Concept
Reasonable Certainty Requirement
Common-law definiteness
Common-Law Definiteness
Reasonable Certainty Requirement
A genuine offer can still fail to produce a contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(1) says that even when a communication is meant to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.1
That makes certainty of terms a third formation requirement, after mutual assent and consideration. The parties may have explicitly declared their assent to contractual obligations, but a court will not make a contract for them if the indispensable, essential elements of the deal are missing.2 The parties need not address every conceivable issue. They must agree on the essential aspects of the deal, so that a court can determine what their basic deal is.3
Consider Oprah and Abby. They expressly agree that Oprah will pay $10,000 for one of Abby's rings, but Abby owns dozens, and which one Oprah gets is left for later discussion. Each has manifested an intent to be bound, and a ring in exchange for $10,000 is a bargained-for exchange. Yet the parties never settled the very subject of the deal, so an essential element is missing and no contract forms. Enforcing the arrangement would require the court to pick the ring itself, which is to make the contract for them.4 Suppose instead that both had pointed to one particular sapphire ring. The subject and the price would be settled, and definiteness would pose no obstacle even though many smaller details remained unaddressed.
Older opinions put the rule in a maxim: the agreement must contain all of the essential terms, because courts enforce contracts and provide remedies for their breach; they do not write contracts for the parties.5 The modern formulation explains the purpose behind the maxim. The parties must assent to a bargain definite enough for a court to determine their respective rights and obligations, because only then can the court decide whether a breach occurred and what remedy would be appropriate.6
The rule has a limit, though. Indefiniteness severe enough to show a lack of assent to the material terms defeats a contract. But a court should not demand that every material term be expressed with piercing clarity. That standard would deny a contract to parties who reasonably expected to be bound, intended to contract despite the indefiniteness, and relied on the existence of a contract.7
Section 33(1) seems to say that an offer can exist and yet cannot be accepted. The explanation is that the certainty requirement applies to the contract, not to the offer. Even a term as important as the subject matter may be open in the offer itself.8 Suppose a seller offers either a roan stallion for $2,000 or a chestnut mare for $3,000, at the buyer's choice. Until the buyer chooses, the offer is uncertain about which animal the seller must sell and the buyer must buy, yet the offer is real. A reply naming the chestnut mare at $3,000 makes the resulting contract definite.
What the seller manifested decides the harder case. Parties can form a contract in which one side selects the specific subject matter later, with the price adjusted accordingly. The question is whether that is the agreement to which the seller assented. If the seller meant the buyer to choose immediately, a purported acceptance that fails to designate the animal is not sufficiently definite.9
The requirement goes by several names: reasonable certainty of terms, definiteness, and agreement on the essential terms. The Restatement prefers the first, but it explains the phrase only loosely.10 That is why the next section turns to the practical test of whether the terms allow a court to find a breach and fashion a remedy. The requirement also does not depend on identifying a neat offer and acceptance. Section 22(2) recognizes that mutual assent may be manifested even though neither can be identified and the moment of formation cannot be determined.11 In such cases the terms of the resulting contract must still be certain.