Concept
Firm Offer Requirements
Offer made irrevocable by statute
Firm Offer Requirements
At common law an offeror may revoke at any time before the offeree accepts, so a promise to keep an offer open binds only if the offeree buys an option.1 A statute can displace that default, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(1)(b) treats an offer as binding as an option contract when it “is made irrevocable by statute.”2 For a merchant’s offer to buy or sell goods, the statute is UCC § 2-205:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.3
The Restatement clause adds no conditions of its own, so everything the offeree must show comes from that sentence. The section applies only if there has actually been an offer, by a merchant, to buy or sell goods, in a signed writing, that gives assurance it will be held open.4 Taken in the order the text presents them, those conditions become five questions:
The conditions are cumulative, so a “no” at any step returns the offer to the common-law default, under which the offeror may withdraw before acceptance. The statute lets an offeror make a “gift” of a firm offer, because the offeree need not give consideration for it,5 and each condition does part of the screening work that consideration would otherwise do: it confines irrevocability to offers that look deliberately made.
A failure under § 2-205 does not necessarily leave the offeree without recourse, since the offeree may still invoke promissory estoppel or Restatement doctrine, the routes taken up at the end of this chapter.6 As far as the statute is concerned, though, an offer that misses a condition is an ordinary revocable offer. The first condition looks to the person who made the offer.
Merchant Offeror
The first condition concerns the offeror’s identity. Section 2-205 reaches only an offer “by a merchant,” and § 2-104(1) defines that word more narrowly than ordinary speech does.7 In essence, a merchant is a person who trades professionally in goods of the kind involved, as seller or buyer, or a professional in business who may reasonably be regarded as possessing skill or knowledge about the goods or about transactions of the type in issue.8 The definition therefore leaves out the party whose dealings in the goods are casual or inexpert.9
The reason for the line follows from what the statute gives up. Section 2-205 dispenses with consideration, the device the common law used to test whether a promise was meant to bind, so the remaining conditions must show that the commitment was deliberate. Limiting the rule to merchants lets the statute relax consideration where a considered business commitment is the likely explanation, and it keeps a friendly assurance from a homeowner clearing out a garage from binding by accident.
Her letter carries the same signature and the same twenty-day assurance that a dealer’s letter would carry, so the offeror’s identity is the only fact that separates the two. An exam stem that dresses a casual seller’s promise in formal language tests exactly this point, and a student who stops at “signed writing plus assurance” has skipped the first filter.
Only the offeror must be a merchant. Article 2 has provisions that apply only in transactions “between merchants,” where both parties must qualify, and others that apply when just one party does, and § 2-205 belongs to the second group.10 Students who carry the “between merchants” label over to this section demand a second professional where none is required. The statute asks whether the offeror’s assurance was a deliberate commitment, and the offeree’s sophistication says nothing on that question.
Merchant status also turns on the offeror’s trade and not on which side of the sale the offeror occupies. A business that regularly buys goods of a given kind qualifies as readily as a regular seller, because the definition covers a professional trading in the goods as buyer or as seller.11
Merchant status settles only the first condition. The remaining conditions still have to be checked, and the next asks whether the communication is an offer to buy or sell goods at all.
Offer to Buy or Sell Goods
The next two conditions come from the statute’s opening words: the communication must be an offer, and the offer must be one to buy or sell goods.13 Each rests on a different reason, so this section takes them in turn.
The Code does not define “offer,” so common-law principles decide whether a communication qualifies.14 At common law an offer manifests present willingness to enter a bargain and be bound, and it contains terms specific and definite enough to create a power of acceptance in the offeree.15 That power is what the statute protects. Section 2-205 stops an offeror from revoking “for lack of consideration,” which preserves the offeree’s power to accept, so a communication that never conferred the power leaves nothing to hold open, and a promise attached to it protects nothing.
In I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co. a price quotation was held not to be an offer under § 2-205, so the section never came into play.16 A quotation often invites orders and leaves the seller free to accept or decline each one, and the buyer who says yes is then the one making the offer. Because the recipient holds no power to conclude the bargain alone, there is no offer to hold open. A firm-offer rule that reached such documents would turn every published price list into a standing commitment to anyone who orders.
Both documents mention March 31, which shows that the offer question and the assurance question are independent. A closing date cannot turn a quotation into an offer, and only a true offer raises the further question whether it promises to stay open.
The second limit comes from the Code’s scope. Section 2-205 sits in Article 2, and § 2-105(1) defines goods as things that are movable when identified to the contract for sale, excluding the money in which the price is paid, investment securities, and things in action, and including growing crops, unborn young of animals, and other identified things attached to realty.17 An offer to buy or sell anything outside that definition falls outside the statute however formal the writing. Courts may also be somewhat less eager to relax common-law rules for real property, which is generally handled with more structure and formality than sales of goods.18 An owner’s signed letter offering to sell a beach house and promising to keep the offer open for ten days therefore falls back on the common-law rule: the offer stays freely revocable before acceptance unless it qualifies as an option contract or is made irrevocable by statute or reliance.19
The general contractor is not necessarily without recourse. When § 2-205 is not met, the offeree may still invoke promissory estoppel or the reliance rule of Restatement § 87(2), a route taken up near the end of this chapter.20 A party who wants Article 2’s rules applied to a contract outside the statute may instead argue that the court should borrow them by analogy. That argument works only to the extent the court is persuaded that the UCC rule is a good one that has worked well in practice and that the transaction is sufficiently analogous to a sale of goods.21
The words “buy or sell” mean the offeror may stand on either side of the exchange. In City University of New York v. Finalco, Inc. a buyer’s offer to purchase used computers from a university could not be revoked during the period the offer stated.22 The statute attaches to the offeror’s deliberate assurance wherever it appears, and an offeree relies on it in the same way whichever side the offeror occupies. A university holding a buyer’s firm offer can pass up other purchasers and plan around the sale, just as a contractor holding a seller’s firm offer can arrange financing or bid a job. Students who treat § 2-205 as a rule about sellers’ letters, because sellers’ letters are the usual illustration, deny buyers protection the text extends to them.
An exam stem that describes a signed assurance on a price list sent to many customers tests the offer threshold. A stem about land, labor, or securities tests the goods threshold. A stem built around a buyer’s assurance tests neither, because buyers’ offers are covered.
Signed Writing
The Restatement clause leaves every requirement to the statute, so the signed-writing condition comes from § 2-205 itself, which protects only an offer made “in a signed writing.”24 A merchant who assures an offeree orally that an offer will stay open, however clearly and sincerely, leaves the offer at the common-law default, revocable until accepted.
The condition exists because § 2-205 removes the need for consideration, and something must take over the job consideration did. A formality can. Formalities serve an evidentiary function, giving reliable evidence that a transaction took place; a cautionary function, giving the promisor time to reflect before committing; and a channeling function, signaling that a given device will produce a binding result and sparing the court a search for intent.25 Each has work to do in a firm-offer dispute. An oral assurance leaves the parties with competing memories of whether the offeror promised to hold the offer open and for how long, and because the statute binds the offeror without payment, a mistaken finding would impose a commitment the offeror may never have made. A writing fixes the words, the signature shows that the offeror adopted them, and the act of signing supplies a pause that a passing remark does not. The Restatement’s own formal route to irrevocability rests on the same view, since there the signed writing has “vital significance as a formality.”26
An exam stem in which a merchant telephones an offer and promises to hold it open for 45 days tests this condition. Satisfying the merchant, goods, and assurance conditions does not rescue the offer.
Modern courts readily recognize that “writing” is not confined to hard copy on a tangible document and extends to recording in electronic form.27 The reason follows from the formality’s functions. A stored e-mail can be produced and read months later, so it serves the evidentiary function as well as paper does, and any medium that reliably records the assurance and shows the offeror’s adoption of it serves the same purposes. The signature is likewise a matter of adoption: the Code’s definition of “signed” in § 1-201(b)(37) has been updated to reflect that records that are not writings may be signed by “attachment to or logical association with the record of an electronic symbol, sound, or process with the present intent to adopt or accept the record.”28
The signature that counts is the offeror’s, because the commitment being enforced is the offeror’s, and the offeree’s signature does no work at this stage. The statute’s one reference to signing a particular term, in the proviso on forms the offeree supplies, again names the offeror, as the last subsection below shows.29
A signed writing satisfies only this condition. Whether the writing gives assurance that the offer will be held open is the separate question taken up next, and an unsigned draft, however detailed, leaves the offer at the common-law default. An answer should state the condition as a signed writing and add that an electronic record adopted with present intent qualifies.
Assurance of Irrevocability
The fourth condition concerns what the signed writing says. Under § 2-205 the writing must, “by its terms,” give “assurance that it will be held open.”31 This condition is separate from the three before it. A merchant can make an offer to sell goods, sign it, and still fail here, because an offer that states price, quantity, and delivery but says nothing about holding it open is an ordinary offer, and the common-law rule that the offeror may revoke before acceptance governs it.32
The reason lies in what the statute removes. It excuses a promise not to revoke from the consideration requirement, so an offeree whose offer qualifies need not have bought an option.33 A statute that excuses a promise from consideration presupposes that a promise exists, and an offer alone is not one. An offer tells the offeree that the offeror is willing to deal on stated terms and gives the offeree the power to accept, but it says nothing about how long the offeror will refrain from withdrawing. The freedom to withdraw is the common-law default, and an assurance is the offeror’s own choice to give it up for a period. Without the requirement, every signed offer a merchant sent would become irrevocable on signing, and the exception would absorb the rule.
The phrase “by its terms” points to the words of the writing itself. The statute binds the offeror without payment, so the commitment should be the offeror’s own deliberate statement, visible on the page, and not something a court infers from the circumstances. That fits the work the signature does: the signature shows that the offeror adopted the writing, and this condition asks what the adopted writing says.
The paradigm is a merchant’s signed offer stating that it will be held open for 30 days. If the merchant tries to withdraw ten days later, the statute makes the offer not revocable for lack of consideration, so it stays open for the stated period.34 The statute prescribes no formula, so other wording that promises the offer will remain available should do the same work, whether it holds the offer open until a stated date, says the offeror will not withdraw before then, or declares the offer irrevocable. The writing need not state a duration at all, because the statute supplies a reasonable time when none is stated, and in no event more than three months.35 Every version shares one feature: it speaks to how long the offer will survive, in addition to stating the terms of the deal.
The paint letter and the thirty-day letter share a merchant, goods, and a signature, and only a sentence promising to keep the offer open separates them. Students often merge offer and assurance into one idea, as though a signed offer from a merchant carried its own promise of firmness. The two conditions fail independently. The price sheet discussed above had a closing date but was not an offer, while the paint letter is an offer with no assurance. An exam stem that lists merchant, goods, and signature but never mentions a promise to hold the offer open tests whether you notice what is missing.
Normile v. Miller shows the same point outside the statute. The offerees apparently believed they held an option, a counteroffer they could delay accepting without losing the power of acceptance even if the seller tried to revoke, and they were wrong in part because the court found that the seller had never expressly promised not to revoke it.36 Section 2-205 can relieve an offeree of paying for such a promise,37 but it cannot supply the promise, so an offeree relying on a merchant’s offer must point to words promising that the offer will stay open.
A harder question arises when a merchant’s signed offer sets a date for the offeree’s reply, such as a request to respond by May 10, and says nothing else about holding the offer open. The date can be read as a promise that the offer will stay available until then, or as information about when the offer lapses if no one accepts. The text of § 2-205 requires assurance that the offer will be held open and does not say how a bare reply date is to be treated. By comparison, the CISG provides that an offer cannot be revoked if it indicates that it is irrevocable, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise.38 The contrast shows the question is a real one under the American text, which contains no such language. An answer should treat the point as one of construing the particular writing: identify the offeror’s actual words, ask whether they speak of holding the offer open (firm until, will not be withdrawn before) or only of when it ends (expires, please reply by), and argue the reading the language best supports without assuming the result.
Offeree’s Form Rule
The last clause of § 2-205 adds a condition that applies in only one setting: “any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.”40 The setting arises when the promise to hold the offer open is printed on a document the offeree prepared, typically a buyer’s purchase-order form, and there the signature that satisfies the signed-writing condition is not enough by itself. The offeror must also sign the assurance term separately.
The stated purpose of the proviso is to protect “against entrapment of an offeror by a printed clause on the offeree’s form, such as ‘All offers are to be irrevocable for 30 days.’”41 The mechanism is easy to trace. A buyer’s form is typically signed to place or confirm an order, and the signer’s attention goes to price, quantity, and delivery, not to the boilerplate printed around them. A signature at the bottom of the page shows assent to the transaction and would satisfy the signed-writing condition mechanically, because the page is signed. If that were all the statute required, a clause the seller never noticed would become a free option, and the seller would bear the market risk for the whole period of irrevocability. Section 2-205 can excuse the offeree from paying for the option only because the signed formality marks the promise as a deliberate commitment, and a sentence buried in pre-printed text and signed along with everything else carries no such mark. A separate signature directed at the assurance term forces a conscious act aimed at that promise, which an offeror is unlikely to perform by accident.
The two signature requirements answer different questions. The ordinary requirement asks whether the offeror adopted the writing as a whole, and the proviso asks whether the offeror adopted this one term. On the offeror’s own paper the two questions collapse into one, because the offeror chose every word of the offer, including the promise to hold it open, and signing the writing adopts all of them. On the offeree’s form the offeror chose none of the words, so a general signature says little about whether the offeror knew of the assurance. The proviso follows who supplied the form and does not depend on how sophisticated the offeror is. The offeror must still be a merchant for § 2-205 to apply, and a merchant’s familiarity with offers does not mean the merchant read every line of a counterparty’s printed form.
The proviso has no application when the offeror writes the offer. A merchant who types a quotation on its own letterhead, states that the offer is firm for 30 days, and signs once at the bottom has satisfied the statute, because the assurance is the offeror’s own language on the offeror’s own paper. A student who sees a signature on a buyer’s purchase order and stops at “signed writing” has checked one condition and skipped another. An offeree whose form fails the proviso is an ordinary offeree under § 2-205, and any remaining claim must rest on the reliance route taken up near the end of this chapter.42 The Code uses the same device elsewhere: under § 2-209(2), a clause in a merchant’s form that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing binds a non-merchant only if the non-merchant separately signed it.43