Concept
Material Versus Nonmaterial Terms
Common-law definiteness
Material Versus Nonmaterial Terms
Nearly every real agreement leaves something open, yet Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33 says an offer cannot be accepted into a contract unless its terms are reasonably certain, meaning they give a basis for finding a breach and for giving a remedy.1 Read alone, that standard might seem to sink any deal with a loose end. Courts avoid that result by asking how close the loose end lies to the center of the exchange. A gap at the center defeats the contract, and a gap at the edge does not.
No contract forms when the parties leave a material aspect of their agreement indefinite and interpretation or construction cannot resolve the uncertainty.2 An aspect of the deal that no reading can pin down shows the parties never reached enough consensus to contract, and the court should not concoct a contract for them.3 The rule has two parts, and both must be present. The uncertainty must concern a material term. And it must survive interpretation: the court first reads the agreement in context, in light of the applicable legal rules, and only the doubt that remains counts.4 An indefinite nonmaterial term does not stop a contract from forming. If it bears on the dispute, the court settles it.5
The second part of the rule turns on what makes a term material. A term is material when it is so central to the values the parties exchange that it is a fundamental basis of the bargain.6 Sometimes materiality is obvious, as with the subject matter and the price.7 Other terms are harder to place, and for those the court interprets the agreement in context to uncover what the parties reasonably expected.8 Materiality is therefore not a fixed property of any term. The same term can sit at the center of one deal and at the edge of another.
Oprah and Abby's ring deal shows a material gap. They agreed that Oprah would pay $10,000 for one of Abby's rings, but which of her dozens of rings was left for later discussion. The parties manifested an intent to be bound, and a $10,000-for-a-ring exchange satisfies the consideration doctrine, yet they failed to agree on the very subject of the deal. A court will not invent that essential aspect for them.9 Nothing in the agreement identifies the ring, so interpretation cannot cure the gap. The ring is what the $10,000 buys, so the gap lies at the center of the exchange. Both parts of the rule are met.
The other pole shows what the rule leaves standing. A gap in a nonmaterial term lies at the edge of the exchange, so a court can fill it, if it ever matters, without changing what the parties bargained for.10
The two painting deals differ in what was left open. Primer and drop cloths concern how the work gets done. The identity of the house, in the three-house version, concerns what the work is, which is the very thing the $4,000 buys. A gap of the first kind leaves the exchange intact. A gap of the second kind leaves nothing definite to enforce.
The rule runs between two errors. If every gap defeated a contract, parties who meant to be bound would lose their bargain whenever a detail went unaddressed. If no gap ever mattered, courts would write agreements for parties who had not yet reached one. Materiality sorts the cases. The resulting principle tolerates some indefiniteness when the evidence shows the parties intended a contract and some means exists of resolving the uncertainty, so that a breach can be identified and a remedy provided.11 It also explains why parties need not address every conceivable issue. They must agree on enough of the essential aspects to let a court see what their basic deal is.12
An answer that lists everything the parties left out and then declares the contract too indefinite has counted gaps without asking the two questions the rule poses. Ask them in order, because the first often disposes of the problem before materiality is reached. The next section names the four items courts traditionally treat as essential: the parties, the price, the subject matter, and the time of performance.13