Concept
Forms of Consideration
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Forms of Consideration
A promisor who asks for something in exchange for a promise may ask for almost anything, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(3) sorts the possibilities into three forms of bargained-for performance: an act other than a promise, a forbearance, and the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.1 A forbearance is a refraining from something the person is legally free to do. A legal relation is a right, duty, power, or liability that the law attaches between people, such as the right to sue on a claim or the duty to pay a debt.
| Form | What the promisee gives | Typical examples |
|---|---|---|
| Act other than a promise | Doing or handing over something | Paying money, delivering goods, painting a fence |
| Forbearance | Refraining from what the law lets the promisee do | Not smoking, not suing, not running a saw before noon |
| Change in a legal relation | Altering who owes what to whom | Releasing a claim, dismissing a suit, granting a right of way |
The list widens what may serve as the price without loosening the test for what counts as one. A performance is bargained for if the promisor sought it in exchange for the promise and the promisee gave it in exchange for that promise, and, except as §§ 73 and 74 provide, any bargained-for performance is consideration.2 The test demands no haggling. It demands reciprocal inducement: each side gives what it has because, in exchange, it wants what the other has, a quid pro quo.3 A court that meets an unusual price, whether a silence, a signature, or a surrender, therefore asks what it asks of money: did the promisor seek it, and did the promisee give it in response?
Section 71(4) adds a second dimension, which concerns who gives the performance and who receives it. The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person, and it may be given by the promisee or by some other person.4 The subsections below take the three forms in turn and then return to that question.
Acts Other Than Promises
An act other than a promise is the simplest bargained-for performance, and § 71(3)(a) names it first.5 Paying money, delivering goods, and rendering services are the standard examples, and each is consideration when the promisor sought it in exchange for the promise and the promisee gave it in exchange for that promise.6 A promisee who performs as requested therefore supplies consideration without having promised anything. Whether a particular act qualifies depends on what the promisor was after. If Jockefeller promises clothes to a homeless person who walks to a store, the walk supports the promise only if Jockefeller bargained for it, and that turns on whether his motive was to extract the walk as the price of the clothes.7
The law lets a performance serve as consideration because a promisor often wants the thing itself, and a promise to deliver it later may be worth less than the thing. A performance also carries its own proof of commitment. A person who performs has already relinquished a legal right, and relinquishing a legal right is what the doctrine calls a legal detriment. When Carr buys a car from Value Vehicles for $30,000, his payment is a detriment to him even though he receives a car in return, because detriment means yielding a right and does not mean suffering harm.8
A promisor who asks for performance and not for a return promise forms what is called a unilateral contract. The offeree accepts by rendering the very performance the contract requires, so the act of acceptance also completes the offeree’s duties. The offeree’s consideration is furnished in full at acceptance, and the offeree owes nothing further.9 When such an offer may be accepted and when it may be withdrawn belong to offer and acceptance. For consideration, it is enough that the act supplies the price.
Employment disputes show the practical stakes. In Marshall Durbin & Co. v. Baker the Company claimed that its promise of payment lacked consideration and argued that Mr. Baker had given no valid promise in exchange for it, and the court agreed on that point. It nonetheless rejected the further contention that the Company’s own promise was illusory, and it held that Baker could, and did, supply consideration by an act other than a promise.10 With no binding return promise on Baker’s side, the Company’s promise stood on what Baker did. An objection that the promisee never promised anything therefore ends nothing. The question is whether the promisee did what the promisor sought.
That qualifier carries the weight: the act must be sought. An act performed before the promisor ever asked for it was not induced by the promise.
Section 71(3)(a) does not relax the bargain test. It confirms that doing can satisfy the test as well as promising can.
Forbearance
A forbearance is the second form of bargained-for performance, and § 71(3)(b) names it.12 The refraining may be carried out, as when the promisee actually abstains for the stated period, or it may be promised, because a promise to forbear in the future also gives up the freedom to act.13 Either way the § 71(2) test governs: the promisor must have sought the forbearance in exchange for the promise, and the promisee must have given it in exchange.14 This form adds one question about content. Only a person who has the right to act can trade it away by refraining, so the thing surrendered must be a legal right.
The defining illustration is the promise of Uncle William Story to his nephew Willie, the case usually cited as Hamer v. Sidway. William promised Willie $5,000 if Willie refrained from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he reached twenty-one. Willie complied but had not been paid when his uncle died, and the estate resisted his claim on the ground that Willie had given no consideration. The court enforced the promise. Willie’s abstention was a sufficient detriment because it was the abandonment of his legal right to engage in those activities.15
Two intuitive objections test the rule, and the doctrine answers each. The first is that abstaining from drink, tobacco, and cards was good for Willie, and a gain looks like the opposite of a detriment. But “detriment” here is a term of art for giving up a legal right. It does not mean harm, loss, or injury, and a detriment may even advance the interests of the person who incurs it.16 A promisee who ends up better off has still traded away a freedom, and the trade is what the doctrine examines.
The second objection is that Uncle William received nothing of value. The court answered that the legal benefit to him need not be economic; it lay in having his expressed desire fulfilled.17 Benefit follows from exchange. If the terms of the transaction, reasonably interpreted in context, show that the parties intended to exchange detriments, the detriment each incurs becomes the benefit the other receives, and that intent is judged objectively.18 The promisor’s motive therefore does not decide the case. It does not matter whether the uncle acted from kindly concern or from a taste for controlling his nephew.19
Forbearance reaches well beyond personal habits. When Carr sued Value Vehicles for $30,000 in damages, the parties settled: Value agreed to deliver a new car, and Carr agreed to dismiss his suit. Carr’s detriment was his promise to forbear from continuing a suit that he had the legal right to bring.20 A promise to refrain from suing is thus a forbearance, and the example shows that a return promise in a bilateral deal can itself be a promise to refrain. When the claim surrendered proves invalid, § 74 sets conditions on whether the surrender counts, which the later section on settlement of claims takes up.21
The rule has a limit that follows from its wording: the promisee must have had the right to do what the promisee gives up. Refraining from what the law already forbids surrenders nothing. Suppose a state prohibits minors from drinking and penalizes the minor who drinks, and an uncle promises his seventeen-year-old niece $5,000 if she abstains for a year. The prohibition and its penalty fall on the minor herself, so her abstention gives up no legal right, and consideration doctrine does not recognize forbearance from illegal activity as a detriment. There is a strong argument that she gave no consideration.22
The contrary argument is real, however, and it points ahead to the preexisting-duty rule. Section 73 denies consideration to performance of a legal duty owed to the promisor that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute.23 The niece owes her duty to the state and not to her uncle, and consideration doctrine confines the preexisting-duty rule to duties owed to the promisor. The uncle apparently values her obedience to the law and bargained for it, and a contract that gives a private party an incentive to obey the law does not raise the concern about corrupting a public official with a reward for performing an existing public duty.24 The question stays open here. What the example settles is where the analysis starts: with whether the promisee surrendered a legal right, and not with whether the promisee gained or lost.
Changes in Legal Relations
The third form of bargained-for performance is the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation, which § 71(3)(c) names.26 Releasing a claim destroys a legal relation, granting a right to cross land creates one, and agreeing to new terms for an existing arrangement modifies one. Courts state the same list when they define consideration. The Mississippi definition applied in Marshall Durbin names an act other than a promise, a forbearance, the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation, and a bargained-for return promise.27
The first two forms describe conduct, doing something or refraining from it, and many valuable trades consist of neither. A claimant who signs away a right of action hands over no goods and refrains from no continuing activity, yet changes who owes what to whom. A promisor who wants a claim ended gets what was wanted only when the claim ends, so the change in the legal relation is itself the price. The doctrine accommodates this by defining legal detriment to include the partial or complete abandonment of an intangible right, along with acts and forbearances.28 The test of § 71(2) still governs: giving up a right counts only when the parties agreed that it was the price of the promise.29
The Carr settlement fits here as well as under forbearance. Carr dismisses his suit, which ends his right to press the claim and Value’s exposure to it, and Value promises a new car to obtain that ending.30 Either label describes the facts, and the overlap costs nothing, because except as §§ 73 and 74 provide, any bargained-for performance is consideration.31 What decides the case is whether the change was sought and given in exchange for the promise.
The form has two limits. First, the relation must actually change. An agreement to do only what one is already bound to do for the promisor leaves the parties where they stood, and § 73 denies consideration for performing such a duty unless the performance differs from what the duty required in a way that reflects more than a pretense of bargain.32 A debtor who agrees to pay a sum on the day it is already due gives the creditor nothing new; one who agrees to pay it early may give something that differs from what the debt required. Second, releases carry a condition of their own. Surrendering a claim that proves invalid is consideration only in the circumstances § 74 specifies, which the later section on settlement of claims develops.33
Third-Party Performances
Section 71(4) answers two questions that § 71(2) leaves open: where the bargained-for performance may land, and who may supply it. The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person, and it may be given by the promisee or by some other person.35 The two questions are independent, so a bargain may send its performance to a stranger, take it from a stranger, or do both.
The breadth follows from the definition of bargained-for. Section 71(2) asks whether the promisor sought the performance or return promise in exchange for the promise and whether it was given in exchange for that promise, and neither question mentions who touches the performance or where it ends up.36 A promisor can want a result and be wholly satisfied when it arrives somewhere else, as when a buyer has goods delivered to a customer or a borrower has loan proceeds paid to a contractor. The requirement of reciprocal inducement stays in place throughout.
A standard illustration makes the point. R promises to paint C’s house in return for S’s promise to repair C’s porch without charge, and it matters not whether S promises to repair R’s porch or C’s porch.37 R’s painting runs to C, who is no party to the exchange, yet each side sought the other’s promise as the price of its own, and the bargain is intact.
The breadth of § 71(4) invites a mirror-image error, which is to treat the mere naming of a third person as though it supplied an exchange. The provision says where performance may go and who may render it, and it leaves the bargain requirement untouched.
A different question arises when a stranger to the exchange wants to sue. In the painting example, C gave nothing and promised nothing, yet C might want to enforce R’s promise to paint her house. Early American decisions, following English common law, refused enforcement by third parties as persons “from whom no consideration flowed” or because there was no “mutuality of obligation.” With the general recognition of enforceable rights in third-party beneficiaries, however, the notion that the plaintiff itself had to incur some legal detriment as part of the bargained exchange has been rejected.38 Consideration asks whether the parties who made the promise bargained for it. Whether a non-party may enforce it depends on its rights as a third-party beneficiary, a doctrine covered elsewhere.