledge supported by consideration or reliance.18 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in King v. Trustees of Boston University. It stressed that, despite § 90(2), it did require a charitable organization to show justifiable reliance, and it found that reliance in what the university did beyond keeping custody: indexing the papers, taking care of them, and making them available for research.19
A charity that only hoped to use a gift stands at the other pole. In Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, a donor orally promised a synagogue $25,000, and the synagogue planned to convert a storage room into a library named for the donor. The donor died without paying, and the synagogue sued the estate. The court found no consideration, because the synagogue had promised nothing and suffered no detriment in exchange. It found no reliance, because the synagogue had not begun the renovation and had only entered the money in its budget. In the court’s words, “[a] hope or expectation, even though well founded, is not equivalent to either legal detriment or reliance.”
The hospital’s claim is strong whether or not its jurisdiction has adopted subsection (2). A donor who pledges toward a new wing should reasonably realize that the hospital will respond by committing funds, and the general nature and extent of that response must have been reasonably foreseeable.20 The contract, the loan, and the groundbreaking give the court concrete harm to weigh when it asks whether enforcement is the only way to avoid injustice. The second charity stands where the synagogue stood in DeLeo. If its jurisdiction follows subsection (2), it need not prove that the pledge induced anything, but it has little to set on the scale at the injustice step, because it made no commitment and lost nothing. If its jurisdiction requires reliance, it fails sooner, because a budget entry is not reliance.