Concept
Reliance Versus Related Doctrines
Promissory estoppel
Reliance Versus Related Doctrines
Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts binds a promisor whose promise should reasonably be expected to induce action or forbearance, that does induce it, and that only enforcement can make good without injustice. The remedy may be limited as justice requires.1 Two features of that text mark its borders. It asks for no bargained exchange, which separates it from consideration. It requires no misstated fact and never uses the word estoppel, which separates it from the equitable estoppel that lent the doctrine its name.
The two subsections below take these neighbors in turn. The first shows how to choose between bargain and reliance on a given set of facts, since the choice controls both the analysis and the amount recovered. The second shows how to tell a promise from a statement of fact, the line that separates promissory estoppel from equitable estoppel.
Reliance Versus Consideration
Consideration and reliance put different questions to the same dealing. Consideration asks whether the promisee's act, forbearance, or return promise was bargained for as the price of the promise.2 Reliance asks what the promisor should have foreseen and what the promisee did in response.3 The two inquiries can reach opposite results on identical facts, so a student facing a promise with no obvious exchange must decide which inquiry governs and in what order to run them.
Each basis rests on its own reason for holding the promisor to the word. A gratuitous promise usually goes unenforced because the promisor has received nothing, the promisee loses nothing by nonenforcement except the prospect of a gift, and the rule protects the promisor from improvidence.4 Reliance changes that calculus. Nonenforcement can be unfair when the promisee incurred some loss in relying justifiably on the promise, and promissory estoppel gives relief there even without consideration. The court may enforce the promise as a contract, or only to the extent necessary to remedy the unfair result of the reliance.5
The difference shows at the margin of the market. Under a bargain test, promises made in a family setting, or otherwise on the periphery of the marketplace, are more likely to go unenforced as non-exchange transactions. A promisee's reliance fails the consideration test, however detrimental, unless it was bargained for as the price of the promise.6 Family promises show why. They are usually actuated by affection and altruism and not by an expectation of something in return, so they are gratuitous. The law's family obligations rest mostly on the relationship, and promissory estoppel gives courts an important tool for reaching equitable resolutions of intra-family disputes.7
The word detriment appears on both sides of the line, but the two detriments differ. Consideration counts any act of the promisee from which the promisor derives a benefit, and any detriment or inconvenience the promisee suffers, however small, so long as the promisee acts at the promisor's request.8 Detrimental reliance needs no bargain,9 but it must involve a real loss that the promise caused, enough that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.10 Each doctrine therefore turns on a feature the other ignores. A promisee who takes on a slight inconvenience at the promisor's request supplies consideration although nothing harmful followed. A promisee who spends heavily on a promise the promisor never sought supplies none, yet may have a reliance claim. And when the change of position was bargained for, consideration is present and the reliance inquiry becomes unnecessary.11
The choice matters most for the amount recovered. Suppose an uncle promises his nephew $10,000 toward a car, asking nothing in return, and the nephew reasonably buys one for $5,000. If the nephew can prove a bargained exchange, he recovers the full $10,000.12 If he has only reliance to stand on, the court may enforce the promise to the same extent as a contract or limit the award to what the unfair result requires.13 The result can be small. He might expect to recover only the $5,000 he spent, and if he could readily resell the car for $4,000, perhaps only $1,000.14 The amounts diverge because the two bases protect different interests. Bargain protects the expectation the deal created, while reliance may be limited to what the promisee lost by relying.15
An uncle's promise can also be bargained for. In Hamer v. Sidway, an uncle's promise to his nephew rested on consideration because the nephew gave a forbearance that the uncle sought, and no reliance theory was needed.16 The uncle in the car example sought nothing, so only reliance can carry that claim.
Not every act that follows a promise is a price. The test for any such act is whether the promisor sought it as the price of the promise.17
In the first scene, the trip is no consideration, because the neighbor did not seek it as the price of the promise and derives no benefit from it.18 If the neighbor gives the television to someone else, the acquaintance must proceed on reliance, and a short drive is a slight loss for a doctrine that looks for loss.19 In the second scene, the help was bargained for, so the friend has a contract claim measured by the full promise. The same Saturday appearance can be the price in one setting and mere collection in another, and only the promisor's purpose in asking for it tells which.
Reliance is an ancillary basis for upholding a promise that does not qualify as contractual, so the logical order is to ask first whether a contract was formed and to turn to reliance only if the answer is no.20 Bargain analysis can be demanding, and § 90 can look like an easy fallback. But § 90 may get the client half the promised amount or less, while a bargained exchange gets the whole.21
Promissory Versus Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel, also called estoppel in pais, is the progenitor of promissory estoppel.23 Traditionally it applies when a party misrepresents or conceals a fact and the other party justifiably relies on the deception to that party's injury. The first party may not then deny the utterances or acts.24 Silence counts as misrepresentation where a duty to speak exists.25 Because the doctrine concerns misrepresented facts, reliance on a promise traditionally could not create an equitable estoppel.26 The contrast fits in a line: equitable estoppel concerns a statement of fact, and promissory estoppel concerns a promise.
Williston explained why a promise does not fit the older mold. The only fact a promise represents is that the promisor, when making it, intends to perform. There is usually no misrepresentation about that intention, and any misrepresentation is not what injured the promisee. The promisee relies on a promise and not on a misstatement of fact, so the term promissory estoppel, or something equivalent, should be used to mark the distinction.27 Fraud is no substitute. In 28 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., the court treated an action for fraud and deceit as the most comparable remedy, but noted that fraud cannot be predicated on unfulfilled promises unless the promisor had a present intent not to perform.
Courts stretched the older doctrine because strict adherence produced injustice. Equitable estoppel traditionally arose only from representations about past facts, but courts confronted with injustices like that in Kirksey v. Kirksey stretched the concept to build an entirely new contract doctrine.29 In a case over a grandfather's promissory note, the court called the claim an equitable estoppel. The granddaughter had abandoned her employment and stopped seeking other work because of the promise, and the grandfather's executor was estopped from alleging that the note lacked consideration.30
The older label survives in places. Some modern decisions hold that a promise can form the basis of an equitable estoppel. A party who promises before breach to accept a late payment is estopped from asserting the lateness unless the promise is withdrawn in time, and the promise is enforced though nothing was given for it. That is promissory estoppel in disguise, except that the term promissory estoppel is ordinarily used for the formation of a contract and not for its performance.31 Expect the labels to overlap in opinions, and classify a claim by what the speaker actually said.
The doctrine's origin raises a second difficulty, because equitable estoppel traditionally works as a shield and not as a sword. It bars the party who made a representation from contradicting it, and it creates no cause of action.32 The Hoffman court observed that using the word estoppel for a doctrine that yields affirmative relief offends that tradition. The record there disclosed a number of promises and assurances from Red Owl's agent on which the plaintiffs relied to their detriment.33 Other courts describe the function in defensive terms. Wheeler v. White said that promissory estoppel is defensive in that it estops a promisor from denying the enforceability of the promise.34 Whatever the label, money awarded for reliance is measured by the harm the reliance caused. In Goodman v. Dicker, the court held the defendants liable for the $1,150 the appellees spent preparing to do business under the promised dealer franchise. It disallowed $350 in lost profits, because the true measure is the loss sustained by expenditures made in reliance on the assurance of a franchise.35
A single tenancy can give rise to either doctrine, and the speaker's words decide which.
Insurance disputes show the shared burden. A policyholder who invokes either equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel against an insurer (see Hetchler v. American Life Insurance Co.) must demonstrate detrimental reliance, and the reliance must have been reasonable under the circumstances.36 On an exam, ask first whether the speaker stated a fact or made a promise, then whether the claimant wants protection against a contradiction or recovery for reliance. The word estoppel in the facts or in a court's opinion decides neither question.