Concept
Other Routes to Irrevocability
Offer made irrevocable by statute
Other Routes to Irrevocability
Section 2-205 is one way to bind an offeror who has been paid nothing for a promise to hold an offer open, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts offers two others beside it. Section 87(1)(b) recognizes an offer that “is made irrevocable by statute,” which is where the firm-offer rule fits.1 Section 87(1)(a) adds a signed writing that recites consideration, and § 87(2) adds reliance. Each route answers the same problem: an offeree who has not bought an option cannot ordinarily hold an offeror to a promise of firmness. Each also substitutes something for the missing purchase, whether a recited formality, a legislative commitment, or the offeree’s own reliance.
The statute is both the most generous route and the narrowest. It is generous because a qualifying offer is a “gift” of firmness: the offeree need not give any consideration or buy an option, and a prime contractor’s reliance is protected even where promissory estoppel would not reach it.2 It is narrow because it reaches only offers that meet every condition covered above: a merchant offeror, an offer to buy or sell goods, a signed writing, an assurance of irrevocability, and the limits on the period. An offer that misses one condition gets nothing from the statute, however deliberate the offeror seemed.
Failing § 2-205 therefore does not end the analysis. The offeree may still invoke promissory estoppel or the Restatement’s own rule, under which an offer the offeror should reasonably expect to induce substantial action or forbearance, and which does induce it, binds as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.3 The two subsections below take up the formal route first and the reliance route second.
Signed Recital Under § 87(1)(a)
Section 87(1)(a) makes an offer binding as an option contract, without any statute, if the offer is in a writing signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for making the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.4 The clause has three features, and they divide the work between form and fairness:
- The offer appears in a writing signed by the offeror.
- The writing recites a purported consideration for the making of the offer.
- The offer proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.
The first two are formalities, and the comment to § 87 treats them as such. The signed writing has “vital significance as a formality,” while the ceremonial delivery of a dollar or a peppercorn is an inconsequential one.5 The third feature limits the clause to bargains a court can regard as fair. A reasonable time takes its usual meaning: how long a reasonable person would believe the offer would stay open, judged by all the circumstances.6
A false recital does not defeat the option. Ordinarily a written statement that consideration was given is only evidence, and a party can contradict it by showing that no consideration was given or expected. Within clause (a), however, the giving and recital of nominal consideration perform a formal function only, so proof that the recited consideration was never given does not invalidate the option.7 The comment’s reason is practical: a solemn written agreement should not fall to oral testimony, which is easily fabricated.8 Some authorities have defended the same result with a fiction, reasoning that acceptance of the written instrument imports a promise to make good the recital, and that this promise furnishes the consideration.9 The Restatement drops the fiction. Comment c calls the rule one of enforcement on a “false recital of nominal consideration” and rests it on form instead of an implied promise.10
Most courts have not followed that approach. They traditionally require the nominal consideration to be actually paid, as the court did in Berryman v. Kmoch.11 The trial court there entered summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the option was granted without consideration, was in effect an offer subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance, and had been withdrawn in July 1973, before the optionee exercised it.12 No one involved appears to have known of the Restatement alternative.13
A minority of courts follow the Restatement. The Texas Supreme Court adopted clause (a) in 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, where the option was in a writing signed by the respondent, acknowledged receipt of ten dollars as consideration, and proposed a sale of land on fair terms within a reasonable time; the court recognized that its rule was the minority position.14 Knott v. Racicot (Mass. 2004) adopts the same approach.15 An exam answer should therefore state the Restatement rule and flag that many jurisdictions still insist on actual payment.
Set beside UCC § 2-205, clause (a) shows what each formality buys. A qualifying firm offer under the statute binds without any recital or payment, because the statute lets the offeror make a gift of firmness.16 Clause (a) demands a signed recital and a fair-terms showing, but its text says nothing about merchants, goods, or a three-month ceiling. The two routes overlap without coinciding. A merchant’s signed assurance about goods works under the statute with no recital, and a landowner’s signed letter reciting ten dollars works under clause (a) though never under the statute. An answer should therefore choose the route by the facts.
Reliance Under § 87(2)
Section 87(2) supplies the third route. An offer that the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance, and which does induce such action or forbearance, is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.19 The rule looks at different facts from the statute. The statute inspects the offer, asking who made it, what it concerned, and what the writing promised; § 87(2) inspects what the offeree did because the offer was made. The subsection adopts, and perhaps expands, the result in a leading construction-bidding case.20
Courts reached that result only after hesitation. They first resisted extending promissory estoppel to commercial transactions (see James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers, 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)), and then came to see that an offer made in a commercial setting may invite reliance and cause considerable injustice if revoked before the offeree can accept.21
Drennan v. Star Paving Co. is the leading case. A general contractor preparing a bid for a government construction job followed industry practice and phoned subcontractors for bids, knowing that the lowest ones would be used to calculate its own bid.22 A paving subcontractor supplied a figure, and the general contractor promptly told the subcontractor that it was being awarded the job and that the subcontract was being awarded to the subcontractor.23 When the subcontractor refused to perform, the general contractor sued for damages.24 The bid was silent on revocation. The court found no option supported by consideration and no bilateral contract, because the general contractor’s use of the bid was not an acceptance that bound it to award the subcontract.25 The question left was whether the general contractor’s reliance made the offer irrevocable.26
The court answered yes, applying the promissory-estoppel rule of section 90 of the first Restatement. That rule binds a promise the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character, and which does induce it, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement.27 Its very purpose is to bind a promise without bargained-for consideration, and reasonable reliance holds the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required.28 The subcontractor’s position made the reliance foreseeable. It did not bargain for the use of its bid, but neither did it make the bid idly, indifferent to whether it would be used; it is reasonable to suppose that it submitted the bid to obtain the subcontract.29 The subcontractor had made no express promise not to revoke, but the court found such a promise reasonably implied.30
The protection ends when the general contractor stops acting like an offeree. A general contractor may not delay acceptance after winning the job in the hope of a better price, and it may not reopen bargaining while claiming a continuing right to accept the original offer.31 The period of irrevocability can therefore be brief. If the general contractor fails to accept promptly after the award, the subcontractor is no longer bound, and further negotiation, a counteroffer, or “shopping the job around” for new bids can free the subcontractor to revoke. With those qualifications, Drennan has gained substantial acceptance.32
Reliance also protects an offeree who has only prepared to perform. Part performance in response to an offer for a unilateral contract makes the offer irrevocable under Section 45 of both Restatements, but mere preparation does not; under promissory estoppel, however, preparation may render the offer irrevocable.33 If the offeree’s preparations are substantial, a court can find an option contract based on that detrimental reliance, and recovery may be limited to the amount necessary to avoid injustice.34 The limit appears in the text of § 87(2) itself, which binds the offer only “to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”35
Running the Drennan facts through UCC § 2-205 shows where the two routes part. A bid solicited by telephone and silent on revocation offers no assurance of firmness, so the statute has nothing to enforce.36 The statute protects a qualifying firm offer up front, on the strength of its formalities, so the offeree need not prove reliance or injustice.37 Section 87(2) has no formal screen. A court asks case by case whether the offeror should have expected substantial reliance, whether the offeree did rely, and how much enforcement injustice requires.
The reliance must also be justified. A buyer who gave nothing for a seller’s promise of irrevocability is unlikely to succeed on promissory estoppel: the buyer may have suffered prejudice, but it should have known that the promise was not binding without consideration, and so it was not justified in relying.38 Courts have validated an option without consideration only where the offeree can justify its reliance, and many of those cases involve subcontractor bids.39 Failing § 2-205 therefore sends the offeree to reliance next, but it does not make reliance easy to prove.