Concept
Irrevocability by Statute
Offer made irrevocable by statute
Irrevocability by Statute
Typically, at common law, an offeree must give consideration to keep an offer open; otherwise the offeror may revoke at any time.1 A statute can override that rule. Section 87(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts records the override: an offer is binding as an option contract if it "is made irrevocable by statute."2 The clause is one of several routes to an option contract collected in § 87.3
The offerees in Normile learned what the common-law rule can cost. They believed they held an option, an offer they could delay accepting without losing the power of acceptance even if the offeror tried to revoke in the meantime. They were wrong, in part because the seller had never expressly promised not to revoke.4
The Restatement clause states a consequence and leaves the trigger to other law. It mentions no writing, no signature, no particular kind of offeror, and no time limit, and the statute that makes an offer irrevocable supplies those conditions itself. Statutes differ in what they cover, so one sentence in the Restatement could not restate them all. An offeree who invokes clause (1)(b) must therefore name a statute that reaches the offer and then satisfy that statute's own terms. Naming the statute is the first move on an exam.
"Binding as an option contract" carries the effect of any valid option. The offeror must keep the offer open for the stated period, the offeree's power of acceptance lasts until the period ends, and the offeror cannot lawfully revoke before then.5 Only the source of the commitment changes. The offeree paid nothing, and the statute supplies the commitment, which is why a firm offer is called a statutorily created option contract.6
The statute that matters most on exams is UCC § 2-205. It makes certain offers by merchants irrevocable even though the offeree gives no consideration to keep them open.7 The protection depends on a merchant offeror, an offer to buy or sell goods, a signed writing, and an assurance that the offer will be held open, and the period of irrevocability cannot exceed three months. A promise to hold an offer open therefore does not become a firm offer just because it is a promise. The next sections take each condition in turn.
The signed-writing condition is a formality, and formalities do identifiable work. A writing is reliable evidence that the transaction took place. The act of signing gives the promisor time to reflect before binding himself. The form also tells everyone that the device will achieve the intended result.8 Comment c to § 87 makes the same observation about the signed-recital route: there the signed writing has vital significance as a formality, while the ceremonial delivery of a dollar or a peppercorn is inconsequential.9 When a statute dispenses with consideration, the writing and the signature are what mark the promise as deliberate.
Two signed letters, each promising to keep an offer open for thirty days, show how much turns on the statute.
The letters share a signature, a thirty-day promise, and an offeree who paid nothing, so none of those facts separates them. What separates them is whether a statute reaches the transaction, the question clause (1)(b) hands to the student.
UCC § 2-205 is not the only statute that can fill the clause. New York General Obligations Law § 5-1109 enforces signed written promises not to revoke despite the absence of consideration, though by its own terms it does not override § 2-205 for a merchant's offer to buy or sell goods.10 Many jurisdictions also have statutes governing the revocation and acceptance of subcontractor bids on government jobs.11 Outside the United States, CISG article 16(2) is the international counterpart of the firm-offer rule,12 and it sweeps more broadly: it does not confine irrevocability to merchants, writings, or three-month periods.