Concept
Rejection and Counteroffer
Termination of the power of acceptance and irrevocable offers
Rejection and Counteroffer
Two of the ways an offer dies lie in the offeree’s own hands. Restatement § 36(1) lists the offeree’s rejection or counteroffer among the events that terminate the power of acceptance.1 The law pairs them because they do the same thing to the offer. A rejection tells the offeror that the offeree will not take the deal. A counteroffer proposes a different bargain on the same matter, and the law reads that proposal as a refusal of the first, so every counteroffer contains a rejection.2
The rules protect an offeror who acts on what the offeree said. Someone who hears an unqualified no, or who sees the offeree propose different terms, reasonably concludes that the first proposal is dead, and may sell the goods to another buyer or commit the property elsewhere. If the first offeree could return a week later and accept the original terms, that reliance would go unprotected, and the offeree would have enjoyed a free option, testing the market with a refusal while keeping the original deal as a fallback. The power at stake is the power to complete a bargained-for exchange, which the material on the bargain theory of consideration takes up;3 the question here is how long the offeree keeps it.
These rules limit only what the offeree can do on her own say-so. The offeror remains free to renew the offer after hearing a no, so an offeree who wants a second chance gets one only if the offeror chooses to give it.4 The offeror may also announce in advance that a refusal or counterproposal will not close the door, and the Restatement lets that manifestation override the default.5 What follows takes the plain rejection first, then the counteroffer, then the timing rule that governs a response sent by mail.
Rejection by the Offeree
Section 38(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets the baseline: an offeree’s power of acceptance is terminated by a rejection of the offer, unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention.6 Rejection is among the events § 36(1) lists, and the offeree controls it entirely.7 An offeree who says no has spent the power the offer conferred, so a later change of heart finds nothing left to accept. The rule raises three questions: how the law decides that the offeree said no, when the offeror can keep the power alive despite a no, and when a response that sounds negative is not a rejection at all.
The law decides by asking what a reasonable person in the offeror’s position would understand. The offeree’s private intention does not control, and no magic words are required. When Sallie offered to sell her home to Bonzo for $500,000, he answered “no way,” and a reasonable seller would hear a refusal. His power of acceptance ended, and his later attempt to accept formed no contract.8
The rule treats a no as final because of what a refusal does to the offeror. A person who has been turned down will reasonably look for another buyer, and the rule lets that search go forward without the risk that the first offeree will return and claim the original terms. If you offer your piano to Alice for $400 and she answers with a scornful dismissal of pianos in general, she cannot call a few minutes later to accept; her refusal ended the offer when she spoke. The objective standard protects the offeree in turn. Only words that a reasonable person would hear as a refusal take the power away, so an offeree whose language leaves genuine room keeps it.
The offeror, who created the power, may decide what a refusal costs the offeree. One who announces in advance that a no will not close the door has removed the reliance the rule exists to protect, because no one may treat the refusal as final when the offeror has said otherwise.
The offeree who is still deliberating gets a second protection. Under § 38(2), a manifestation of intention not to accept an offer is a rejection unless the offeree manifests an intention to take the offer under further advisement.9 The reliance logic carries over: an offeree who says that a decision is still pending has given the offeror no basis for concluding that the offeree is out. Normile v. Miller illustrates the idea. The buyers there received the seller’s counteroffer, disagreed with its change in payment terms, and said they would wait awhile before deciding what to do with it. The court found that they had neither accepted nor rejected the counteroffer, and the seller later revoked it by contracting with another buyer.10 The counteroffer side of that case comes in the next section.
A question about terms works the same way. An offeree who asks whether the offeror would consider a lower price has manifested no intention not to accept, because the question seeks information while the offer stays on the table, and ordinary haggling would be punished if every question ended the deal. The line is crossed when the offeree stops asking and declares the offer declined.
Once a genuine rejection has been communicated to the offeror, the offeree cannot recant it and accept, because the offer has come to an end.11 (The timing of a rejection sent by mail is taken up below.) The purported acceptance is not without effect, since it can operate as a new offer from the former offeree.12 The original offeror remains free to accept that new offer, and Sallie, likewise, could reinstate her offer to Bonzo.13 Either way, a contract rests on the offeror’s fresh assent rather than on the first offer. The usual exam error is to treat the offeree’s second call as an acceptance of the original offer, when it can operate only as a new offer that the original offeror may take or leave.
Counteroffer as Rejection
Section 39(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a counteroffer as an offer made by an offeree to the offeror that relates to the same matter as the original offer and proposes a substituted bargain differing from the one the original offer proposed.15 Each element does work. The reply must come from the offeree, because only the holder of the power of acceptance can give it up by what is said. It must relate to the same matter, which separates a counterproposal from an unrelated overture about some other deal. And it must propose a different bargain, so that taking the reply at its word would leave the parties contracting on terms the offeror never offered. When Sallie offers her house for $500,000 and Bonzo answers that $490,000 is all he can do, his reply meets all three.16
A counteroffer terminates the offeree’s power to accept the original offer, unless the offeror has manifested a contrary intention or the counteroffer itself manifests a contrary intention of the offeree (§ 39(2)).17 That puts it beside rejection among the events listed in § 36(1).18 What a counterproposal tells the offeror is that the offeree will deal on the offeree’s own terms and, by implication, not on the terms offered. The offeror may then treat the first proposal as declined and decide whether the new one is worth taking or whether to look elsewhere. Without the rule, an offeree could float a counterproposal, learn that the offeror will not budge, and fall back on the original terms, holding two options where the offer conferred one. So Bonzo’s later declaration that $500,000 is fine after all forms no contract; it operates as a new offer that Sallie may accept or ignore.19 His $490,000 reply, meanwhile, gave Sallie a power of acceptance of her own: if she says yes to that figure, a contract forms at $490,000.20
The commonest counteroffer is a qualified acceptance. Under the common-law mirror-image rule, a purported acceptance that varies the terms of the offer is equivalent to a rejection.21 In Ardente v. Horan, the sellers refused to convey, and the buyer sued for specific performance and lost, because an acceptance that is equivocal, conditional, or limited is a counteroffer that the original offeror must still accept before a contract can exist.22 In routine merchandise transactions, UCC § 2-207 has supplanted and substantially modified the mirror-image rule, so the common-law baseline described here applies most directly outside that setting.23
Two cases show the two faces of a counteroffer. In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Columbus Rolling-Mill Co., the mill had offered to sell not less than 2,000 tons. The railway’s telegram of December 16 proposed to purchase only 1,200 tons. The Court held that the telegram varied the offer’s terms and so was a counteroffer and hence a rejection, which entitled the mill to treat the original offer as withdrawn; the mill could renew the offer if it chose, but a later tender of acceptance by the railway could not revive it.24 In Normile, the seller answered the buyers’ offer with a counteroffer that changed the payment terms. The buyers neither accepted it, expressly or by conduct, nor rejected it, and instead operated under the mistaken impression that they held an option and that the property was off the market. Without an acceptance or a rejection there was no mutual assent. The seller then contracted with another buyer, which manifested her intention to revoke the counteroffer, and the buyers had no power to revive it by later attempts to accept.25 The first case shows a counteroffer killing the original offer. The second shows that a counteroffer is itself only an offer, which its maker may revoke before the other side accepts.
Close cases arise when a reply asks about different terms without clearly insisting on them. The test is objective: a reasonable offeror either hears a statement that the offeree will deal only on the offeree’s own terms or hears an inquiry into whether other terms are possible. An inquiry leaves the offer on the table, and treating every question as a refusal would punish ordinary haggling. In State v. Rios, a prosecutor offered a plea deal built around an Alford plea, and defense counsel, before accepting, asked, “Would you consider a nolo plea to reckless endangerment?” The motions court held that the question was a counteroffer that rejected the original offer, which the prosecutor then sought to withdraw. The appellate court reversed.26 A question put before the offeree commits leaves the offer alive. A reply that purports to accept but adds a condition or limitation is a counteroffer.
The rule is only a default. An offeror who invites counterproposals and says the offer will stay open regardless has manifested a contrary intention, and so has an offeree who frames a counterproposal as an additional option rather than a replacement.27
An exam problem in which the offeree answers with an added term or a lower price is usually testing this rule. The efficient way through is to ask whether the reply was a firm proposal of different terms or only a question, and whether either party said the original offer would stay open. The usual error is to treat a qualified acceptance as an acceptance with a few extra requests, and to forget that once the reply is a counteroffer, a later yes to the original terms is only a new offer.
Mailed Rejections
Restatement § 40 governs a rejection or counteroffer sent by mail or telegram, where the message spends hours or days in transit. Such a message does not terminate the power of acceptance until the offeror receives it, yet it limits the power from the moment it goes out: a letter or telegram of acceptance started after an otherwise effective rejection or counteroffer is only a counteroffer, unless the acceptance reaches the offeror before the rejection or counteroffer does.29 The section answers two questions. The offer dies when the rejection is received. An acceptance sent while the rejection is still traveling is saved or lost by a race to the offeror’s desk.
Each half has its own reason. The receipt requirement follows the reliance that makes a rejection end the power at all. An offeror who has received nothing does not know the offeree has declined, so he cannot have sold the goods elsewhere on the strength of a refusal he has never seen, and nothing justifies cutting off the offeree’s power while the letter is in transit. The race rule answers a different danger. Because the mailed rejection has not yet ended the power, an offeree who regrets it can still send an acceptance, and without a limit the offeree could send both messages and stand on whichever the market favored. The rule removes that choice by looking to arrival. If the rejection reaches the offeror first, he may already have acted on it, so a later-arriving acceptance counts only as a counteroffer. If the acceptance reaches him first, no one could have relied on the rejection, and the acceptance stands.
In a problem that lists a rejection mailed Monday and an acceptance mailed Tuesday, ask which letter reached the offeror first. The order of arrival decides; the order of mailing drops out.
Bea’s loss in the first scene stands out against the ordinary rule for acceptances. Under the deposited-acceptance rule, an acceptance is effective upon dispatch, even if it never reaches the offeror.30 Had Bea not sent the rejection first, her Tuesday letter would have formed a contract the moment she mailed it. The Monday rejection took that away, so her acceptance reaches Aldo with only the force of an offer. The mirror case is an acceptance mailed before the rejection: the contract then exists from the moment of mailing, and a rejection sent afterward, however fast it travels, comes too late to undo it.
The two timing rules look inconsistent until one asks when someone could first rely on a message. An offeree who has mailed an acceptance is already relying on the deal being on,31 and the dispatch rule protects that reliance. A rejection involves no comparable reliance until it reaches the offeror, who cannot depend on a message he has not seen. Each rule gives a message effect at the moment someone could first have relied on it. A lost rejection follows the same logic: it never reaches the offeror, so it never ends the power, and an acceptance that does arrive forms a contract.