Concept
Contracts Despite Open Terms
UCC open terms and open price
Open Terms Under the UCC
Contracts Despite Open Terms
A contract for the sale of goods does not fail for indefiniteness merely because the parties left a term open. Two conditions must be met: the parties intended to make a contract, and the agreement gives a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy.1 UCC § 2-204(3) states the rule in a single sentence. The first condition asks whether the parties meant to be bound; the second asks whether a court can administer the bargain they made. This unit takes the two in that order and then turns to quantity, the one term a court cannot ordinarily supply.
The two subsections before § 2-204(3) explain why the Code can be this tolerant. Under § 2-204(1), a contract for sale may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties that recognizes the contract’s existence.2 Under § 2-204(2), an agreement may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.3 A deal can therefore exist before anyone has recorded all of its terms.
The common law asks for more. Its general rule is that no contract arises when a material aspect of the agreement is left indefinite and interpretation or construction cannot resolve the uncertainty; the parties then never reached sufficient consensus, and a court should not concoct a contract for them.4 See Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever. Yet the common law never demanded the same certainty everywhere. How much a contract needs depends on its subject matter and complexity, and parties to a land transaction typically proceed with care and deliberation and set out their agreement in specific detail.5 Courts therefore required more certainty of terms in land contracts than in employment or construction contracts, and they required even less in transactions in goods, where market practice often produced agreements meant to bind at once despite silence on matters that could be rather important; the UCC carries that liberal approach forward.6 One treatise sorts the common-law problems into purported agreements that are indefinite throughout, silence as to a material term, duration problems, and agreements to agree or negotiate, and it treats the Uniform Commercial Code separately.7
Article 2 is statutory law in a field otherwise governed by judge-made state common law, and the Uniform Commercial Code is an important exception to that pattern.8 The basic elements of a contract (offer, acceptance, and consideration) are the same under the Code as at common law, and common-law rules supplement Article 2 unless an Article 2 provision displaces them.9 Section 2-204(3) displaces the stricter common-law view of indefiniteness for goods. It is not alone in relaxing common-law formation rules: a merchant’s firm offer, for example, is not revocable for lack of consideration.10
Intent to Be Bound
The first condition rests on an old idea: a person’s commitment should be enforced when the person has manifested an intention to be legally bound. Section 2-204(3) carries that idea into sales law by permitting enforcement of a contract with open terms when the parties intended to make a contract and a reasonably certain basis for a remedy exists.11 The court’s first question is therefore whether the parties meant to be bound, not whether they said everything. If they were still bargaining, nothing remains to enforce, because a court should not concoct a contract for parties who never reached consensus.12
Open terms count as evidence on that question. The more terms the parties leave open, the more likely it is that they did not intend to conclude a contract for sale.13 The importance of the missing term matters as well. In a dispute over an escalation clause, the trial court treated intent as a question of fact and concluded that, given the clause’s importance, the complexity of the determinations involved, and the rapid inflation underway, the parties did not intend to contract unless they could agree on price; the appellate judges then divided, with a three-judge panel reversing, a panel of seven reinstating the finding of no contract, and the state supreme court affirming by an equally divided vote.14
Courts look to the whole transaction to decide intent. The Restatement (Second) lists the extent to which the parties have expressly agreed on all terms to be included, whether the contract is of a type usually put in writing, whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression, whether it has few or many details, whether the amount involved is large or small, whether it is common or unusual, whether a standard form is widely used in similar transactions, and whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during the negotiations. An agreement reached by correspondence is likely one the parties intend to be bound by.15 On that list a contemplated formal writing is one factor among many, not a bar to commitment. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, arose from a project of this commercial kind: an airline hired a construction manager to prepare bid specifications, accept bids, and award contracts for an airport expansion, and a contractor sued both.16
Cases applying § 2-204(3) show how courts weigh these circumstances. In Unique Designs v. Pittard Machinery Company, the parties were confused over whether the price was $104,000 or $104,850 and left other terms open, yet the record showed that Unique intended to buy a “Mori Seiki” lathe from Pittard. The court held that the confusion over price and the open terms did not negate the parties’ clear intent to make an enforceable agreement.17 In Dura-Wood Treating Co. v. Century Forest Industries, Inc., the court treated intent as a fact finding and asked only whether the district court’s decision on the parties’ intentions was clearly erroneous. It held that the trial record supported a meeting of the minds and the requisite intent to enter a contract.18 The record backed that finding in at least three respects. A letter dated April 5, 1978 carried the same date on which both agents testified they discussed the sale of cross-ties; one agent testified that the letter expressed the substance of their discussion in general terms; and Century Forest filled out a “phone order form” recording 20,000 cross-ties as “sold to” Dura-Wood and “promised upon release.”19 Past practice can carry similar weight. When silver was delivered to H & H, the district court found that both parties intended the transaction to be governed by H & H’s past practices and procedures, under which the price would ordinarily have been fixed within four to six weeks of delivery.20 See Jannusch v. Naffziger.
The evidence can also point both ways. In Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., PGA relied on Nora’s own papers. Nora’s agent had reported that “final contract negotiations will follow,” Nora’s president had told the agent he would receive a commission “in the event of conclusion of a contract” within the coming month, and other documents showed that agreements with PGA’s subsidiaries were incomplete, with quantity unset for some. The court declined to treat Nora’s failure to complete formal contracts with the subsidiaries as conclusive, because PGA, as the umbrella company, could have entered a master agreement contemplating more particularized agreements with its subsidiaries.21 Nora, for its part, offered a March 23, 1988 letter from PGA’s purchasing manager stating that “[t]his letter will serve as our agreement and understanding” on contract packaging a 1.5-liter container. The letter carried a price identical to Nora’s March 1 proposal and estimated PGA’s needs at between one-half million and one million cases.22 In each of these cases the inquiry turned on what the parties said and did about being bound.
To analyze a record, sort the facts into two groups. One group shows commitment: a confirming letter, an order form recording the sale, goods delivered and kept, part payment, or steps taken toward performance. The other shows deferral: statements that negotiations will continue or that a contract is still to be concluded. Weigh the groups together, remembering that the more terms remain open, the more the first group must carry.
Basis for a Remedy
The second condition asks a different question. Once a court finds that the parties intended to contract, § 2-204(3) still requires a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.24 The requirement does two jobs. A court must know with some certainty what the contract’s terms are before it can decide whether the contract was broken, and it must be able to say what the promise was with enough precision to calculate damages that place the promisee where performance would have left it.25
The limit is practical. A remedy may not rest on speculation, and none can be awarded when nothing shows whether a breach occurred.26 The statute asks for a reasonably certain basis, not a perfect one, and agreements that name the core of the deal clear it. In Transammonia Export Corporation v. Conserv, Inc., the court held that if the jury believed Transammonia’s testimony and memoranda, it could reasonably have found that the agreements existed. It held also that the evidence supplied more than enough terms to provide a remedy: product, quantity, price, due dates, and FOB delivery terms.27 See also Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co. Pricee quotations get the same treatment. A quotation that specified the items to be sold, the quantity and price of each, and the delivery terms was “not hopelessly vague.”28 Those are the essential terms of a contract for the sale of goods.29 If the remaining terms (warranty, excuses, remedies, and so forth) can be pieced out from trade usage, the contract does not fail for indefiniteness.30 See Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co.; Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger. Likewise, where the parties knew which piece of equipment was involved, its selling price, and the basics of what the price included, the Code required no more.31 See also Continental-Wirt Electronics Corp. v. Sprague Electric Co.
A missing term that sounds important can still leave the remedy condition satisfied when the Code fills the blank. In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the parties had discussed and agreed on the specific goods, the quantity, and the price. TSL argued that two further terms, the nature of the transaction (sale or license) and the warranties, appeared only in a box-top license and were essential to a definite contract.32 The court disagreed. Unlike the terms missing in Bethlehem Steel Corp., which were “gaping holes in a multi-million dollar contract that no one but the parties themselves could fill,” these terms could be filled. The parties’ rights under federal copyright law, if the transaction was a sale, were nearly identical to their rights under the box-top license, and the UCC supplies express and implied warranties unless the seller disclaims them.33
A formula can do the work of a stated price. Where the parties intended to contract but fixed no specific price, and the price was to be calculated from the current market value of feed in proportion to other defined expenses and the sale price of the cattle, the contract for the sale of crops and feed did not fail for indefiniteness. There was an intent to contract and a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.34 When the missing term is price and no method exists for fixing it, the condition is hard to meet: damages must put the promisee where performance would have left it, and a court that cannot say what the promised performance was worth has nothing to measure.35
Courts should make every effort to fill gaps and enforce agreements when the parties intended to contract, despite some decisions to the contrary.36 The Code helps by supplying default rules for many omissions, as it did for the warranties in Step-Saver. Those gap-fillers come next, and the open price term follows them.
Quantity as the Essential Term
Quantity stands apart from the terms the Code can fill. Parties may conclude a contract for sale without settling price, in which case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.38 But despite Article 2’s liberal formation rules, the parties do not form a contract without a quantity unless their agreement is a requirements or output contract. A market price exists for goods sold, but there is no “market quantity.”39
The remedy condition explains the difference. A court that cannot tell how many units were promised cannot say whether the contract was broken, and it has no promise to measure damages against.40 Quantity accordingly appears among the terms that supplied the remedy in Transammonia, beside product, price, due dates, and delivery terms.41
The recognized way to leave quantity open is the requirements or output contract, in which quantity floats with the buyer’s needs or the seller’s production. The open quantity does not make such an agreement too indefinite, because a court can fix each party’s liability after the fact. If extrinsic evidence suggests that the parties intended to bind each other to an exclusive, non-cancelable requirements contract, and the court can ascertain the extent of each party’s liability from that evidence, the agreement is enforceable even if quantity and price were never settled.42 Because quantity floats with need, both pre-Code cases and § 2-306(1) allow “good faith” reductions and even abandonment. A buyer acts in good faith when it reduces orders because its own business needs have actually fallen off, because it adopts a technological advance, or because of new government regulations, a strike, or another event beyond its control, provided it did not assume the risk of that event.43
In Essco Geometric v. Harvard Industries, a foam supplier’s letter said it would provide the “Lion[’]s share” of the buyer’s foam needs and the foam for the “entire [GSA] project[].” The supplier’s testimony strongly suggested that both executives, Edsel Safron and Michael Gray, understood the agreement to be an exclusive arrangement.44 The court reasoned that even if the two had not settled quantity and price, the agreement would be enforceable if extrinsic evidence showed they intended an exclusive, non-cancelable requirements contract and the district court could ascertain each party’s liability from that evidence.45 See also Williams v. Medalist Golf, Inc.