Concept
Traditional Essential Terms
Common-law definiteness
Traditional Essential Terms
Section 33(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts tells a court what reasonable certainty is for, but not where to look for it: the terms are reasonably certain if they give a basis for determining that a breach occurred and for giving an appropriate remedy.1 The test is functional, and it names no term that a contract must contain. It matters because an offer cannot be accepted to form a contract unless its terms are reasonably certain.2
Courts have supplied the missing specifics. Traditionally they look at four items: the parties, the price, the subject matter (the return performance that the price buys), and the time of performance.3 Each item answers a question that a court must be able to answer before it can do what § 33(2) asks:
- The parties: who is bound, and against whom is a breach measured?
- The price: what must the buyer pay?
- The subject matter: what must the other side provide in return, and how much of it?
- The time of performance: when does a failure to perform become a breach?
The ring deal of Oprah and Abby shows what a missing item does. Oprah agreed to pay $10,000 for “one of Abby’s rings” (Abby has dozens), and which ring was left “for later discussions.” Both women manifested an intent to be bound, and trading $10,000 for a ring satisfies consideration. Yet they never agreed on the very subject of the deal, so the terms are not reasonably certain, and a court will not invent that essential aspect for them.4
The four items are shorthand for the functional test, and the test still controls: a gap defeats a contract only if it leaves a court without a basis for finding a breach or giving a remedy. This unit states the common-law approach. Sales of goods fall under Article 2 of the UCC, which covers movable property such as a car or a computer but not real estate, services, or leases of goods.5 Article 2 handles gaps more flexibly. The Restatement supports a similar flexibility, but common-law courts have not broadly embraced it.6 In practice, the identity of the parties is rarely an issue, courts have grown increasingly willing to fill in a reasonable time, and most modern disputes arise when the parties have not sufficiently described the price or the subject matter.7
Identity of the Parties
A contract binds particular people, and a court cannot find a breach or direct a remedy until it knows who they are. Measuring a breach means comparing what a particular promisor undertook with what that promisor did, and a remedy runs against a particular obligor. If the agreement leaves no one identifiable as the promisor, the comparison has nothing to start from and a judgment has no one to run against.8
Of the four terms, this one rarely causes trouble.9 Parties who strike a deal usually know each other and say who they are. The requirement also asks for less than a legal name: it asks whether the words used, read with the surrounding facts, let evidence establish who is bound.
Bujnoch v. Copano Energy illustrates the point. Copano sought to buy an easement on the Bujnochs’ land, and the terms were set out in a series of emails between Copano and the Bujnochs’ attorney, Schwartz. No email named the Bujnochs; they appeared only as Schwartz’s “clients.” The court conceded that the identity of the parties is a material term and that a writing that fails to identify a party does not satisfy the statute of frauds (an easement is an interest in land, so the statute applied). It nonetheless held that the reference to Schwartz’s “clients” was enough, because extrinsic evidence was admissible to establish who the clients were.10
In both scenes no one is named. The difference is whether the words point to anyone. The attorney’s “clients” can be matched to real people by ordinary evidence, while “the buyer,” with nothing more, matches no one. The absence of a name is therefore never the problem by itself, and the term fails only when nothing in the agreement or its context identifies the obligor.
Price
A court asked whether a buyer breached must be able to say what payment was owed, and a court asked for damages needs the same figure to measure the loss. The parties must therefore agree, at a minimum, on an objective means for determining the amount the buyer is obligated to pay. They need not state a number.12 The ring deal fixed the price and left the subject open; here the gap sits on the paying side, with the performance settled and the payment left for later.
An objective means matters because it fixes the price without another act of assent. A clause that says only that the parties will agree on a figure later lets either side reject every number the other proposes, and nothing tells a court which figure should have prevailed. Under § 33(3), such an open term may show that the parties did not yet intend to be bound.13 What is not sufficient is a mere “agreement to agree” on the price at some later time.14
The parties can supply an objective means directly or in several indirect ways. Four are common:15
- an agreement on the “market price” on a fixed date on a recognized market, such as the New York Stock Exchange;
- a formula or calculation method, as in many adjustable-rate mortgages;
- an institution that regularly sets the price for similar contracts, such as the “blue book” for automobiles; or
- a specific person, such as a third-party expert.
Each method answers where the number will come from after the parties stop talking. Someone can look up a market price, compute a formula, read a published figure, or consult the named expert, and in none of those cases must a court ask either party to agree to anything new.
A shopping-center lease clause shows where the line falls. It provides that the rent for a later period “shall be renegotiated to the then prevailing rate within the mall.”16 The word “renegotiated” sounds like an agreement to agree, but the clause points to a figure that exists apart from the parties’ bargaining: what space in the mall commands at the time. That fits the market-price method, so the clause has an objective benchmark, and the later negotiation only reports it.
A clause that leaves the rent for an extension “to be agreed on” has no such benchmark. It is the classic agreement to agree, and some cases still follow the older view that it prevents the tenant from exercising the option. Other cases follow what one court called the better view: the clause intends renewal at a “reasonable” rent, because market conditions are ascertainable with enough certainty to make the clause specifically enforceable. That result fits the parties’ intent and fairness, since the tenant has already paid for the option and should not lose the benefit of the bargain.17 A later section develops that modern trend. For the traditional rule, the safe statement remains that a bare agreement to agree on price is not enough.
An upper limit on the price can also give a court a number to apply. In a newsprint-supply dispute, the defendant refused to deliver when December 15 arrived, at a time when the Canadian Export Paper Company was charging a stated price for newsprint. The court’s reasoning treated that price as the highest the defendant could demand: if the plaintiff offered to pay it, the defendant was bound to deliver, and the opinion said the point seemed very clear.18 The ceiling gave the court a figure to apply, so a buyer who tendered that price left the seller with no basis to refuse.
A stem that gives no dollar figure poses one question: where would the number come from? Verbs such as agree, negotiate, or determine do not decide the answer. A clause that names a benchmark survives even when it says “renegotiate,” and a clause that names none fails even when it promises an “appropriate” figure. Look for the benchmark first.
Subject Matter and Quantity
The subject matter is the most important of the four terms.20 It is whatever the seller must provide in return for the price—goods, services, or lease rights—and it includes how much: the quantity in a sale of goods, the amount of space in a lease.21 The price covers the paying side of the exchange; this term covers the side the price buys.
The term carries so much weight because of the two jobs § 33(2) gives a court. A court finds a breach by setting the promised performance beside the performance actually rendered, and it builds a remedy by valuing what the plaintiff lost when the promised performance did not arrive.22 If the contract never says what was to be delivered, or how much, the comparison has nothing on one side and the valuation has nothing to value.
Contracts can concern so many different things that no single definition of a reasonably certain subject matter exists. That variety explains the Restatement’s deliberately loose standard, which asks only for a basis for finding a breach and for fixing a remedy, and how much detail that takes varies greatly with the type of contract and the trade or business.23 Courts typically require considerable specificity in a sale of real estate, for example, because they cannot order a transfer if the parties have not agreed on the details of the land.24
The ring deal and the oil deal below share a pattern: in each, the parties fixed the price and left for later the choice of what exactly to deliver. In Wilhelm Lubrication v. Brattrud, decided before the UCC, a seller agreed to sell and a buyer agreed to buy 5,000 gallons of motor oil under a designation that covered seven weights, with a definite price for each weight. The buyer repudiated before submitting any specifications, and the court held the agreement too vague to enforce because the assortment—how the 5,000 gallons would divide among the seven weights—was never fixed. The total quantity and every price were stated, but because each weight carried its own price, the buyer’s obligation depended on a choice no one had made. A later section, on selection by one party, takes up how courts treat a choice reserved for one side.
A stem that states a price and then describes the thing bought only as “some,” “a number of,” or “one of” a larger group points to this term. The question is whether anything in the agreement or its context fixes the core performance and its amount. A gap in a peripheral detail, such as which supplier’s paint a contractor will use, belongs to the materiality analysis and rarely defeats a contract. A gap in the identity or amount of the thing sold usually does under the traditional approach.
Time and Duration
A failure to perform becomes a breach at a particular moment: the moment performance was due and did not come. A court that cannot tell when performance was due cannot say whether a promisor who has not yet delivered is late or still within the agreement.26 Yet a clear agreement on the time of performance is essential only for some contracts, and the answer turns on whether the transaction is a one-time transfer or a continuing relationship.27
In a one-time exchange, a missing time is usually a gap a court can close. The performance is a single event, so the only question is how soon it had to occur, and what is reasonable for that kind of transaction supplies a standard from outside the contract. Courts have become increasingly willing to fill in a “reasonable time” for performance, but that willingness is not uniform.28 A missing time can also be read with other gaps as a sign that the parties were still negotiating; § 33(3) permits that inference without requiring it.29
A continuing relationship changes the analysis because the length of the arrangement is itself part of the exchange. A lease or license is a series of performances over a period, and how many of them are owed depends on how long the arrangement lasts. Without a stated or determinable duration, a court cannot tell whether a party who stops performing has breached or has reached the end of the deal, and it cannot tell how many periods of lost payments to count in a damages award.30 Thus courts have insisted on more detail about the duration of leases and of intellectual property licenses.31
The translation and the license are both silent about time, yet the first gap concerns when one event happens and the second concerns how long a relationship lasts. The usual error is to treat the missing term as the whole issue without asking what kind of transaction it is missing from. And because most modern disputes arise over price or subject matter, a stem that shows a missing delivery date alongside a missing price should be analyzed for the price problem first.32