Concept
Analyzing a Section 86 Problem
Promise for a benefit previously received
Analyzing a Section 86 Problem
Section 86 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts becomes a working method because its two subsections ask their questions in a natural order. Subsection (1) supplies the basis for enforcement: a promise made in recognition of a benefit the promisor previously received from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.1 Subsection (2) names what defeats or trims that basis. Clause (a) excludes a benefit conferred as a gift, along with any other case in which the promisor has not been unjustly enriched. Clause (b) cuts a promise back to the extent its value is disproportionate to the benefit.2 The earlier sections taught these pieces one at a time. This section runs them in sequence against a single pattern: someone confers a benefit, and the recipient later promises to pay for it.
Running the Questions
Each question screens out claims that the next one would waste effort on. A claim with no benefit to the promisor leaves § 86 nothing to enforce. A promisee who acted as a donor has no unjust enrichment claim to release, and release of that claim is what the promise buys: a promisee with a potentially valid unjust enrichment claim has a legal right to trade it, and the promisor's money is the exchange.3 Only a promise that survives these screens raises the question of amount. The promise itself needs a separate test. No bargain stands behind it, so the safeguards that consideration ordinarily supplies are missing, and the court must ask for itself whether the promise was a sober, voluntary commitment unaffected by impulse or manipulation.4
Two steps repay extra attention. Step 3 contains three separate questions, and the promisor's sincerity answers none of them. An analysis that treats gratitude as enough has skipped the screening that § 86 exists to perform. Step 6 comes last in the list but first in practice when a problem names a controlling statute or precedent, because that authority changes the framework before any benefit is weighed.
Sam and Benny Applied
Benny is away on a trip and out of contact when a storm damages his roof. His neighbor Sam buys a tarpaulin and climbs up to cover the hole, but he falls. The fall costs him $4,000 in medical expenses and $2,000 in unpaid sick leave, and he has no medical or disability insurance.5 Two other routes need closing off before § 86 enters the analysis. A contract claim fails because Benny made no promise before the repair; the work was finished when he spoke. Restitution fits poorly as well. Sam did not reasonably intend to be paid beyond the cost of the tarpaulin, so he was a volunteer in climbing onto the roof, and restitution looks to the benefit Benny received, which bears no relationship to the size of Sam's loss.6
Section 86 offers a better basis once Benny makes a promise. When he returns and learns of the fall, he promises to cover the medical bills and the lost pay, and he later refuses to pay. Step 1 is met. Benny received a benefit from Sam, the protection of his house until he returned, and a promise that names Sam's losses recognizes that benefit.7 The promise also shifts the equities in Sam's favor. By recognizing the benefit and placing a value on it, Benny creates the presumption that Sam did not confer it with gratuitous intent.8 The remaining steps test that presumption.
Step 2 splits Sam's outlay. Altruistic intent may reasonably stop short of donating out-of-pocket expenses, so it is reasonable to attribute to Sam the intent to claim reimbursement for the cost of the tarpaulin. A neighbor's services in protecting property are more likely altruistic and gratuitous, even when they involve personal risk, because a person who elects a risky favor cannot claim danger pay.9 That split explains why restitution alone would return the tarpaulin's cost and nothing more. It also shows what Benny's promise adds: the presumption of non-gratuitous intent reaches the losses that restitution would treat as donated.
Step 3 raises the three “other reasons” questions, and Sam clears each. Nothing in the facts suggests Sam already owed Benny the work. Nor did he force the benefit on an unwilling recipient. A person is generally not justified in imposing an unrequested benefit, but in an emergency the intervention is not intermeddling if the harm of inaction would be serious, there is no opportunity to get authorization, and there is no reason to believe the beneficiary would object.10 The open hole threatened serious damage, Benny could not be asked, and nothing suggests he would object. The emergency was less urgent than one in which delay would risk death or serious injury, so a court might weigh this point closely. Finally, the benefit reached the promisor himself, because the roof is Benny's.
Step 4 turns to the promise, which is the only safeguard this claim has. The court asks whether Benny's promise was a sober and voluntary commitment.11 He offered it on learning of the fall, without being pressed, and that points to a deliberate undertaking and not a reflex of thanks. A variation shows how much turns on this step.
The two versions share every fact through step 3 and diverge only at step 4. A promise offered freely is evidence of a serious commitment, while a promise extracted at the door shows only that the promisor wanted the confrontation to end. The earlier steps do not make up for that difference.
Step 5 measures the promise. Sam's losses total $6,000, and the benefit to Benny, protection of a house from the weather, has no fixed relationship to that sum. Measured against the benefit alone, a fair promise could look excessive. Where the promise answers the injury, it is fairer to measure proportion against the injury, and a promise to cover $6,000 in medical bills and lost pay fits that measure.12 The words “to the extent” in clause (b) still do their work. A promise of ten times Sam's losses, made in a rush of gratitude, would exceed anything the injury or the benefit supports, and a court would enforce the portion that fits and decline the rest.13
Step 6 keeps the conclusion honest. The older qualification to the past-consideration rule already lets a promise stand when the promisor, having received a material benefit, is morally bound to compensate the promisee and promises to do so; the promise is then treated as an affirmance or ratification of the services rendered.14 Section 86 states that idea as a general rule, but few courts have considered it, and those that have generally declined to extend the moral-obligation doctrine beyond the narrow situations involving earlier unenforceable or avoidable legal obligations.15 A court that follows that cautious approach would leave Benny's promise unenforced as a promise for a past benefit. A state with a statute of the kind covered under statutory alternatives would let form decide instead. Benny's oral promise would fail for want of a signed writing that expresses the consideration, and a signed writing reciting Sam's help would satisfy the statute without any inquiry into Benny's enrichment.
A complete answer therefore reaches two conclusions. Under § 86, Sam has a strong claim for up to his $6,000 in losses if Benny's promise was freely made. That claim exists only in a jurisdiction willing to follow the Restatement.