Concept
Revocation by the Offeror
Termination of the power of acceptance and irrevocable offers
Revocation by the Offeror
Revocation is the termination event that the offeror controls. A rejection or counteroffer comes from the offeree, and lapse comes from the passage of time, but revocation is the offeror's own act of withdrawing the proposal before anyone has accepted it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 36(1) lists it among the events that end the power of acceptance.1
Most of the world's legal systems treat an offer as irrevocable for its stated period or for a reasonable time, and they let an offeror avoid that result by expressly reserving a right to revoke.2 The common law starts from the opposite premise: every offer is revocable. When an offeror revokes before acceptance, the burden falls on the offeree to show why this particular offer should be treated as irrevocable. The offeror's promise to keep the offer open does not carry that burden, because a gratuitous promise not to revoke binds only if consideration or some other basis for enforcement supports it.3
The default makes sense once you ask what a binding promise to hold an offer open would do. It would hand the offeree a valuable protected period, during which the offeror could deal with no one else, in exchange for nothing. The law enforces a promise of that kind only when consideration or another basis for enforcement is present. Until one appears, the offeror stays free to change course when circumstances shift or a better buyer turns up. In Berryman v. Kmoch, the trial court held that an option granted without consideration was in effect an offer to sell, subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance, and that the offeror had withdrawn it in July 1973, before Kmoch exercised it.4
The second version of the hypothetical shows the basic exception. An option contract is a promise that meets the requirements for formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer.5 The other grounds for irrevocability come later in this chapter, and each reads as an exception to the default described here.
Because revocation is the offeror's act, the remaining question is how that act reaches the offeree. A private change of heart ends nothing, since the offeree cannot know of it and may reasonably go on treating the offer as open. The Restatement therefore ties termination to what the offeree has received or learned, and it does so by three routes. The first is a message from the offeror that the offeror does not intend to enter the proposed contract. The second is definite action by the offeror inconsistent with entering it, combined with the offeree's acquisition of reliable information about that action. The third, for offers made to the public at large, is a notice of termination given publicity equal to that given the offer.6 Each route shields the offeree from a withdrawal that the offeree could not have known about.
Direct Revocation
An offeree's power of acceptance ends when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract.7 This is Restatement (Second) § 42, and it gives working content to the revocation event listed in § 36(1).8 The rule has two parts that do separate jobs: the first sets what the message must say, and the second sets when it takes effect.
On content, the law asks for substance, not vocabulary. An offeror who tells the offeree, “I've decided not to sell Greenacre,” has revoked even though the message never uses the word or mentions the offer, because it manifests an intention not to enter the contract. The test is objective: how would a reasonable person in the offeree's position understand the words? The offeror's unexpressed purpose does not count. Once a reasonable offeree has been told, in any words, that the offeror is out, the offeree has no expectation left to protect and can turn to other deals. A rule demanding ceremonial language would let a plain withdrawal fail for want of the right label. The same standard protects the offeree from the opposite mistake. A report that a broker has also asked about Greenacre, together with a request for a quick answer, speaks of competition but does not say the offeror has stopped being willing, so the power stays in place.
On timing, the revocation does nothing until the offeree receives it. An offeree who has heard nothing is entitled to treat the offer as open and to rely on it by arranging financing, lining up subcontractors, or sending an acceptance. The Restatement's own comment describes the offeree's need for a dependable basis for decision and notes that the common-law rule that a mailed acceptance prevents revocation meets that need in part.9 An acceptance that becomes operative before the revocation is received therefore forms a contract. The receipt rule also leaves the risk of a delayed or lost message with the offeror, who chose how and when to send it.
The step students skip is the second. The usual error is to date the revocation from the day the offeror wrote or sent it, when the day that matters is the day the offeree received it. The scenes below show how much turns on that date.
The rule governs ordinary revocable offers. When an option contract exists, the power of acceptance is not terminated by rejection or counteroffer, by revocation, or by the offeror's death or incapacity, unless the requirements for discharge of a contractual duty are met.10 Where the offeror says nothing but acts in a way that shows the deal is off, the same objective logic applies through a separate route, taken up next.
Indirect Revocation
An offeror who takes a step showing that the deal is off can end the power of acceptance without sending the offeree a word. Under Restatement (Second) § 43, the power terminates when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the offeree acquires reliable information to that effect.12 Section 42 turns on a communication from the offeror, while § 43 turns on what the offeror has done and what the offeree has learned about it. The rule does not say where the information must come from. It requires only that the information be reliable.
Each part of the rule has its own reason. The first two parts fix what counts as a withdrawal. Selling the offered land to another buyer is as complete a refusal to go forward as any sentence the offeror could write, because the offeror cannot perform both bargains. A rule demanding formal notice would tell an offeree who already knew of the sale nothing new, and it would let that offeree send an acceptance anyway and sue on a promise the offeror could not keep. The third part ties the withdrawal to the offeree, and its reason matches the receipt rule for direct revocation: an offeree who knows nothing of the offeror's step is entitled to treat the offer as open. Requiring both definite action and reliable information also protects the offeree from losing the power too early, since a rumor or ambiguous conduct gives a reasonable offeree no real ground to think the offer has been withdrawn.
The rule comes from Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876), the English case that established indirect communication of revocation.13 Dodds had offered property to Dickinson and then sold it to Allan, and Dickinson knew of the sale before he tried to accept. The court held that no binding contract had formed between Dodds and Dickinson. Its reasoning started from death. If an offeror dies, the offer cannot be accepted after his death, and parting with the property “has very much the same effect as the death of the owner, for it makes the performance of the offer impossible.” So “when once the person to whom the offer was made knows that the property has been sold to someone else, it is too late for him to accept the offer.” The court added that even if a contract had existed, the sale to Allan came first in point of time.14
A modern court applied the same logic in Normile v. Miller. The seller had made a counteroffer to the buyers and then contracted with a second buyer. The court held that by entering that contract she manifested an intention to revoke her counteroffer. An offer that has been revoked is terminated, and the offerees have no power to revive it by any later attempt to accept.15 The consequence matches the one that follows a rejection: a later purported acceptance concludes no contract unless the offeror chooses to reinstate the offer.16
Because § 43 demands both parts, the offeror's act alone ends nothing. A sale the offeree has not heard of leaves the offer outstanding, so a timely acceptance still forms a contract, and the offeror may find that he has sold the same land twice.17 The usual exam error is to date the revocation from the second sale. The date that controls is the day the offeree acquired reliable information of it, and an acceptance that became operative before that day binds the offeror.
The same two-part requirement protects the offeree from the opposite error. Loose talk does not cut off the power, and an offeree who hears only that the offeror might be dealing with others has been told of no act at all.
The rule governs ordinary revocable offers, and the option-contract exception noted above applies here as well. The Dickinson court's comparison to death also previews the next termination event: death or insanity of the offeror or offeree may not end an offer that is irrevocable as part of an option contract.18
Revoking Public Offers
An offer made by newspaper advertisement or other general notification to the public, or to a number of persons whose identity is unknown to the offeror, can be withdrawn without reaching every reader. Under Restatement (Second) § 46, the power of acceptance ends when a notice of termination receives publicity, by advertisement or other general notification, equal to that given the offer, and no better means of notification is reasonably available.20 That standard takes the place of the receipt requirement that governs direct revocation, under which the power ends only when the offeree receives the offeror's message.21
The receipt rule works for ordinary offers because the offeror knows whom to tell. A public offeror does not know who has read the offer, so individual notice is impossible. A receipt requirement would make every public offer irrevocable in practice, since the offeror could never be sure that the last unknown reader had been reached. Section 46 substitutes the next best thing, a withdrawal that travels the road the offer traveled. The offeror chose the channel and the audience when making the offer, and a notice with equal publicity reaches the same pool of people. A reader who saw the offer cannot demand personal notice that no one could give, so the risk of having missed an equally prominent notice falls on the reader.
The two conditions in the rule do separate work. The equal-publicity condition ties the withdrawal to the offer, since an offeror who withdraws in a quieter forum than the one used to make the offer has not done what could reasonably be done to reach the same people. The qualification that no better means be reasonably available keeps a matching notice from ending the power when the offeror had a plainly better way of telling the audience.
The usual exam error runs in two directions. One is to apply the receipt rule and conclude that a revocation fails because the claimant never personally saw it, which ignores that § 46 exists because personal receipt cannot be required of an unknown audience. The other is to conclude that a notice placed anywhere ends the power. What controls is the comparison between the notice and the offer: the withdrawal must reach the audience the offer reached, with comparable prominence, and a better available channel defeats a notice that fails to use it.
The equal-publicity requirement matters only when the offeror needs to act, because some public offers end without any notice at all. A reward for information leading to the conviction of a wrongdoer shows how. Once one informant supplies the information, the offeror has what the reward was meant to buy, and a plausible reading of the offer is that it stays open only to the first person who performs. If that limit is implicit in the offer, the offeror need not publish any notice of withdrawal, the offer lapses on the first performance, and a second informant has no claim to a second reward, even though both informants' testimony led to the conviction.22 Section 46 answers only the narrower question of how an advertised offer is withdrawn.