Concept
Period of Irrevocability
Offer made irrevocable by statute
Period of Irrevocability
A firm offer stays firm only for a limited time, and the statute that creates the firm offer also sets the limit. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1)(b) says only that an offer “is made irrevocable by statute,” so the duration has to come from the statute itself.1 For a merchant’s signed offer to buy or sell goods, UCC § 2-205 supplies it: the offer is not revocable for lack of consideration “during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months.”2
This unit assumes the offer already meets the other requirements of § 2-205: a merchant’s offer to buy or sell goods, a signed writing, and assurance that the offer will be held open. When the assurance sits on a form the offeree supplied, the offeror must also sign that term separately.3 The Code uses the same device elsewhere: a non-merchant is held to a clause barring modification except by signed writing, in a form a merchant supplied, only if the non-merchant signs that clause separately (§ 2-209(2)).4
A merchant who signs a promise to hold an offer open for two months is bound, without consideration, for two months. A merchant who signs a promise for six months is bound for three. A merchant who gives assurance without naming any period is bound for a reasonable time, and never beyond three months. Suppose each tries to withdraw. The two-month merchant who withdraws at six weeks fails, because six weeks falls inside a period that itself lies within the ceiling. The six-month merchant who withdraws in month four succeeds, because protection without consideration ended with month three.5
Students misread the six-month case in two ways. Some treat a stated period over the limit as void, which would strip the offeree of all protection. Others treat three months as the automatic period for every firm offer, which overrides a shorter period the merchant chose. The text answers both errors: the offer is irrevocable “during the time stated,” so a shorter stated period governs, and the limit caps that period without replacing it.6
The cap makes sense once you see what the statute gives away. Section 2-205 lets the offeror make a “gift” of a firm offer: the offeree gives no consideration and need not buy an option.7 Because the offeree pays nothing, the gift runs for at most three months. The section aims mainly at the offeror who withdraws a firm offer on which the offeree reasonably relies.8 An offeree who needs a longer commitment must look elsewhere, for example by buying an option.
Counting the three months raises a question the Code leaves open: whether the period runs from the date the offer is sent or from the date it is received.9 The difference can decide a case.
The Code is just as silent on how to measure a reasonable time when the writing states none.10 General contract law, in deciding how long an offer stays open, asks how long a reasonable person would believe the offer would last, judged from all the circumstances.11 An advocate can borrow that approach12 and argue from the facts: how fast the price of the goods moves, how long they take to produce or ship, how much time the offeree needs to line up financing or finish a bid that depends on the quote, and what earlier dealings between the parties suggest. An offeree who wants a longer period points to its own needs and to the merchant’s knowledge of them. A merchant who wants a shorter one points to a volatile market. Because a reasonable time can never pass three months, the whole argument takes place inside that window, and an answer should not treat any particular number of weeks as settled.
When the period ends, § 2-205 has nothing left to enforce, because it bars revocation only for the time it fixes. A six-month writing that is still unrevoked in month four no longer binds the merchant under the statute, and the merchant may withdraw it. An offeree who needs more has other routes: buying an option, or invoking the Restatement’s rule that an offer the offeror should reasonably expect to induce substantial action or forbearance, and which does, is “binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice,” or promissory estoppel. Where § 2-205 does not protect the offeree, those doctrines remain available.13