Concept
The Past Consideration Barrier
Promise for a benefit previously received
Promise for Benefit Received
The Past Consideration Barrier
A promise to reward help the promisor has already received usually fails for want of consideration. Someone nurses a sick stranger or pays a bill on another's behalf. The recipient promised nothing at the time and says only afterward, "I will pay you for that." The earlier act cannot support the later promise. The bargain theory of consideration produces this result, and the reason is timing, not the size of the benefit or the promisor's good faith.
That theory treats consideration as an exchange in which each side's undertaking induces the other's. The promisor seeks the promisee's act or return promise as the price of the promise, and the promisee gives it in response. When the promisee acts first, the later promise cannot have induced the act, because the act was finished before the promise existed. No inducement means no consideration, and no consideration means no contract.1 Lawyers call a completed performance of this kind past consideration. The label sounds contradictory, since something already finished cannot be the price of a promise made afterward. A related rule springs from the same exchange requirement: a promisee who merely does what the law already obliged it to do gives nothing new in return. That rule returns later in the chapter.2
The classic case is Mills v. Wyman. Daniel Mills cared for Levi Wyman, who was sick, twenty-five years old, and long gone from his father's household. The son was in no respect under his father's care, and Mills did not give his kindness and services at Seth Wyman's request.4 Seth Wyman afterward promised to compensate Mills, then determined to break the promise. The court held that the nonsuit directed by the trial court was right and entered judgment for the defendant.5 It found the promise made without any legal consideration, and it called the rule that a mere verbal promise without consideration cannot be enforced "universal in its application." Courts could not depart from the rule, it said, "to suit particular cases in which a refusal to perform such a promise may be disgraceful."6
The court did not pretend the outcome was comfortable. It acknowledged that the father had determined to break his promise and was willing to have his case appear on record as a strong example of particular injustice sometimes necessarily resulting from the operation of general rules.7 Courts tolerate that cost because of what the consideration requirement protects. A promise motivated by affection, generosity, or altruism returns nothing to the promisor. Refusing to enforce it costs the promisee only the prospect of a gift, so the promisor may recant without liability. That policy shields the promisor from improvidence. It also shields the promisor's heirs and creditors, whose claims against the promisor's assets take priority over a promise to give them away.8
Gratitude, which is the usual reason for a later promise, does not repair the defect. One might argue that a strong moral duty to repay a favor should itself count as consideration. Williston's treatise answers that this test would prove too much. Since there is a moral obligation to perform every promise, a morality-based test would enforce every promise, including every promise that repeats or restates an earlier gratuitous one. The test would also vary with the opinion of each individual.9 A rule with no boundary cannot function as a rule, so the law does not treat moral obligation as a general substitute for consideration.
Courts have recognized a few narrow exceptions, each involving a later promise to pay an existing debt the law would otherwise not enforce. The three widely recognized situations are a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, a debt discharged in bankruptcy, and an avoidable debt.10 Mills's care was a first-time favor with no earlier debt behind it, so none of these exceptions reached it.
Dougherty v. Salt shows the same structure from a different angle. Helena promised something to her eight-year-old nephew. It is hard to see what a child that age could have done for his aunt. The court's reasoning goes further: even if he had performed services for her or otherwise benefitted her, her later promise would not have been enforceable.11 Helena did not make the promise to extract something from her nephew in return, so the court held it an unenforceable gift promise.12 A benefit that did not induce the promise cannot be consideration for it, however much the promisor appreciates it.
This pattern matters for exams. When a fact pattern has a promise of thanks coming after the help, ask who spoke first. Under the bargain theory, order of events decides the analysis. The value of the benefit, the promisee's sacrifice, and the promisor's sincerity do not.
The barrier is not the end of the story, because it sometimes produces results that courts regard as plainly unjust. Some courts therefore qualified the rule where the promisor, having received a material benefit from the promisee, is morally bound to compensate the promisee and promises to pay in recognition of that obligation. In such cases, the later promise is treated as an affirmance or ratification of the services, with a presumption that a prior request for them was made.13 The next unit's case, Webb v. McGowin, shows how a court faced the barrier head-on. It found strict application of the rule very unjust, partly because the promisor's serious intent to honor the promise was evidenced by his payments until his death. It overcame the barrier with the legal fiction of deeming the detriment contemporaneous with the promise.14 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86 later generalized the idea: a promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.15