Concept
The Consideration Problem
Promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations
Promise to Pay Time-Barred Debt
The Consideration Problem
A father promised in writing to repay the stranger who had sheltered his dying son, and the court refused to enforce the promise. In Mills v. Wyman, the son was twenty-five and had long since left his father's family. He fell sick among strangers on his return from abroad, and the plaintiff, acting the part of the good Samaritan, gave him shelter and comfort until he died. The father, told of the death and moved by a transient feeling of gratitude, promised to pay the expenses, then decided to break the promise. The court held that the promise was made without legal consideration: the kindness was not bestowed at the father's request, and the son was in no respect under his father's care.1
The holding follows from what consideration is. In the United States, the most common basis for enforcing a promise is that it was made for something in return, as part of a bargain or deal. The thing in return may be a sought-after return promise, or it may be the actual doing or forbearing of an act.2 A promise is the price of a performance only if the promisor sought that performance and the promisee supplied it in exchange. In Mills the care was finished before the father spoke, and he had asked for none of it. His promise could not have induced the care, and the care could not have been the price of his promise. Gratitude explains why he spoke, but it does not turn his promise into a bargain.
Lena's promise fails for the same reason the father's does, and Mills went further by rejecting the idea that moral obligation alone can carry a promise. The court acknowledged that a moral obligation is said to be a sufficient consideration for an express promise, and that some authorities state the rule that broadly. After examining the cases, however, it concluded that the universality of the rule could not be supported. There must have been some preexisting obligation, made inoperative by positive law, to form the basis of an effective promise.3 The court explained that great interests of society justify withholding the law's coercive arm from "duties of imperfect obligation." These duties are imperfect not because they bind the conscience less, but because the wisdom of the social law does not impose sanctions on them.4
The requirement of a preexisting obligation is what keeps the doctrine narrow. The court's illustrations were debts barred by the statute of limitations, debts incurred by infants, and debts of bankrupts. A promise to pay such a debt is not a promise to pay something for nothing, and it is not a naked pact. It is the voluntary revival of an obligation that existed before and that the law had dispensed with, principally for the public convenience. The promise merely removes an impediment the law had placed in the way of recovering a debt honestly due.5 The father in Mills had no such obligation to revive. The care was not given at his request, so no debt of his existed for a later promise to restore.
Read this way, "moral obligation" is shorthand for a narrow, judicially recognized set of situations in which a debtor promises to pay an earlier unenforceable debt. Three are widely recognized: a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, a promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, and a promise to pay an avoidable debt.6 Although the later promise lacks consideration, courts treat the moral obligation to pay the preexisting unenforceable debt as sufficient justification for enforcing it.7 The label suggests more than the doctrine delivers. A moral duty with no earlier debt behind it supports nothing.
What, then, separates the father in Mills from a debtor who promises, after the limitations period has run, to pay a bill the debtor really owed? The answer is the antecedent debt, and the debtor in the next example has one.
The time-barred debt is the first situation Mills lists, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 82(1) states the modern rule. A promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor is binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute of limitations.8 The working parts of that rule come next. For now the line it draws is clear. On one side are promises that revive an earlier debt. On the other is gratitude for a benefit that never created a debt, which the general rule leaves to conscience.