Concept
Contrast With the UCC
Common-law definiteness
Contrast With the UCC
Common law and the UCC ask nearly the same question about indefiniteness, but the UCC gives the court more to work with. At common law, the terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.1 For a sale of goods, UCC § 2-204(3) adds a second element: even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.2 Both formulations end at the remedy. They differ in two ways. The Code names the parties' intent as a separate condition, and it writes default terms into the contract, so a remedy basis often exists even when the parties said little.
The source of law changes with the subject matter. State judge-made common law is the principal source of contract law in the United States, and the Uniform Commercial Code is an important exception, covering subjects as different as negotiable instruments (Article 3), letters of credit (Article 5), and secured transactions (Article 9).3 The article that matters here is Article 2, which governs transactions in goods. Everything below is limited to how its treatment of open terms differs from the common-law rules in the earlier sections.
Intent is the first condition, and it matches the common-law instinct that gaps are evidence about commitment. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(3), leaving one or more terms open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not meant to be understood as an offer or an acceptance.4 Courts ask the same question in related settings, such as whether parties who contemplate a later record are bound at once. The cases there reach different results, the parties' intention governs, and that intention is often a question of fact.5 The Code does not abandon this inquiry. It tells the court what to do after finding intent. Early common-law decisions leaned toward formalism: the parties had to supply all essential terms or there was no contract, and courts said they enforced the contracts the parties made and did not make contracts for them.6 Article 2 lets a court fill many of those gaps once it finds that the parties meant to be bound.
The Code fills them with default terms that apply unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The ones that matter most are these:
- If the parties intended a contract although the price was not settled, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery, under the conditions that § 2-305(1) sets.7
- A time for shipment, delivery, or any other action that the Code does not provide and the parties did not agree upon is a reasonable time.8
- Unless the parties agreed otherwise, the place for delivery is the seller's place of business, or the seller's residence if there is no place of business. That rule is itself subject to an exception for particular circumstances.9
- A contract for successive performances that is indefinite in duration is valid for a reasonable time, and unless the parties agreed otherwise either side may end it at any time. Termination other than on an agreed event requires reasonable notification to the other party, and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if enforcing it would be unconscionable.10
The Code has a separate section for open time for payment or running of credit.11 The duration default contrasts with the common-law doubts about contracts of indefinite length, which the earlier sections covered.
The price default ties most directly to the remedy condition of § 2-204(3). If no price can be set, a court cannot compute damages by contract-market differentials, by the difference between the contract price and the cost of cover (for an aggrieved buyer), or by the difference between the contract price and a resale price (for an aggrieved seller).12 Once a court can fix a reasonable price, each of those computations becomes available. Price gaps come in two kinds. A complete gap leaves price unaddressed and falls under § 2-305(1)(a). A partial gap arises when the parties specified a method of fixing the price and the method fails; §§ 2-305(1)(b), (1)(c), (2), and (3) govern those.13 Whether a gap exists at all may itself be disputed.
The price default never overrides the parties' intent, and Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Industries shows how that limit operates. The trial court there treated intention as a question of fact. It weighed the importance of the escalation clause to the contract, the complexity of the determinations involved, and the rapid inflation then underway, and it concluded that the parties did not intend to contract unless they could agree on price. On appeal, a three-judge panel reversed.14 The disagreement between the two courts shows that a price gap can leave the real contest on intent, and that a court can read a difficult, inflation-sensitive price term as a condition of the deal. The Code states the same limit in § 2-305(4). Where the parties intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed and it is not, there is no contract. The buyer must return any goods already received or, if unable to do so, pay their reasonable value at the time of delivery, and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on account.15
Article 2 departs from older common-law formality in other formation rules as well. For example, a merchant's firm offer is not revocable for lack of consideration.16 Outside the Code, a litigant who wants one of these rules is making an argument by analogy. Because Article 2 is a statute for transactions in goods, the force of the argument depends on convincing the court that the rule has worked well in practice and that the common-law contract is sufficiently analogous to a transaction in goods.17 Service contracts are often made with about the same informality as sales of goods, so Article 2's formation rules can appropriately be borrowed there. Real property transactions are generally handled with more structure and formalism, and courts may be less eager to relax the traditional rules.18
Students often make two errors here. They apply Article 2's gap-fillers to every contract, or they assume that an open price in a sale of goods is cured automatically. Classify the transaction first and test intent second. The drafting lesson follows from § 2-305(4) and the shipbuilding dispute: parties who leave a term open should say expressly whether they intend to be bound without it.