Concept
Price Fixed by One Party
UCC open terms and open price
Price Fixed by One Party
Section 2-305(1) lets parties conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled, and it supplies a reasonable price at the time for delivery1 in three situations: when nothing is said about price,2 when the price is left to be agreed and the parties fail to agree,3 and when the price is to be fixed by an agreed market or other standard that a third person or agency fails to set or record.4 In each situation the Code supplies a number the parties never did.
Two other provisions of § 2-305 address a different arrangement, one in which the contract itself says who will fix the price. If the seller or the buyer is to fix it, the other side has committed to a figure it cannot influence after signing. If a third person or agency is to fix it, the figure depends on a process that either party can obstruct. One rule cannot answer both risks, so the Code uses two. Subsection (2) leaves the price with the party the contract designates and limits how that party sets it. Subsection (3) lets the party who did not cause a breakdown in an outside price-setting process decide what happens next.
Good Faith Price Fixing
A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for that party to fix in good faith.5 The clause is therefore enforceable, and good faith is the limit on it. The limit matters because the clause gives one side a term the other cannot influence after signing. Without a constraint, a party who regretted the bargain could name a price the other side would never pay and leave a contract that still bound its counterparty.
Subsection (2) differs from the gap-filler in subsection (1) in who supplies the figure. Under subsection (1), the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.6 Under subsection (2), the designated party fixes the price, and the only question is whether that party fixed it in good faith. A court applying subsection (2) tests the price the party chose. The price the court itself would have found reasonable is not the measure.
In Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, a dealer argued that good faith in setting a price under § 2-305 includes subjective “honesty in fact” as well as the objective standard of “observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” The court rejected that view and held, citing White and Summers, that only the objective standard is required.7 Its reason was practical. A subjective test would let a jury decide in every case whether any “improper motive animating the price-setter” was present, even when the prices charged were undisputedly within the range charged throughout the industry.8 Under that reasoning, a price inside the industry range satisfies the standard even when the other side alleges a bad motive.
Read the case as one court’s answer. A footnote in the opinion describes the Article 2 merchant concept of good faith as pairing subjective honesty with objective commercial reasonableness, and adds that recent amendments to the Code have extended that concept to other Articles.9 An exam answer should therefore name both components and note that Shell required only the objective one.
The dealer’s challenge in Shell and the cooperative’s challenge here fall on opposite sides of a line. A price inside the range charged in the trade survives an allegation of bad motive. A price far outside that range, with no tie to cost, has nothing to stand on.
The pricing clause in Arbitron, Inc. v. Tralyn Broadcasting, Inc. shows how the two questions fit together. The court of appeals held that the license agreement, including its escalation clause, was not unenforceably vague under New York law, and it vacated the district court’s judgment. It then remanded and suggested that the district court consider whether Arbitron had exercised its authority under the clause in “good faith” within the meaning of § 2-305, or more generally in a manner consistent with its implied duty of fair dealing under New York law. The court noted that § 2-305 may or may not apply to a license of this sort and expressed no opinion on either question.10 The case thus shows the order of inquiry: the clause is enforceable, and how the party used its authority is a separate question. It does not hold that any price was set in good faith.
Two errors recur on exams. One is calling the clause void because the other side cannot know the price in advance. The other is replacing the party’s price with whatever figure a court thinks reasonable.
Failure Through a Party's Fault
When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to be fixed through the fault of one party, the other party may, at its option, treat the contract as cancelled or fix a reasonable price itself.12 Such a price comes from an outside process. Parties who doubt that a court can fill in an appropriate price may designate a third party, perhaps one with transaction-specific expertise, to fix the price if the parties disagree, and arbitrators are a prominent example.13
Those arrangements depend on the parties’ cooperation, and subsection (3) protects the party who did not undermine it. The Illinois comment quoted in Weisberg v. Handy & Harman says that the subsection continues the policy of USA § 10(2), which gave the aggrieved party recourse against the other party who wrongfully prevented a third party from determining the price.14 The recourse is a choice. The innocent party decides whether to cancel or to fix a price, and the party at fault has no say.
The second option has a limit written into the text: the price the innocent party fixes must be reasonable. That sets subsection (3) apart from a clause that hands a party the pricing pen, where the party’s own price stands if it was fixed in good faith.15 Fault is also an element. If an outside process fails and neither party caused the failure, subsection (3) gives neither party the election, and the open-price rules of subsection (1) may supply the answer.
Subsection (3) is narrower than a price that simply goes unfixed. In Weisberg, a dispute over silver, the opinion recounts that the court ruled § 2-305(3) did not apply, so the plaintiff’s mailgram would not have affected the pricing date even had the defendant received it. The plaintiff was entitled to recover the maximum price of silver reached during the four- to six-week period after delivery, the window in which the price normally would have been established.16 The opinion’s analysis explains why. Subsection (3) applies when some action by the parties is required to enable a third party or external agency to set the price. The Weisberg contract never intended a third party or agency to set the price, and instead called for Handy & Harman to set it after determining the silver content of the metal.17 The opinion adds that the Code distinguishes contracts in which the parties set the price from those in which a third party sets it, and that it is easier to establish that a party failed to cooperate than to prove that a party failed to bargain in good faith.18 A price that a party is to set therefore falls under subsection (2), where the question is good faith.
The question to ask on an exam is who was to fix the price.
- A party was to fix it: subsection (2) applies, and good faith limits the price.
- A third person or agency was to fix it, and one party’s fault stopped the process: subsection (3) applies, and the innocent party chooses between cancelling and fixing a reasonable price.
- Nobody was to fix it, the parties left it to agreement and failed to agree, or an agreed standard was never set or recorded: subsection (1) applies, and the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.
The usual error is to invoke subsection (3) whenever a price is unsettled. That ignores both the requirement of an outside price-setter and the requirement of fault.