Concept
Promises as Consideration
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Promises as Consideration
A promise can be the price of a return promise, but only through the performance it pledges. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75 says so directly: except as §§ 76 and 77 provide, a bargained-for promise is consideration “if, but only if, the promised performance would be consideration.”1 The earlier sections tested acts, forbearances, and changes in legal relations against the bargain requirement, the preexisting duty rule, and the settlement rules. Section 75 sends a promise through those same tests by looking past the words to the performance behind them. Would that performance, once delivered, have counted?
Many students suppose that in a bilateral contract each promise supports the other simply because each party undertakes something the law did not already require. The cases do not work that way. Uttering a promise supplies no consideration. A court scrutinizes the promised performance, and a promise supports the counter-promise only if that performance would be consideration.2 Suppose B tells A, “If you pay me the $50 you owe me, I promise to give you a DVD worth $10.” B’s promise is unenforceable, because A, by paying, would do only what A was already legally bound to do.3 Performing a duty owed to the promisor that is neither doubtful nor honestly disputed is not consideration, unless the performance differs from the duty in a way that reflects more than a pretense of bargain, and a promise to perform that duty fares no better.4
The rule closes two shortcuts. A promisor could not make a gift binding by asking the recipient to “promise” something worthless, and a party could not turn performance of a duty already owed into consideration by recasting the performance as a promise to perform it.
Section 75 opens with “except as stated in §§ 76 and 77” because the rule has two adjustments: one for conditional promises (§ 76) and one for promises that reserve a choice among alternative performances (§ 77).5 The last subsection below treats conditional promises, and alternative promises have their own section later. Before that come two contrasting problems: the promise that sounds firm but leaves the promisor free to do nothing, and the promise that looks empty but carries a commitment a court finds in context.
Illusory Promises
An illusory promise looks like a commitment and binds the promisor to nothing. Its words put no limit on the speaker’s freedom. The speaker’s future action stays subject to the speaker’s future will, as if nothing had been said, and a prediction of future willingness is not a promise.6 Section 75 asks whether the promised performance would be consideration, and an illusory promise promises no performance, so it cannot support the other party’s return promise.7
The lawn is the simplest case. X promises to pay Y $20 to cut X’s lawn, and Y promises to cut it “if he feels like it.” Y’s duty depends on his mood, so Y has a free way out: if he never feels like it, he never breaches. Nothing supports X’s promise to pay, and X is not bound.8 A bargain requires each side to give up some freedom the law would otherwise leave it, and Y has given up none.
The same defect appears in commercial dealing. A supplier agrees to deliver “such goods as the retailer may, in its discretion, order from time to time.” The retailer may order everything or nothing, so it has committed itself to nothing and has given no consideration for the supplier’s promise. The retailer may believe it has bound the supplier while keeping its own options open. In fact the supplier is not bound either, and need not fill any order the retailer submits.9
The question arises only when the party who made the illusory promise tries to enforce the contract. If Y never feels like mowing, Y has not breached and X has no complaint. A consideration issue appears when X repudiates before Y has mowed and Y sues for damages, and X answers that Y had a free way out.10
Standard-form terms can reproduce the defect on a larger scale by binding one side tightly while the drafter keeps itself free. In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the agreement bound the employee absolutely to arbitrate but left Hooters free to terminate the agreement on notice and to change the arbitration rules and procedures without notice, and the court held that the agreement lacked consideration because Hooters’ promise was illusory.11 Harris v. Blockbuster, Inc. came out the same way. Its drafter had reserved such broad discretion over its own performance that the only conclusion was that its promise was illusory and could not be consideration.12 A reserved power to revise terms does not create the problem, however, when the contract provides for it, the drafter gives reasonable notice of each change, and the other side may reject a change by ceasing to use the service.13
Some real limit on the promisor’s freedom is enough, and a court does not weigh how large the limit is, because it does not weigh the adequacy of consideration.14 A promisor who may cancel only on notice has committed to perform at least until the notice runs, and a limit that small can still count. In Devine v. Notter, a real estate contract letting either party cancel on its attorney’s disapproval within a limited period was held not illusory.15 A right to terminate at any time, without notice, leaves the promisor bound to nothing.
Conditions within the promisor’s control can hide the same free way out, and they must be examined with care to see whether the promise is in fact illusory.16 The third subsection takes them up.
Older opinions call this defect a lack of “mutuality of obligation” and summarize it in the maxim “both parties must be bound, or neither is bound.” The maxim should not be taken literally, because a contract may commit only one party. In a unilateral contract the offeree’s act of acceptance completes the offeree’s performance, leaving only the offeror’s promise outstanding. A bilateral contract may also give only one side the right to cancel.17 The doctrine is one of mutuality of consideration, and “mutuality of obligation” has been thoroughly discredited, in part because phrasing the rule that way produced exceptions and judicial circumventions.18 Restatement (Second) § 79(c) and comment f disavow the concept as redundant and misleading and deny that it is a separate requirement.19 What survives is that each promise exchanged must itself be real.
An illusory promise on one side does not always doom the arrangement. In Marshall Durbin & Co. v. Baker, the company did not promise Baker employment for any definite period, but it did promise to pay him if he stayed until a triggering event occurred. That promise was contingent, not illusory.20 The company attacked only Baker’s supposed return promise and overlooked that his actual performance was itself sufficient consideration. Baker had given consideration by “an act other than a promise,” and once the event occurred the company’s promise to pay bound it.21 By the same reasoning, X who lets Y mow as requested has received the act X sought, and that act can support X’s promise to pay.
A promise that is illusory when made may also ripen into a binding one once the promisor exercises its discretion, a point the third subsection takes up.22 Reliance, by contrast, does not turn an illusory promise into a bargain. Whether reliance can support a remedy on another theory is the subject of promissory estoppel, taught separately.23
Implied Commitments
A promise that looks empty on its face may still bind its maker, because a court reading a contract is not limited to its express terms. What appears on the surface to be an illusory promise may be a firm undertaking if one can infer that the parties intended an implied promise.25 Two questions follow: when does a court fill a gap with a duty of best efforts or good faith, and when does the contract leave no gap to fill?
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, decided in 1917, is the leading case. Lucy, a fashion designer, gave Wood the exclusive right to market her name, endorsements, and designs and to license others to do so, and Wood undertook to pay her half the profits.26 When Lucy endorsed products on her own and kept all the profits, Wood sued for his share. Lucy answered that no contract existed, because Wood had promised to pay half the profits but had not promised to do anything to earn them.27 The court disagreed. It found in her grant of an exclusive agency a promise by Wood to use reasonable efforts to market her name and products, and that implied promise supplied the consideration.28
Two features of the arrangement carried the implication. The parties plainly meant to make a deal with business efficacy, and that purpose could be achieved only if Wood committed himself to do something, since a profit-sharing agreement under which no profits need ever be generated would serve neither side. The grant was also exclusive. Lucy could license no one else, so Wood was the sole source of income from her name, and both parties must have intended him to use best efforts.29 That Wood had a business organization suited to the task made the intention easier to credit.30 The implied duty also gives § 75 a performance to test, because Wood’s conduct can now be measured against it.
The same technique answers a conditional promise that seems to leave the promisor a free way out. A buyer who agrees to buy a house for $500,000 on condition that the buyer obtains a $400,000 mortgage may seem to have committed to nothing, since the buyer could escape by never applying to a lender. Even if the contract is silent, the buyer carries an implied obligation to use best efforts to secure the loan. That obligation limits the buyer’s discretion and keeps the promise from being illusory.31
The Uniform Commercial Code supplies a statutory source of such limits. UCC § 1-304 (formerly § 1-203) imposes an obligation of good faith in every contract arising under the Code, and it has been suggested that courts may use it to find enforceable obligations where the express promises seem inadequate to make a present contract. An “agreement to agree,” too indefinite at common law, may now yield a duty to negotiate in good faith.32 Good faith reaches discretionary choices throughout a contract. Extorting a modification without a legitimate commercial reason, for example, violates it, even if the modification is dressed up with a technical consideration such as an added cigar.33
Requirements and output contracts apply the principle to quantity. A requirements buyer promises to buy what it needs, and an output seller to sell what it produces. Neither is bound to a fixed quantity, and either may make decisions that significantly change the amount.34 On its face that looks illusory, since a buyer could decide it needs nothing. The good-faith standard answers the objection by governing every decision that affects quantity, so the crucial question is whether the decision was made in good faith. A court answers it by evaluating all the circumstances in which the contract was made and the requirements or output determined.35 Honesty and fair dealing are elastic standards, so applying them to particular conduct is difficult, and the results are hard to predict.36
Implication has limits, and they show what a court needs before it will supply a commitment. In Harris and Hooters, a party really did reserve such broad discretion over its own performance that the only conclusion was that its promise was illusory and could not be consideration.37 Wood differs because the contract there was silent about effort, and the court read the silence in light of the exclusive grant and the evident commercial purpose. In Harris and Hooters the contract spoke, and what it said was a power to change or end the arrangement at will. An implied duty of good faith or reasonable efforts would have contradicted that express reservation, so nothing remained to imply. These decisions leave intact the many discretionary promises whose discretion is subject to some control.
Conditional Promises
A conditional promise falls due only if some stated event occurs, and Restatement (Second) § 76(1) makes it consideration unless the promisor knows when promising that the condition cannot occur.39 Section 75 asks of it what it asks of every return promise: would the promised performance be consideration?40 Ordinarily the answer is yes, even when the event is uncertain or unlikely. Until the event happens the promisor owes nothing, but once it happens the promisor can no longer refuse, so the promisee holds a right that ripens on the event. How likely the event is affects what that right is worth, and the worth of an exchange is for the parties to price.
The exception for impossible conditions reverses the reasoning. A promisor who knows the event can never occur will never come under a duty, so the promise takes nothing from the promisor’s freedom and the apparent exchange is a pretense. The rule turns on what the promisor knows. A promisor who merely expects the event to fail, or who is mistaken about whether it can happen, falls outside § 76(1).
A harder problem arises when the promisor controls the triggering event. The question then is whether the promisor can slip out by choosing not to trigger it, and control alone does not make the promise illusory.41 A professor agrees to sell her house to B on condition that she accepts a position she has been offered. Whether she accepts is hers to decide, but she has no free way out. The decision has independent significance, rests on many factors unrelated to the house sale, and will occur or not on those factors. If she accepts, her duty to convey arises, so her promise is present consideration for B’s promise, and B cannot escape by calling it illusory.42
A drugstore sale comes out the other way. B agrees to buy T’s drugstore, but only if B works out a satisfactory new lease with the landlord, L. The lease means nothing to B apart from the purchase, so B loses nothing by conducting himself so that no agreement is reached with L. B therefore has a free way out, and a court might find his promise illusory and T’s promise to sell unsupported.43 Both promisors control the triggering event. What separates the cases is whether the event matters to the promisor independently of the deal. A promisor with an independent stake pays a real price to escape, because the professor who declines the position gives it up. A promisor without one escapes free.
A promise that fails for want of commitment can also ripen. A logger that promises to buy timber only if the logger decides to buy the land has promised nothing yet. If the logger buys the land, its discretion is gone, its now unconditional promise binds, and the parties have a contract on the timber, provided neither side revoked its promise first.44
Conditions of satisfaction reserve controlled discretion in another form. In Mattei v. Hopper, a buyer’s duty to buy land depended on his obtaining leases “satisfactory to the purchaser,” and the trial court held his promise illusory. The California Supreme Court reversed. Satisfaction lay within the buyer’s sole judgment, but that judgment was subject to a good-faith obligation, so his promise was genuine and substantial and was consideration for the seller’s promise to sell.45 Today dissatisfaction is usually judged by reasonableness unless the parties manifest an intent to use good faith, and that inference is generally confined to matters of personal taste. A commercial or technical performance is unlikely to be judged by a purely idiosyncratic standard. A buyer’s creditworthiness, for example, is measured by what a reasonable lender would consider satisfactory.46
Where the promisor’s duty depends on a third party’s approval, the promisor’s own effort limits its discretion. A buyer whose purchase depends on a rezoning must make a conscientious effort to obtain it. If the buyer does not, the seller may ask the court to excuse the condition, and the buyer’s failure to proceed with the now-unconditional performance is a breach.47 The mortgage contingency in the previous subsection works the same way.48
A promise conditioned on the promisor’s own performance is different. Section 76(2) treats it as a promise of alternative performances within § 77 unless occurrence of the condition is also promised.49 The promisor who controls the triggering act holds a choice: perform the act and owe the promised performance, or withhold the act and owe nothing. Under § 77, a promise that reserves a choice of alternatives is not consideration unless each alternative would have been consideration if it alone had been bargained for, or one alternative would have been consideration and there is, or appears to the parties to be, a substantial possibility that events will eliminate the alternatives that would not have been before the promisor chooses.50 The next section develops that test.