Concept
Irrevocable Offers
Termination of the power of acceptance and irrevocable offers
Irrevocable Offers
An offeror may ordinarily withdraw an offer at any moment before it is accepted, because at common law an offeree must give consideration to keep an offer open.1 That freedom costs the offeree. An offeree who needs time to investigate a purchase, arrange financing, or price a bid on the offered terms spends that effort at the risk that the offer will vanish before acceptance. Many legal systems answer by treating an offer as irrevocable unless it provides otherwise, which gives the offeree a dependable basis for deciding whether to accept. The common law, resting on consideration, permits revocation even of an offer stated to be firm. It relieves the offeree in part through the rule that a mailed acceptance prevents revocation, and it leaves the option contract for cases that need more.2
The traditional devices for making an offer irrevocable are consideration given for the promise to hold the offer open and the seal. An offer can also become irrevocable by statute or through the offeree's reliance.3 Four routes follow, each with its own requirements and its own reach: the option contract, the statutory firm offer, reliance on an offer, and part performance of an invited performance. The option contract comes first, because the others are measured against it.
Option Contracts
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 defines an option contract as a promise that meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer.4 Each half of the definition does its own work. The first half returns the analysis to ordinary formation doctrine: the promise to hold the offer open must itself rest on consideration or on some other recognized basis for enforcing promises. The second half names the payoff, a limit on the offeror's power to withdraw.
The promise can take either of two forms. It may appear in the offer itself, or the offeror may make it separately, as a collateral promise to keep the main offer open. The word option also gets used loosely for any continuing offer, even a revocable one, which is why the Restatement says option contract when it means the enforceable kind.5 In the Restatement's first illustration, A promises B, under seal or in return for $100 paid or promised by B, to sell B 100 shares of stock for $5,000 at any time within thirty days that B selects. In its second, A offers to sell Blackacre to B for $5,000 at any time within thirty days and later promises, under seal or in return for $100 paid or promised by B, not to revoke. Each arrangement is an option contract.6 Because the $100 may be promised and not paid, the optionee need not pay anything when the option is made.
A real estate option shows the device in operation. It joins two concepts: an offer to sell on defined terms, and a contractual undertaking to leave that offer open for a period. Ordinarily an offeror may revoke an unaccepted offer at will, but in an option the optionor suspends that power by contracting not to use it. If consideration is paid, the promise to hold the offer open is specifically enforceable and the offer cannot be withdrawn during the option period. When the optionee accepts, the option is exercised and a contract of sale forms.7 A builder can use the protected window to investigate a parcel and satisfy itself on every concern, with no obligation to buy unless all of them are met.8
The consideration that supports an option must be separate from the consideration in the main bargain. Suppose an owner offers to sell a farm for $2 million and promises to hold the offer open for five days. The offeree's promise to pay $2 million is consideration only for the transfer of the farm; it is not consideration for the owner's promise not to revoke.9 That promise to pay binds only if and when the offeree accepts, so it cannot also pay for a promise that operates earlier. To buy the option, the offeree must give or promise something more, such as the $100 in the Restatement's illustrations. Students often treat the purchase price as the consideration for the option, and the error is worth guarding against.
The separate-consideration rule applies when the promise to hold the offer open relates to a new contract. An option granted inside an existing contract is one of the bundle of rights exchanged there, and the grantee's contractual consideration supports it. A five-year lease that lets the tenant renew for five more years is the usual example: the rent the tenant pays under the lease supports the renewal right along with every other term.10
The limit on the power to revoke is what changes outcomes. A right to revoke asks whether the offeror may withdraw without breaching a duty; a power to revoke asks whether the withdrawal works. An option contract is usually held to take away the power as well as the right. The offeree owns the power of acceptance for the stated time because it has been bought and paid for, so an attempted revocation does not terminate the offer, and the offeree can still accept and form a contract.11
The standard Greenacre illustration shows the difference. A buyer holds an option to purchase Greenacre for $500,000. If the option took away only the seller's right to revoke, a revocation would be wrongful but effective, and the buyer, unable to accept, would be left with damages for breach of the promise not to revoke. Because the option removes the seller's power, the revocation is void, the buyer's acceptance forms a contract for the sale of Greenacre, and the buyer's remedies for breach of that contract can include specific performance.12 Comment d says the same thing in the Restatement's vocabulary: a revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective, and the offer is properly called an irrevocable offer.13 The usual exam error is to stop at noting that the optionor breached the promise to hold the offer open. The question to ask is whether the revocation had any effect on the optionee's power of acceptance, and under an option it had none.
Once an option exists, ending it takes more than a revocation. To discharge an option, the parties must make another binding agreement, ostensibly with new consideration on both sides, or establish another ground for terminating the power of acceptance under doctrines taken up later in these materials.14 Comment d points the same way: the termination of the offeree's power of acceptance is governed by the requirements for discharging a contractual duty, a point § 37 develops.15 Courts divide on one timing question. The Restatement does not give the mailbox rule effect for an acceptance of an option, and Worms v. Burgess, 620 P.2d 455 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980), rejected that position on the ground that the mailbox rule is so widely known that the parties to an option should be presumed to have contracted with reference to it unless they expressly provide otherwise.16
Consideration is hard to prove when parties paper an option in a hurry and the recited payment is token or never made. Restatement § 87(1)(a) supplies a route that avoids the problem. An offer binds as an option contract when all four of these conditions are met:17
- The offer is in writing.
- The offeror has signed the writing.
- The writing recites a purported consideration for the making of the offer.
- The offer proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.
Because the writing need only recite a purported consideration, the recital does the work that an exchange would otherwise do. Courts reinforce that result: when the recited consideration is a sham, a court will more readily read the recital as a promise to furnish the consideration, or will more easily estop the grantor from calling it a sham.18 A separate clause of § 87(1) covers offers made irrevocable by statute, taken up in the next section.
The Restatement accepts a formal substitute because options differ from ordinary gift promises. Consideration screens out gifts, and the law refuses to enforce a gratuitous promise. An offeror who grants an option rarely has a gratuitous motive. The common purpose is commercial: by committing to give the offeree an irrevocable opportunity to accept, the offeror hopes to facilitate an exchange, so there is less reason to shield the offeror from liability for the promise.19 Formalities also do the other work that consideration does. A signed writing gives reliable evidence that the transaction took place and makes the signer pause before committing.20
Courts have enforced options on payments at both ends of the scale. In Harley v. Indian Spring Land Co., a refundable $10,000 good-faith deposit supported an option to buy land for $1.2 million, because the optionee's loss of the use of the deposited money was itself a detriment sufficient as consideration. In Terraces of Sunset Park, LLC v. Chamberlin, a nonrefundable $100,000 fee supported a two-year option to buy land for $1,750,000.21 The Restatement is also lenient toward purely formal consideration in options, and many courts that demand more elsewhere follow it here.22
Berryman v. Kmoch shows how the traditional approach treats an unpaid recital. Berryman signed a writing granting Kmoch an option for 120 days to buy 960 acres of Kansas land, and the granting clause began: "For $10.00 and other valuable consideration, I hereby grant unto you or your assigns an option for 120 days after date to purchase" the land described.23 The trial court held that the option was granted without consideration, that it was in effect an offer to sell subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance, and that it was withdrawn in July 1973, before Kmoch exercised it.24 The case also puts in play the rule that a revocation can reach the offeree indirectly, which Dickinson v. Dodds established and § 43 now states.25
Read against § 87(1)(a), the instrument in Berryman raises the question the formal route answers. The writing was signed, it recited consideration, and it ran for a fixed 120 days, so under the Restatement the recital would count as a purported consideration and the unpaid $10 would not defeat the option at the threshold.26 What would remain is whether the exchange was proposed on fair terms within a reasonable time. A court following the traditional approach looks for consideration actually given or promised, and a bare recital supplies none.
Statutory Firm Offers
A legislature can make an offer irrevocable as well as a bargain, and the Restatement folds the result into its option doctrine: under § 87(1)(b), an offer made irrevocable by statute is binding as an option contract.28 The clause creates no rule of its own. It lends the option label to whatever a statute enforces, and for sales of goods the statute that counts is UCC § 2-205. The Code's firm offer is a statutorily created option contract, one the offeree does not have to buy.29 It displaces the need for consideration, and it asks for no recital of a purported consideration either.30
Section 2-205 provides that an offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods, in a signed writing that by its terms gives assurance it will be held open, is not revocable for lack of consideration during the time stated, or for a reasonable time if none is stated, but never for more than three months. An assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.31 Without the statute, a merchant who wrote that a price was firm for thirty days could still withdraw on day ten, since nothing had been paid for the assurance. With it, the merchant's written assurance binds.32 The requirements work together as signals of deliberateness: a business person, a written and signed commitment, and an express promise to hold the offer open. Formality, not bargain or reliance, supports the commitment, so the elements do not ask whether the offeree gave anything or relied.33
One familiar setting shows the need. A prime contractor builds a subcontractor's quotation into its own bid, wins the job, and then finds that the subcontractor has withdrawn. Some pre-Code courts allowed the withdrawal because an offeror can always withdraw an offer for which it received no consideration, and some added that promissory estoppel does not apply to the formation of contracts.34 A subcontractor's signed assurance that satisfies § 2-205 closes that gap without requiring the prime to prove reliance.
The merchant requirement is the element an exam writer is most likely to build a problem around. Only the offeror need be a merchant, so a consumer can hold a dealer to a firm offer.35 The offeror must also act in a mercantile capacity. A restaurant owner who signs a note offering to sell the barbecue grill from his own home for $100, and promising to hold the offer open for five days, has made no firm offer if he sells the grill to someone else two days later. The grill came from his home, not from his mercantile activity, and the buyer gave nothing for the promise, so the offer stayed revocable.36
The offer must also concern goods. Article 2 defines goods as things movable at the time of identification to the contract, other than money, investment securities, and things in action, and it includes growing crops and other identified things attached to realty.37 A signed assurance on an offer to sell a building lot therefore falls outside § 2-205, because land is not movable. An offeree in that position must rely on a purchased option, the signed-writing route of § 87(1)(a), or reliance.38 The statute reaches offers to buy as well as offers to sell, as in City University of New York v. Finalco, Inc., where a buyer's offer to purchase used computers from the university was held not revocable during the period stated.39 What the statute protects is an offer, and a quotation that is not itself an offer cannot become a firm one.
The offer must appear in a signed writing. A writing includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form, and a signature is any symbol executed or adopted with present intention to adopt or accept a writing, so an offer on a merchant's letterhead can qualify.40 Courts also treat electronic recordings as writings.41 The formality matters because a writing and a signature give reliable evidence that the offer was made and make the offeror pause before committing, the same evidentiary and cautionary functions that let some promises bind without a bargain.42 The writing must also state the assurance. A signed quotation that says nothing about how long it will stand is an ordinary revocable offer.
Once the assurance is found, the question becomes how long it lasts. The offer is irrevocable for the time stated or, if none is stated, for a reasonable time, and never beyond three months.43 A signed promise to hold an offer open for two months therefore binds for two months, a promise to hold it open for six months binds for three, and a promise to hold it open indefinitely binds for a reasonable time not exceeding three months. After three months the statute no longer helps, and the offeree needs consideration or another route to keep the offer alive. The Code leaves open whether the period runs from the date the offer is sent or the date it is received, and it does not say how a reasonable time is to be determined.44 The usual exam error is to treat a merchant's six-month assurance as irrevocable for six months.
The last requirement protects the offeror in one specific setting. When the assurance appears on a form supplied by the offeree, the offeror must separately sign that term, and a signature at the bottom of the form does not do it.45 The requirement keeps a firm offer from slipping in as boilerplate on the offeree's own form. An offeree who drafts the form can insert a clause making every quotation irrevocable, and an offeror who signs the form to approve a quotation may never read that clause. A second signature or initials on the clause itself draw the offeror's attention at the moment of commitment.
When an element is missing, the offer returns to the common-law default and stays revocable unless another route applies. A non-merchant who signs a writing that recites a purported consideration and proposes an exchange on fair terms may still have an option under § 87(1)(a).46 The statute also leaves the offeree's other arguments in place. An offeree who cannot satisfy § 2-205 may still invoke promissory estoppel or the Restatement's reliance rule, under which an offer that the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character before acceptance, and that does induce it, is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.47 That reliance route is the subject of the next section.
Reliance on an Offer
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87(2) gives an offeree who has invested in an offer a route to irrevocability that requires neither a purchased option nor a signed writing: an offer that the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character before acceptance, and that does induce such action or forbearance, is binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.49 The rule fills a gap. A bargained-for option needs separate consideration, the signed-writing route needs a recital, and the firm-offer statute reaches only a merchant's signed assurance. An offeree who fits none of those categories faces the common-law default alone. Section 87(2) borrows the logic of promissory estoppel, which enforces a promise when the promisor should foresee that the promisee will rely on it and the promisee does. Most jurisdictions already enforce an express or implied promise not to revoke an offer on that logic when the offeror could foresee, and the offeree did, rely to the offeree's detriment.50 Section 87(2) applies the same reasoning to the offer itself.
The rule grew out of the subcontractor-bid cases, and Drennan v. Star Paving Co. is its leading example. Drennan, a general contractor preparing a bid to build a school, relied on subcontractors' bids for portions of the work. Star Paving telephoned a bid of $7,131.60 for the paving. Drennan built that figure into its general bid and won the contract. Star Paving's construction engineer then told Drennan that Star Paving had made a mistake and could not perform the work for the amount it bid, and Drennan hired another paving subcontractor at $10,948.60 and sued for the difference.51 The claim looked weak on ordinary principles. Drennan had neither bought an option nor accepted the bid, so the usual routes to irrevocability were closed.
The court nonetheless held that it was only fair to give Drennan an opportunity to accept, because Star Paving had reason to understand that Drennan would rely on the bid and Drennan did rely. It invoked Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, which enforces promises when the promisor should reasonably expect the promisee to rely.52 Drennan and the decisions that follow it created a new revocation bar, namely reasonable reliance on an offer for a bilateral contract. The result for Drennan was judgment for $3,817, the difference between Star Paving's bid and the cost of the paving to Drennan, plus costs.53 Drennan broke from the line represented by James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., in which Judge Learned Hand declined to protect an offeree who relied on an unaccepted offer, reasoning that an offer is not a promise. The Restatement (Second) adopted the Drennan result in § 87(2) but framed it as an option contract and not as a promise, which respects Hand's point.
The final clause of § 87(2) ties the remedy to the justification. Because reliance is what makes the offer binding, the offeree receives only the protection that avoiding injustice requires, and a court may limit recovery when the reliance was smaller.54
The doctrine is narrow, and the reason is worth stating in an exam answer. A buyer receives a seller's offer of land stated to be firm for five days, gives no separate consideration, decides on the first day to accept but waits because of the promise, and sees the seller revoke on the second day. The buyer is unlikely to win. The buyer should have known that a promise lacking consideration was not binding, which makes the reliance unjustified.55 An offeree of a bilateral contract can also bind the offeror by promising to perform before relying, so one can argue that any reliance before acceptance is at the offeree's own risk. And an offeror of a bilateral contract has little reason to expect reliance before acceptance. If you offer your piano to Alice for $400 and she buys expensive accessories for it before replying, you would not reasonably have expected that.56 The usual exam error is to find irrevocability whenever the offeree spent money. The rule demands an expectation of substantial reliance and reliance that was justified, and most offerees fail the second requirement.
The subcontractor-bid setting is the paradigm because it removes the obstacle. Ordinarily an offeree must accept an offer before relying on it, and the subcontractor cases are the recognized exception.57 The reason is practical. A general contractor has to fix its own price before it knows whether it will win the general contract, so it cannot accept every subcontractor's bid at that stage without committing to subcontracts for work it may never receive.
Two limits follow from the requirement that reliance be justified. An estimate does not support reliance, and neither does a bid so palpably low that it signals a mistake.58 The protection also runs in one direction only. The general contractor is not bound to accept the bid, because the contractor made no promise on which the subcontractor relied. A contractor that engages in bid shopping or bid chiseling terminates the option contract.59 A contractor cannot reopen bargaining with the subcontractor while claiming a continuing right to accept the original offer.
An offer that falls outside these limits remains an ordinary revocable offer, and the offeree must look to the other routes in this section. A different kind of reliance, the offeree's beginning of a performance the offer invited, has its own rule, taken up next.
Part Performance of an Invited Performance
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 protects an offeree who has started a task the offer asked for but has not finished it. Where an offer invites acceptance by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract arises when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance, or tenders a beginning of it. The offeror's duty under that option contract is conditional on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the offer.61
The rule answers a gap in the termination rules above. An offer that can be accepted only by finishing an act cannot be accepted halfway, and an unaccepted offer can be revoked, so an offeree in the middle of the work would seem exposed to a withdrawal at the last step. Classical contract law accepted that result. It called such a proposal an offer for a unilateral contract, one the offeree accepts by rendering the very performance the offer requests, and it treated the completed performance as both consideration and acceptance.62 The offeree never promises, so the offeree may stop without liability, and once the performance is complete the offeror's commitment binds.63 Petterson v. Pattberg belongs to the same background. The offeree had offered payment but had not made a formal tender when the offeror withdrew, and the dissent argued that the offer of payment was already the act the offeror had requested.64 Section 45 speaks to that kind of case by protecting a tender of a beginning as well as work already under way.
The option protects the offeree without binding the offeree. Because the offer sought an act and invited no promise, beginning the act is not an acceptance, and the offeree has committed to nothing. The offeror, however, may not withdraw while the offeree performs, and must allow the time the offer states, or a reasonable time if it states none, to complete the act. The offeree remains free to stop.65 The law reaches this result through a legal fiction: the offeror of a unilateral contract makes a binding implied promise not to revoke once the offeree begins to perform.66 That promise limits the power to revoke in the way § 25 describes, so a later revocation does not end the offeree's power to finish.67
Cook v. Coldwell Banker shows the rule protecting a performing offeree. A real estate firm offered a bonus payable at the end of 1991 to a broker who continued to work for it. The broker stayed, and before the firm modified the offer in September 1991 she had already earned more than $32,400 in commissions, which made her eligible for the bonus. She later sold and listed enough property to qualify for all three bonus levels, and the firm paid $500 of the bonus and none of the rest. The court held the evidence enough to submit a claim for breach of a unilateral contract, because such an offer may not be revoked once the offeree has substantially performed.68 The court's phrase, substantial performance, asks for more than § 45, which requires only a tender or beginning.
Storti v. University of Washington marks a limit. A university announced a merit raise policy for qualifying faculty and later suspended it after deep budget cuts. The Washington Supreme Court held that the faculty's performance had created a unilateral contract under § 45, yet the suspension was no breach, because the plan and the faculty handbook reserved the university's power to reevaluate the policy as economic conditions changed.69 Read together, the cases show that an offeror cannot take back an offer after the offeree has substantially performed, and that the offer's own terms can reserve a power to change them. The option protects an offeree against an offeror who rewrites the deal once performance begins, and it protects on the offer's own terms.
Section 62 supplies the contrasting rule for an offer read the other way. Where an offer invites the offeree to choose between acceptance by promise and acceptance by performance, the tender or beginning of the invited performance is itself an acceptance.70 Beginning the work then carries an implied promise to complete it, so a bilateral contract forms at once and binds the offeree.71 The difference shows when the offeree quits. If beginning created a bilateral contract, quitting is a breach. Under the § 45 option, quitting is only a failure to exercise a right.
Which rule governs depends on how the offer is read. Suppose a note on Ned's windshield offers $20 if he cuts the owner's grass by noon the next day and says nothing about how the offer may be accepted. A court reads that note as inviting either a promise or a performance, so when Ned starts mowing at 8:00 a.m. his beginning is an acceptance with an implied promise to finish, and both parties are bound from that moment. An offer is read as seeking performance only when a return promise would be worthless to the offeror or when the circumstances make it unreasonable to expect a firm commitment. An offer of $100 for the return of a lost dog is the example, because a promise to search is worth little to the owner.72 The classification matters in only two settings: the offeror tries to revoke after the offeree starts, or the offeree starts and then stops. The usual exam error is to treat every offeree who has begun work as bound to finish, which is true only under § 62.
Section 45 is triggered by a tender or beginning of the invited performance, and the line falls between that and mere preparation. Once the offeree has begun the requested act, the right to revoke is gone, and it matters not how slight the performance is, so long as it is some performance or tender of performance.73 An offeree who has only prepared leaves the offer revocable.74 The difference lies in what each act shows. Starting the invited act answers the invitation in the form the offer requested, while buying equipment that could serve any job shows only that the offeree is thinking about accepting.
Preparation can still carry weight through a different route. If the offeree's preparations are substantial, a court may find an option based on detrimental reliance under § 87(2), with recovery limited to what is necessary to avoid injustice.75 That route applies the reliance rule from the preceding subsection to an offer for performance, and it carries the same demand for substantial action.
The last piece of § 45 concerns an offeree who does not finish. The offeree made no promise, so the offeree who stops is free to stop, and the offeror's duty was conditional from the start on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the offer's terms.76 When the offeree stops, that condition fails, no contract forms, and the offeror has no claim for breach. Any recovery for the work already done would have to rest on a separate theory, which this section does not take up.