Concept
Adequacy and Sham Bargains
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Adequacy and Sham Bargains
A court will enforce a promise bought at a ruinous price, but it will not enforce one whose price is only a pretense. Both results come from a single rule: except as §§ 73 and 74 provide, any performance that is bargained for is consideration.1 The rule says nothing about what a performance was worth, and its limits concern the kind of performance offered. Performing a legal duty owed to the promisor is not consideration when that duty is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute,2 and only a duty owed to the promisor counts, not one owed to a third person.3 Surrendering a claim or defense that proves invalid is likewise not consideration unless further conditions are met.4 The next two sections take up those limits.
Those limits turn on legal detriment, not on value. A debtor who promises to pay a debt already due adds nothing to her existing duty, so a creditor's promise to accept less, or to extend the due date, is generally not binding even when the modification was fairly bargained; strict doctrine invalidates it unless the debtor incurred some new detriment.5 This section asks the opposite question: how much does a low or lopsided price matter, and when does a price count as no price at all?
No Inquiry Into Adequacy
Section 72 does not ask how much a performance was worth. It asks whether the performance was sought as the price of the promise and given in exchange for it, and once a court answers yes, the consideration element is met however the performance compares with the promise it supports.6 Section 79(b) of the Restatement (Second) makes the same point: equivalence in the values exchanged is not required. Nor must each side supply the same number of promises or performances.7
Adequacy and sufficiency are easy to confuse. Adequacy asks whether the exchange was fair, meaning whether the values traded were roughly equal. Sufficiency asks whether the consideration is legally enough, and it requires only a legal detriment suffered in exchange for the promise. Courts test sufficiency and leave adequacy alone: as long as a legal detriment was suffered in exchange for the promise, consideration is present, and the court will not invalidate the contract or adjust its terms because the consideration was small next to the promise.8 A student who writes that consideration fails because the price was too low has answered a question the doctrine does not ask.
The disparity between what was promised and what was given can have many sources: poor judgment, inaccurate cost calculations, bad luck in market predictions, even deliberate underpricing. None is a reason to unwind a voluntary deal, and a party who fairly agreed to take less than the performance was worth has no basis to complain afterward.9 A court that reopened prices on request would be rewriting bargains it had no part in making, and neither side could rely on the price it had set.
The classic application arose in wartime. In Batsakis v. Demotsis, Demotsis received 500,000 drachmae from Batsakis and promised to pay $2,000 in return, explaining that she needed the money for the support of her family during difficult days and could not transfer her own dollars from America.10 After the war, when Batsakis sued in Texas, she argued that the drachmae had been worth only about $25. The Texas Court of Appeals rejected her pleas of want, failure, and inadequacy of consideration. She had received the 500,000 drachmae, exactly what she had bargained for, and mere inadequacy of consideration will not void a contract.11 Her own stated reasons explain the result. She wanted immediate money in uncertain times and was willing to promise that much to get it, so the court would not second-guess a judgment she had made herself.12
The rule governs the consideration element and leaves courts free to police how a deal was made. Courts ordinarily do not examine adequacy, but they do often inquire into issues such as fraud and duress.13 In Dohrmann v. Swaney, Dohrmann consulted an estate planning attorney, who drafted a skeleton agreement for him, before the contract was made, and the court held that these facts showed gross inadequacy of consideration as well as circumstances of unfairness.14 The two cases differ in their setting. Demotsis's defense rested on the disparity alone, and she had given her own reasons for wanting the money. In Dohrmann the disparity came with circumstances of unfairness, and that combination, not the price gap by itself, is what a court can act on.
The rule protects unequal exchanges, but it still requires an exchange. A promise to pay $1,000 for a peppercorn can satisfy the doctrine, but only if the buyer really was willing to part with $1,000 in exchange for the peppercorn, perhaps because it once sat on George Washington's table.15 Where no one actually sought the trifle as the price, the vocabulary of exchange covers a gift, and the next subsection takes up that pretense.
Sham and Nominal Consideration
The rule against measuring adequacy stops at a pretense of bargain. The Restatement (Second) states that a mere pretense of bargain does not suffice, as where there is a false recital of consideration or where the purported consideration is merely nominal. In such cases there is no consideration, and the promise is enforced, if at all, as a promise binding without consideration under §§ 82-94.17 A false recital is a writing that says something was given in exchange when nothing was. Nominal consideration is so insignificant that it bears no relationship to the value of what is being exchanged, as with $10 for a piece of real estate.18 Some treatments say that such consideration can be valid because courts do not ordinarily examine adequacy, which is exactly where courts divide.
The two rules answer different questions, so they do not collide. Section 72 makes any bargained-for performance consideration, and § 71(2) defines a performance or return promise as bargained for if the promisor sought it in exchange for the promise and the promisee gave it in exchange for that promise.19 The no-inquiry rule operates after those conditions are met. It may not apply where the purported consideration is a sham or is so patently inadequate that it clearly was not really intended as consideration, and parties who intend a promise to be gratuitous may try to make it binding by creating an apparent consideration.20 A disparity in value is useful evidence of that. If a donor's $100,000 pledge recites that it was given in consideration for the charity's promise of a coffee mug bearing its logo, it defies common sense to believe the donor bargained for the mug, and the likeliest explanation is that the recital was a device to turn a gift into a contract.21
The promisor's motive explains why a pretense fails. A promise made without the motive of extracting something in return is a gift promise. In one case an aunt promised her eight-year-old nephew something without that motive, and the court held her promise an unenforceable gift promise even if he had performed services for her or otherwise benefitted her.22 A trifle recited in a writing, which the promisor never sought as the price, leaves the motive where it was.
The Restatement's own illustration makes the point with a book. A wants to make a binding promise to give $1,000 to his son B. Advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $1,000 a book worth less than $1. B accepts, knowing that the purchase is a mere pretense, and there is no consideration for A's promise to pay $1,000.23 The son's knowledge is what matters. The same freedom to set one's own price that protects a lopsided deal protects only a deal in which one side wants what the other hands over, and here no one wanted the book.
A different view treats consideration as a form that any token payment can fill, the idea expressed in Holmes's remark that consideration is “as much a form as a seal”. There is a convincing policy argument for letting parties use recited or nominal consideration to validate a gratuitous promise, provided the pretense is not designed to defraud a third party and the promisor has not been tricked or coerced. The Restatement (Second) does not take that approach.24
Courts divide, and outcomes vary by jurisdiction. Some follow the Restatement and refuse to recognize consideration that is clearly sham or nominal. Others give effect to the parties' effort and uphold promises that were really gratuitous: they honor nominal consideration on the principle that courts do not inquire into adequacy, they read a false recital as an implied promise to provide the stated act or forbearance later, or they estop the promisor from denying receipt of the recited consideration. For many of these courts, the decision turns on whether the equities favor protecting the promisor from ill-considered generosity or unfair imposition.25 Options get more lenient treatment. Comment b to § 87 says a nominal payment is regularly held sufficient to support a short-time option proposing an exchange on fair terms, though a payment of one dollar by each party to the other is so obviously not a bargaining transaction that it does not provide even the form of an exchange.26 The later section on options develops this point.