Concept
Alternative Promises
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Alternative Promises
A promise that lets its maker choose between two or more performances cannot be tested the usual way, because there is no single performance to examine. Section 75 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes a bargained-for promise consideration only if the promised performance would be consideration, and it carves out §§ 76 and 77 from that test.1 Section 77 covers the alternative promise: a promise or apparent promise is not consideration if, by its terms, the promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances, unless one of two conditions is met.2
The rule denies the promisor a free way out. A promisor who may pick among alternatives will pick the cheapest, so if any alternative would fail as consideration on its own, the promisor can steer toward it and end up bound to nothing. The illusory promise from earlier in this chapter is the limiting case, because the promisor's alternative is simply to do nothing. Section 77 extends that concern to every promise that offers a menu of performances and asks whether the menu contains an exit that costs the promisor nothing.
The section removes the exit in two ways. Under the first, every alternative would have been consideration if it alone had been bargained for, so whichever one the promisor selects, a real commitment follows.3 Under the second, only one alternative would have counted, but there is, or appears to the parties to be, a substantial possibility that events will eliminate the others before the promisor chooses, so the costless route cannot be relied on.4 The two subsections below take them in that order.
Section 77 speaks of a promisor who reserves the choice. When the promisee holds the choice instead, the promisor cannot steer toward the cheapest alternative, and the analysis changes, as the first subsection explains.
Every Alternative Qualifies
A promise that reserves to its maker a choice among alternative performances is consideration under § 77(a) when each alternative would have been consideration if it alone had been bargained for.5 Because the promisor decides later, the test must look at every performance the promisor might render. Take the alternatives one at a time and ask of each whether a promise of that performance alone, made in exchange for the return promise, would be consideration. If every alternative passes, the promise passes. A promisor who may choose will choose the cheapest alternative, so the promise is only as strong as the weakest item on the menu, and when even the weakest item is a real commitment, no exit remains.
A gallery that promises a buyer any one of three paintings, the gallery's choice, for $2,000 shows the test at work. A promise to deliver the first painting for $2,000 would be a bargain, and so would a promise to deliver the second or the third, since each requires the gallery to surrender a painting it was free to keep. Every alternative passes, so the gallery's promise is consideration however the gallery chooses.
The same logic governs alternative prices. A condition that might have ended a land contract can instead keep it in force and give the buyer alternative promises: to pay either the higher price or the lower one.6 Provided that each promise, on its own, would be consideration, nothing is objectionable in permitting a party to select between alternative promises.7 Neither price is an exit, because the buyer pays one or the other.
A closer case arises when one alternative asks little of the promisor. One court held that an obligation to give advance notice of termination was enough to keep a promise from being illusory, provided the party was irrevocably bound until the notice was given.8 That can look like form over substance beside a purely discretionary promise, but the notice gives a court a basis for validation if it finds the agreement fairly bargained for.9 The phrase would have been consideration imports the whole bargain requirement, and a slight performance can satisfy it. The classic peppercorn bought for $1,000 qualifies, but only if the buyer really was willing to part with the money in exchange for the peppercorn, as when it once sat on George Washington's table.10 The question for each alternative is whether it is a genuine, bargained-for surrender of freedom, not how heavy the surrender is.
A single alternative that is no legal detriment at all changes the answer, because the promisor can select it and owe nothing new.
A standard problem fails the same way. A promises to paint for B, and B promises, in exchange, either to do masonry work for A or to pay A a liquidated debt of $5,000, a debt in a fixed amount, that B already owes. Paying a debt already owed is no detriment, so one of B's alternatives is not consideration, B's promises do not support A's, and the attempted bilateral contract is void.11 One bad alternative that the chooser can always select taints the whole promise.
Everything above assumes that the promisor holds the choice. Where the choice belongs to the promisee, the promisor cannot steer toward the cheapest alternative, because the promisee can insist on whichever one counts, and the alternatives supply consideration if any one of them is detrimental.12 Had Jack been the one to choose among Smith's lessons, the portrait, and the class, Jack could have demanded the lessons or the portrait, so Smith's promise would have bound Smith to something real and Jack's promise to pay would be enforceable.
A conjunctive promise differs again. It promises this and that, not this or that, so the promisor must perform every component, and one detrimental component is enough to support a counter-promise.13 If A promises B a black Honda in return for B's promise to pay a $500 liquidated debt and to paint A's fence, the promise to pay the debt gives nothing, but the promise to paint the fence is a detriment and supplies consideration for A's promise.14
Alternatives That May Disappear
Section 77(b) rescues a promise in which only some of the alternatives would have been consideration. It requires that one alternative would have been consideration and that there is, or appears to the parties to be, a substantial possibility that events will eliminate the alternatives that would not have been consideration before the promisor exercises the choice.16 Weighed alternative by alternative, such a promise ordinarily fails, because a promisor who holds the choice can select the non-qualifying alternative, such as paying a debt already owed, and owe the promisee nothing new.17 The rescue applies when the parties cannot count on that free exit remaining open.
A free exit is worth something to a promisor only if it will still be open when the choice comes due. If the parties reasonably expect that events may close it first, the promisor has accepted the chance that the genuine performance will be the only one left, as part of the price of the deal, and the promisee has bargained for a real chance at that performance. The promise then lacks the mark of the illusory promise, the costless option to do nothing.
Each of the two requirements has its own reason. The requirement that one alternative would have been consideration gives the promisee something genuine to hope for, since if every alternative were empty, events could clear away some and leave the rest equally empty. The requirement of a substantial possibility keeps the rescue from swallowing the rule, because almost any free exit can be imagined to vanish, and a remote chance of that leaves the promisor as free in practice as before. And because the text accepts a possibility that merely appears substantial to the parties, the inquiry looks to what they saw when they struck the bargain.
A constructed illustration shows where the line falls, using the Smith of the preceding subsection.
The earlier Smith faced a class certain to run, a free exit that nothing could close, and his promise failed. This Smith faces a class that may vanish, and the whole difference follows from that fact, since he cannot be sure the costless route will still exist when the choice arrives. Jack bargained for a real chance at lessons or a portrait, and the possibility of cancellation makes that chance genuine. Had enrollment already reached twelve when the promise was made, the class would again be a dependable exit, and the promise would fail as before.
Section 77(b) should be kept apart from the problem of the slight alternative. A small burden, such as a duty to give advance notice of termination, is still a real commitment, so the question it raises belongs to § 77(a), whether the alternative is a genuine, bargained-for detriment.18 Section 77(b) concerns an alternative that is no detriment at all, such as a duty already owed to the promisee, and it saves the promise only because the parties foresee events removing that alternative.
An analysis that stops at the observation that one alternative is already owed has applied § 77(a) and found a failure. The remaining work is to ask what the parties foresaw about that alternative.