Concept
Open Terms and Intent to Be Bound
Common-law definiteness
Open Terms and Intent to Be Bound
Open terms raise two separate questions. The first is whether the terms give a court a basis for finding a breach and fashioning a remedy.1 The second is whether the parties had yet meant to commit themselves at all. On that question, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(3) says that leaving one or more terms of a proposed bargain open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.2 The word may matters. A gap is evidence, which a court weighs with everything else the parties said and did, and it does not settle the matter alone. Two settings produce most of these disputes: the bargain with visible gaps, and the bargain that the parties say will later be put into a formal document.
Gaps as Evidence of Intent
Parties who have settled some points and left significant ones open are often still bargaining, and either side may regard the open points as conditions of its own commitment. A court therefore reads the gaps as a measure of how far the negotiation has gone. When intent to be bound is a close question, missing terms can tip the court toward finding that no intent had yet been manifested. The more terms the parties have agreed upon, the more likely the court is to find that they meant to be bound.3
This inquiry differs from the breach-and-remedy test of § 33(2), although the two connect. Section 33(2) looks at the court's position and asks whether the terms leave it able to find a breach and give relief.4 Section 33(3) looks at the parties' position and asks whether their words and conduct show a present commitment.5 An agreement can fail on either ground. Terms detailed enough to enforce still produce no contract if the parties' conduct shows they were only tentative, and a firm intent to be bound does not help when the terms give the court nothing to measure. Indefiniteness therefore cuts both ways. In some cases the parties plainly intended a contract despite it, and in others the lack of resolution shows that they had not yet reached consensus.6
The cabin plumber from the transaction-type discussion shows a gap that sits comfortably beside a commitment. The owner phones the plumber and asks for a new water heater, leaving the type, size, brand, and price to the plumber. Almost nothing has been fixed, yet nothing in the exchange suggests that either side thought the deal unfinished. The critical finding is that the parties intended to be bound, and a court can then fill the gaps with reasonable terms, such as the market price at the time of delivery.7
The plumber and the manufacturer both left much open. They differ in whether the parties' own conduct treated the gaps as part of an unfinished negotiation, and that difference decides which way the inference runs. An answer that sees a list of open items and declares the agreement indefinite has therefore addressed only the court's half of the problem. It should also ask whether the parties' description of the open items shows that they were still negotiating, because that question can end the case even when a court could fill every gap.
Contemplated Formal Writings
Negotiating parties often say that a formal document will follow once they agree. The question then is whether a contract arises when they reach agreement or only when the final document is signed, and the answer depends on what they made clear about the writing's role. If they make clear that no legal consequences follow until a final record is executed, there is no contract until then. If they make clear that the record is merely a convenient memorial of an agreement already made, the agreement binds even if the memorial is never adopted, and a party's refusal to execute it is a breach.9 The parties' statement controls because it is the clearest available evidence of what they meant, and intent is the question the law is asking.
The two pairs of parties made the same bargain and announced the same later writing. The only fact that changed is what each pair said the writing was for, and that statement placed the moment of commitment at signing in the first pair and at agreement in the second.
The hard case arises when the parties show only that they expect a record to be made and say nothing about its effect. Some courts have held that the parties are not bound until the record is executed, and others have held that the contract became binding when the agreement was reached. The decisions are hard to reconcile, but they do not conflict in principle, because the parties' intent governs and is often a question of fact. Courts have also reached for presumptions in both directions. Some treat the planned record as a mere memorial, and others treat the plan for a writing as a sign that the parties did not intend to be bound before signing.10 With the presumptions pulling opposite ways, a better approach is to identify the factors that influence the courts. The Restatement lists these:11
- the extent to which the parties have expressly agreed on all the terms to be included;
- whether this type of contract is usually put in writing;
- whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression;
- whether it has few or many details;
- whether the amount involved is large or small;
- whether it is a common or an unusual contract;
- whether a standard form is widely used in similar transactions; and
- whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during the negotiations.
Each factor bears on how likely the parties were to treat signing as the point of commitment. A large, detailed, or unusual transaction is more naturally one that the parties would expect to put in a signed document, while a small, routine one is often complete on the handshake. A party that begins preparing to perform during the negotiations is acting as though it is already bound. An agreement reached by correspondence is likely to bind when the parties reach agreement.12 In Cochran v. Norkunas, the parties did not intend to be bound by a letter of intent until a standard-form realty contract was executed.13
The letter of intent is the most common real-world version of this problem. Sophisticated parties engaged in long negotiations sometimes draft such a letter to set down the subjects on which they have already agreed, even though they contemplate further negotiations. If the talks later collapse, the frustrated party may claim that the letter already reflected a binding contract. Beyond the letter's express terms, one of the most significant factors courts consider is the extent to which the letter leaves significant matters unresolved, which is the § 33(3) inference at work.14 A single letter can also raise two problems at once. It may be an agreement to agree, in which the parties settled important matters and left others for later, and also a case of a formal contract contemplated, in which they agreed in principle on the major provisions and expect a formal writing.15 Agreements to agree receive their own treatment in the next sections. The point for now is that the two questions can overlap in one letter.
The drafting lesson follows from all of this. In Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., both the majority and the concurring opinions criticized a letter of intent for leaving unclear whether its issuer was bound.16 Vague wording can serve a party's short-term purposes, but it invites litigation and obligations the party never meant to assume, so a careful letter says outright whether the parties are bound. Counsel for the recipient of such a letter should likewise remain alert to the likelihood that it lacks contractual force.17 An answer to a letter-of-intent problem should therefore begin with what the letter says about whether the parties are bound and then ask how much it leaves open.