Concept
Performance and Reliance
Common-law definiteness
Performance and Reliance
The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.1 The earlier sections tested the agreement's words against that standard. A court has other evidence as well, because parties who have begun to act on an agreement have shown how they understood it. Their conduct can supply content the words left open and can show that they meant to be bound, so a gap that might have sunk the deal on signing day can become harmless after performance. The governing principle tolerates some indefiniteness when the evidence shows that the parties intended a contract and some means exists of resolving the uncertainty so that a breach can be identified and a remedy provided. Performance and reliance supply that evidence.2
Performance helps in two ways. It shows that the parties treated themselves as bound, which answers the worry that an open term may show a manifestation was never meant as an offer or an acceptance.3 It can also fix the term itself, since a party who renders a particular performance that the other side takes has chosen the very thing the words left open. Fairness points the same way, because a party who has taken the benefit of performance is poorly placed to say that nothing was agreed. Performance has a limit, though: it settles only what it actually specifies. The subsections below follow that arc, from the cure of an indefinite side, to the weight courts give reliance and benefit, to the point where the cure stops.
Performance Cures the Indefinite Side
If the side of an agreement that was too indefinite becomes definite by performance, the other side, though not originally enforceable, can become enforceable.4 An exchange has two sides, and the vagueness may afflict only one of them. While that side remains a promise, a court must construe words that do not say enough. Once the promisor performs, the court faces a completed act whose content anyone can read, and the objection that no one can tell what was promised loses its footing. The counterpart promise then rests on an exchange that can be measured.
The sale of goods supplies the standard illustration. Suppose the parties fail to agree on the quality of the goods, the seller sends goods of a particular quality, and the buyer accepts them. A contract then exists on a theory of acquiescence, a result described as forging a good unilateral contract out of a void bilateral agreement.5 A unilateral contract is formed by performance rather than by an exchange of promises, and the label captures the point that the shipment and its acceptance did what the original words did not. Each half of the conduct has its own work to do. The shipment gives the quality term concrete content, and the buyer's acceptance shows assent to that content. The court no longer chooses among possible qualities, because the quality shipped and kept is the quality the deal was about, and any later shortfall can be measured against it. The cure is available rather than automatic. The forging process has requirements beyond the bare act of performing, and meeting them does not guarantee the result.6
The sapphire ring and the shipment of goods share the feature that matters: the party who performed was the party whose side of the exchange had been left open. A court has no reason to doubt what that party gave, because the performance shows it, and the other side's acceptance shows it was taken as the thing bargained for. A stem that pairs a vague term with later delivery and acceptance is asking whether the performance fixed the vague term.
Reliance and Benefit
Courts will go far when one side has relied on an agreement and the other has profited from that reliance, as the Camel Cash litigation against the cigarette maker RJR shows. Smokers who enrolled in the rewards program, bought the cigarettes, and collected the certificates sued after RJR stopped making rewards merchandise available. RJR answered that the program was too indefinite to enforce because it controlled which rewards were offered. The court looked well beyond the program's wording. RJR had accepted registration forms, issued enrollment numbers, run the program for fifteen years, and, according to its own documents, treated the outstanding certificates as a binding obligation, monitored its exposure closely, and created a financial reserve to cover it. The court found all of this consistent with a legally binding commitment.8 It also weighed the smokers' substantial reliance and the substantial benefit RJR gained from consumers' reliance on the program. When one party has greatly benefited from part performance or the other has relied extensively on the agreement, the court reasoned, a court should go to great lengths to find a construction that salvages it. It held that dismissal for indefiniteness was unwarranted.9
The conduct in that decision does three separate jobs, and each can be spotted in a new fact pattern. RJR's reserve and internal accounting show intent, because a company does not set money aside against a liability it believes it does not owe. RJR's fifteen years of performance supply content: they show what the program actually delivered, which gives a court reference points for measuring a shortfall, much as performance by the party with the open side did in the sale of goods. The smokers' purchases and RJR's resulting profit supply the equities, since a company that collected the commercial benefit of those purchases for years is poorly placed to argue that it never made a promise definite enough to enforce. The ruling came at the pleading stage. It decides only that the objection fails on those allegations, and it leaves the smokers to show later that a rational measure of damages can be built.10
The same loyalty promise, announced to the public and never acted on, would leave a court with only the words. It would have no reserve, no history of performance, and no purchases to weigh, and the indefiniteness objection would be judged on the wording alone. That contrast explains why reliance and benefit bear on definiteness at all: they give a vague agreement a record that a court can read.
Performance of the Definite Side
Performance cures only the side of the exchange that it actually specifies. In an indefiniteness case, if only the promise that was definite is performed, the indefinite promise remains indefinite, and the performing party has only the possibility of recovery in quantum meruit.12 Quantum meruit is recovery of the reasonable value of the work or benefit the performing party conferred. It is measured by what was given, not by what the other side promised. The limit follows from what performance shows. A party who completes the definite task has shown what that party promised and nothing about what the other side promised, so a court asked to enforce the vague promise would still be choosing its content. A court that named the figure would bind the nonperforming party to an obligation never assumed. The restitutionary recovery answers the opposite concern, that a party who kept the benefit of the work should not keep it free.
Performance of the indefinite side would have cured this agreement. Had the client paid a stated amount that the designer accepted as the fee, conduct would have fixed the formerly open term, as the shipment and its acceptance fixed the quality of the goods. The logo and the sapphire ring differ in which side was performed, because the vagueness in each deal sat on a different side of the exchange. For any problem of this kind, ask first which side is vague and then whether that side is the one that was performed. A long record of performance by the other side does not answer that question.