Concept
The Open Price Term
UCC open terms and open price
The Open Price Term
Section 2-305(1) of the UCC lets the parties conclude a contract for sale even though they have not settled the price, if they so intend. In that case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery in the situations the subsection lists.1 The section does two jobs. It is a formation rule, because an unsettled price does not by itself defeat a contract. It is also a gap-filler, because it tells a court what the price will be once a contract exists.2 The jobs come in that order: a court cannot reach the gap-filler unless it first decides that the parties “intended” a contract under the opening words of the section.3 Every problem in this unit therefore begins with intent to be bound and ends, if the answer is yes, with a reasonable price at the time for delivery.
Parties leave price open for ordinary commercial reasons. Some recognize that they cannot set an agreeable and fair price in a long-term contract. Some hope to negotiate a better price later than they could get at the outset. Others are in such a hurry that, in the glow of “agreement in principle,” they assume the price will be no problem.4 Parties who distrust a court's ability to fill in a price may instead designate a third party, such as an arbitrator, to fix it if they disagree.5 When they do none of these things, the Code supplies the missing term, just as it supplies an array of other supplementary terms for an ordinary sale of goods.6
These rules govern sales of goods, where Article 2 is an important exception to the judge-made common law that governs most contracts.7 Article 2 tolerates open terms. If the parties manifested an intent to be bound, a court can usually find a way to establish the terms they left out, and modern common-law decisions outside goods show a similar trend.8
Subsection (1) names three ways a price can go missing. Nothing is said about price.9 Or the price is left to be agreed and the parties fail to agree.10 Or the price is to be fixed by an agreed outside standard that is never set or recorded.11 In each, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery, and each raises a different question about what the parties meant. That reasonable price is not necessarily the same as the good-faith price that governs when one party fixes the price, a subject for a later section.12 The subsections below take the three situations in order and then ask what a reasonable price at the time for delivery means in practice.
Nothing Said About Price
The first situation is the simplest: the parties conclude a contract for sale and “nothing is said as to price.”13 If they intended a contract, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.14 Paragraph (1)(a) governs this complete gap, in which the parties supplied no way at all of arriving at a price: no figure, no formula, no outside standard, and no one designated to set it. A gap is partial when the parties did specify how price would be determined and the method fails. Paragraphs (1)(b) and (c) and subsections (2) and (3) govern partial gaps.15
The default does necessary work. If no price can be set, a court cannot compute damages from the difference between the contract price and the market price, from the difference between the contract price and the buyer's cost of cover, or from the difference between the contract price and the seller's resale price.16 A reasonable price supplies the missing number. With it, the court has what an agreement with open terms needs alongside intent to contract: a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy.17
An example shows the default at work. A retailer and a manufacturer agree on 2,000 specifically described speakers and a delivery date, and the agreement never mentions price. If both meant to be bound, a contract exists and the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.18 The goods and the quantity carry the deal, and the market gives a court a way to value speakers of that description.
A court reached a similar result for a sale of crops and feed that had no specific price term. The price was to be calculated from the current market value of the feed, in the proportion that the feed expense bore, among other defined expenses, to the sale price of the cattle. The court held that the contract would not fail for indefiniteness, because the parties intended to contract and there was a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy.19 The formula makes that agreement less bare than the speaker sale, but the point is the same: the lack of a stated figure is not indefiniteness when the surrounding terms or the market give the court something to measure against.
A fixed price needs no default at all. One court called a seller's quotation “not hopelessly vague” because it specified the items, the quantity and price of each item, and the delivery terms. The court added that the contract would not fail for indefiniteness as long as the remaining terms could be pieced out from trade usage.20 The quotation shows what the parties hand a court when they supply the terms; § 2-305 matters when they do not.
Both deals lack a price. What separates them is whether the buyer made its commitment depend on settling it. The reasonable-price default applies unless it is apparent that the parties did not intend to contract for a reasonable price, and a later section develops that limit.21 On an exam, a silent-price fact pattern is neither automatically fatal nor automatically harmless. Ask first whether the parties conditioned their commitment on price. Only if they did not does a reasonable price at the time for delivery follow.
Price Left to Be Agreed
The second situation arises when the price is “left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree.”23 This is the agreement to agree in a familiar commercial form: the parties settle the goods and the delivery, promise to fix the price later, and the later talks stall. A court first asks whether the parties intended a contract despite the unsettled price. If they did, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.24
Paragraph (1)(b) is a partial-gap rule, because the parties did name a method for fixing price, their own later agreement, and it failed.25 Agreements to agree are a classic indefiniteness problem, and treatises treat the common-law answer separately from the Code's.26 Under Article 2, a court can substitute a reasonable term, such as the market price at the time of delivery, so long as the parties intended to be bound.27 The rule also changes bargaining incentives. Because the market at delivery supplies a figure whatever either party does at the table, neither side can escape a finished deal merely by refusing to name a number.
RegScan, Inc. v. Con-Way Transportation Services, Inc. shows how the first step can end the inquiry. The parties never fixed the price in the way their licensing agreement provided. RegScan then supplied a price, and Con-Way accepted that price structure. Applying Pennsylvania's open-price provision, 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2305(a)(2), the court held that the contract had been properly concluded, because RegScan's provision of a price and Con-Way's acceptance of it made the agreement definite on that point.28 The agreement was a license, not a sale of goods, but the lesson carries over: one party's price, accepted by the other, can close a gap before a court needs a reasonable price.
Whether price was left open at all can itself be disputed. In USL v. Mylan, a dispute over an alleged requirements contract for a pharmaceutical, Mylan contended that the prices discussed in an April telephone conference were “first stage,” that is, subject to change. USL contended that the agreed prices were fixed, and it offered an expert's opinion that fixed prices are customary in the pharmaceutical industry when a requirements contract is involved. The court found disputed, material questions of fact about whether the alleged contract included an open price term and recommended denying that part of Mylan's motion.29
The gap-filler has nothing to complete when the evidence shows that the parties did not intend to be bound. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Industries, Inc., the trial court held that there was no contract. A three-judge panel reversed, a seven-judge panel reinstated the trial court's decision, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote.30 The justices who voted to affirm stressed four points: the parties' writings were ambiguous and left many terms open; competent evidence showed that the parties' conduct was inconsistent with an intent to be bound; there was no reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy; and the “option” was not supported by consideration.31 The second and third points track the two conditions for a contract with open terms, intent and a basis for a remedy.
The three decisions apply one idea to three records. In RegScan, the parties' own conduct settled the price. In USL v. Mylan, the dispute was whether price was open at all, and a fact dispute kept the court from deciding. In Bethlehem Steel, evidence that the parties' conduct was inconsistent with an intent to be bound left nothing for a gap-filler to complete. An answer that stops at “agreement to agree, therefore unenforceable” ignores the Code's rule. An answer that leaps to “reasonable price” skips the intent inquiry that the words “if they so intend” require.32
Agreed Standard Not Set
The third situation arises when the price “is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.”34 The provision has three features. The parties tied price to a benchmark, such as a published index or a market quotation. Someone other than the buyer or the seller was to set or record that benchmark. And the benchmark was not set or recorded, as when an index stops publishing. If the parties intended a contract, the price becomes a reasonable price at the time for delivery.35
Parties who doubt that a court can find an appropriate price sometimes name a third party, such as an arbitrator, to fix it if they disagree.36 Paragraph (c) covers the case in which an outside standard fails. A related subsection, (3), applies when some action by the parties is required to enable a third party or agency to set the price, and a later section takes up that situation.37
Paragraph (c) is a partial-gap rule, like paragraph (b), because the parties specified how the price would be determined and the method failed.38 The difference lies in what failed. Under (b) the only machinery was the parties' own later agreement, so the failure came from their inability to settle. Under (c) the parties named an outside yardstick, and the failure came from a source that neither of them controls. Both paragraphs end in the same fallback, and both depend on a finding that the parties intended a contract despite the failed method.39
The fallback makes sense because parties who peg price to a standard usually want a price that tracks the market, and the standard is a convenient way of reading it. When the standard disappears, a court can substitute a reasonable term, such as the market price at the time of delivery, but only if the parties intended to be bound.40 The condition has its own logic. A party may choose a particular benchmark precisely because it would not contract without it, for example because its own resale contracts are priced off the same benchmark. A court that substituted a reasonable price for that party would impose a bargain it never made.
In Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., the trial court recognized that the pricing mechanisms in a 1957 contract had failed. It nonetheless found that the parties intended to be bound despite the failure, and the reviewing court agreed that competent, credible evidence supported that finding.41 The evidence included the parties' long-standing and close business relationship, with joint ventures, interlocking directorates, and Armco's ownership of Oglebay stock. The contract itself recognized Armco's vital and unique interest in the combined dedication of Oglebay's bulk vessel fleet, and Oglebay could be required to ship up to 7.1 million gross tons of Armco iron ore a year.42 The contract covered shipping, not a sale of goods, but the case shows what intent evidence looks like when the pricing machinery breaks. A court may fairly infer from a relationship that deep that neither company meant to abandon an arrangement of that size because a pricing device stopped working.
A standard can also fail because of outside events. In a decision on a crude-oil price escalator, the Court of Appeals held that the contract's escalator clause failed because of later government action. It nonetheless upheld the contract, found that the agreement now had an open price term under § 2-305(1)(c), and remanded for a reasonable price.43 It advised the district court to base that price on the parties' intention “to establish an escalation clause which would pass through some of the costs of the raw material by increasing the price of the refined product in a definite relationship to any increase in the posted price of certain crude oil.”44 A failed standard thus does not leave the court with a blank page. The design of the failed clause remains evidence of what a reasonable price looks like.
Oglebay and the wheat sale both lose their pricing standard. What differs is what the parties' words and relationship said about commitment. In Oglebay, a long, close relationship pointed toward staying bound. In the wheat sale, a written statement that no other measure would do pointed away. On an exam, the failure of an index or market is the trigger for analysis, not the answer. Calling the contract void because the standard failed ignores the Code's gap-filler. Jumping to a reasonable price skips the intent condition in the opening words of the subsection.45 Sort the evidence of intent: the length and closeness of the relationship, the parties' conduct, and any statement that ties commitment to the failed standard.
Reasonable Price at Delivery
Section 2-305(1) supplies the measuring date in its own words: when the parties intended a contract and the price falls into one of the three open-price situations, the price is “a reasonable price at the time for delivery.”47 The phrase gives a court two instructions. “Reasonable” tells the court that no figure waits in the agreement, so the amount must come from commercial judgment. “At the time for delivery” tells it which moment's market to consult. A court filling the gap may use the market price at the time of delivery as the reasonable term.48 The date makes sense because parties who leave price open have not allocated the risk that the market will move before performance. A price frozen at signing would hand one side a windfall and the other a loss from market movement that neither agreed to bear. A price measured at delivery follows the market the buyer actually faces when the goods arrive.
The statute names no formula, and the cases treat reasonableness as a question answered on the commercial evidence in the record. Weisberg v. Handy & Harman shows a court working from market evidence inside a window set by the parties' own practice. Weisberg delivered silver to H & H, and the district court found that both parties intended the transaction to follow H & H's past practices, under which the price would normally have been fixed within four to six weeks of delivery. That did not happen, because H & H misplaced the silver and a strike intervened.49 The district court could not tell when in that window the price would have been fixed, so it awarded the highest market price silver reached during the six weeks after delivery. The court of appeals affirmed. That figure was the most Weisberg could have received had the contract been performed as the parties intended, and H & H did not object to it, so the court concluded that the price was reasonable.50 The affirmance leaned on the lack of objection, so the case does not teach that a court may pick the claimant's best number whenever timing is uncertain.
Other evidence comes from the parties' own pricing design and from experts. When a crude-oil escalator failed, the Court of Appeals told the district court to build the reasonable price around the parties' evident plan to pass through some raw-material cost increases in a definite relationship to the posted price.51 In the MEMC litigation, a witness opined that certain figures represented reasonable long-term contract prices, even though those figures were significantly below the spot-market prices of the period.52 A court may therefore weigh market evidence, expert testimony, and the parties' own design together, and each answers a different question about what the parties would have paid.
Everything above assumes that the parties left the timing and method of pricing to the Code. In MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc. v. BP Solar International, Inc. the evidence was that they had said when price would be set. The parties failed to agree on a price for 2007 shipments in October 2006, but emails supported a finding that they agreed to determine a single price point as of October 2006 for those shipments, and that the price would be the same throughout the year. The court held that, to the extent the parties agreed that price would be set in October for the following year, “that agreement trumps § 2-305.” The jury, having found that the parties formed a contract, was free to accept the testimony offered on a reasonable price.53
An agreed pricing date controls because the delivery-date rule is a default for parties who said nothing. Emails showing what these parties wanted remove the need to guess, and pricing each shipment at its own delivery date would undo the arrangement they made, in which price was set once for the whole year. The agreement supplied the date and the shape of the price. Because the parties never agreed on the figure, a reasonableness standard still supplied the number. In Oglebay Norton the pricing mechanisms had failed, so the question was whether the parties intended to be bound anyway. In MEMC the agreement had already fixed the moment of measurement.
An answer to a reasonable-price problem should therefore begin by asking whether the parties said when or how price would be set. If they did, that agreement governs the date. If they did not, the date is the time for delivery, and a reasonable price is found from the commercial evidence in the record.