Concept
Degrees of Certainty
Common-law definiteness
Degrees of Certainty
Reasonable certainty is a sliding standard. The requirement itself never relaxes: an offer cannot be accepted into a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.1 But the Restatement defines certainty by what the terms let a court do, not by what they contain. Terms are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.2 That definition lists no required terms and sets no minimum level of detail. How much detail it takes to find a breach and fashion a remedy depends on the kind of deal and on the relief the plaintiff requests.
Two variables therefore set the bar: the kind of transaction and the remedy sought. A student who runs every agreement through one fixed checklist will find defects that do not matter in some deals and overlook ones that do in others. Ask first what kind of deal the parties made and what the plaintiff wants, and only then decide whether the terms are certain enough for that purpose.
Transaction Type
The degree of certainty an enforceable contract requires varies with the subject matter and complexity of the transaction. Land contracts demand the most, service contracts such as employment and construction demand less, and common-law decisions involving goods generally required less still.3 Each step down the scale has its own reason.
Land sits at the demanding end for two reasons. Parties to a real property transaction typically proceed with due care and deliberation and set out their agreement in specific detail, so a land contract that omits basic particulars looks like an unfinished negotiation.4 The remedy supplies the second reason. A court cannot order a transfer of land if the parties never agreed on the details of the land at issue, because an order to convey must identify what is to be conveyed.5
Services tolerate more gaps because a court can often fill them from ordinary practice. Suppose a cabin owner phones a plumber and asks him to replace the water heater, leaving full discretion to the plumber. Almost nothing has been fixed, yet the parties can fairly be read to have meant that the plumber would choose a replacement of the requisite type (gas or electric) and size, from a brand he carries or deems appropriate, at the price he charges his regular customers. To fill the gaps, a court can substitute a reasonable term, such as the market price at the time of delivery. The critical finding is that the parties intended to be bound.6 Nothing comparable fills a missing description of land.
Goods sit at the least demanding end. In the marketplace, parties often made agreements meant to bind them at once despite the absence of terms on matters that could be rather important, and common-law decisions involving goods generally required less certainty than those involving land or services.7 That practice bears on intent. Under § 33(3), a term left open or uncertain may show that a communication was not meant as an offer or an acceptance, but the word is may.8 Where parties in a market routinely bind themselves with gaps, a gap proves little. Where intent to be bound is a close question, missing terms can tip the scale against it, and the more terms the parties have agreed upon, the more likely a court is to find that they meant to be bound.9
The importance of a particular term also shifts with the structure of the deal. In a loan, the details of the credit, such as its length and the structure of repayment, commonly are essential.10 A cash sale needs no interest rate at all, but a price payable over ten years at an interest rate 'to be agreed' may make the entire agreement unenforceable. The rate depends on the buyer's creditworthiness, the value of any collateral, any guarantors, the volatility of the financial market, applicable regulatory limits on lending, and the likelihood that the enterprise will succeed, so the parties' silence leaves a court with no objective way to say what the buyer owes.11 Duration matters most when a transaction creates a continuing relationship rather than a one-time transfer, and courts have insisted on more detail about the duration of leases and intellectual property licenses.12 A later section takes up time and duration.
A frequent exam error is to call a term essential in every contract, or to apply the standard as one fixed checklist whatever the deal. The standard stays the same. What changes is how much detail a court needs in order to find a breach and give a remedy in the particular kind of transaction before it.
Remedy Sought
The remedy half of the reasonable certainty test cannot be applied without asking which remedy the plaintiff wants. Terms must give a basis for an appropriate remedy, and appropriateness is judged against the relief actually requested.14 The same agreement can therefore support one form of relief and fail to support another, because each asks something different of the terms.
A plaintiff who asks for money needs the least. The court must be able to find that a breach occurred and to put a figure on the loss. It need not frame an order telling the defendant what to do. The law also does not demand that every material term be expressed with piercing clarity. A standard that strict would refuse to recognize a contract even when the parties reasonably expected to be bound, meant to contract despite the indefiniteness, and relied on the contract. Indefiniteness severe enough to show a lack of assent to the material terms still defeats the claim.15
A plaintiff who asks for specific performance needs much more. Specific performance orders the defendant to cooperate in exchanging performances as originally agreed, which is the simplest way to protect the plaintiff's expectation, but it is often unavailable.16 The most important factor is usually whether damages would be an adequate legal remedy, and some injuries cannot be compensated in money at all.17 A plaintiff who clears that hurdle faces a second: because the order is essentially a specialized type of injunction, the court must be able to define the obligation clearly enough for the defendant to obey it, on pain of contempt.18 A court may still supply a minor missing detail, such as the time for delivery or the total quantity in an output contract, so that the parties' expectations can be carried out. The decree must nonetheless stay faithful to the bargain the parties made.19
This creates an uncomfortable overlap. The plaintiff who needs the order most is the one whose loss damages cannot measure, and a contract with open terms is hardest to enforce by order.
Two decisions show where courts have drawn the line. In Honolulu Waterfront Ltd. Partnership v. Aloha Tower Development Corp., a four-page letter agreement for a real estate development was held to be a binding agreement, yet the court refused specific enforcement because virtually every provision contemplated further negotiation. The same document cleared the formation hurdle and failed the decree hurdle, since an order to perform would have required the court to settle matter after matter that the parties had reserved for themselves. Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc. came out the other way: a long-term contract for shipping iron ore on the Great Lakes was specifically enforceable even though the agreed pricing mechanism had failed, because damages could not remedy the plaintiff's injury. In Honolulu Waterfront the gaps ran through nearly every provision. In Oglebay the open point was a single pricing mechanism in a contract whose loss money could not repair.
An exam answer on definiteness should therefore start from the relief the plaintiff requests, and should resist calling a contract 'definite' or 'indefinite' in the abstract. If the plaintiff wants money, the terms need only show that a breach occurred and give the court a basis for a monetary award. If the plaintiff wants an order to perform, the terms must let the court define the obligation precisely enough for the defendant to obey it.