Concept
Why Section 2-207 Exists
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
Why Section 2-207 Exists
Two merchants agree on what is being sold, how much of it, and at what price, and then each sends a form whose fine print the other never reads. At common law, that mismatched fine print can void the deal before the goods ship and, once they do, hand the deal to whichever side sent the last form. Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, part of Article 2’s law of transactions in goods, rejects both results.1 It provides that a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time, operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.2
Lawyers call the setting the battle of the forms: the parties exchange incompatible forms, and a court must decide which prevails.3 One court explained why the common law needed replacing. Under the common law, the disparity between the fine-print terms would have prevented a contract when the forms were exchanged, but § 2-207 recognizes that in many, though not all, cases the parties attach no such significance to their printed terms.4 They have matched on the points that matter to them, and they ordinarily go on to ship and pay on that basis. A rule that voids the deal over fine print nobody read defeats that shared expectation.
Article 2 solves the problem by separating two questions the common law ran together: whether the parties have a contract, and what its terms are. Subsection (1) decides whether the writings form a contract, subsection (2) treats the additional terms of an acceptance as proposals once a contract exists, and subsection (3) supplies a contract from the parties’ conduct when the writings do not.5 Keeping the questions apart stops the answer to one from dictating the answer to the other. The three parts below cover the commercial problem, the structure of the section, and its scope.
The Problem of Preprinted Forms
Routine commercial sales run on standard forms with printed terms. A typical deal begins with a request for quotation, answered by a quotation, and continues with a purchase order and a sales acknowledgment. The buyer’s purchase order ordinarily serves as the offer. The seller’s varying acknowledgment fires the “last shot”: it declines to contract on the buyer’s terms, which rejects the offer, and signals willingness to contract on the seller’s, which makes a counteroffer.6
The parties bargain over only the transaction-specific, or “dickered,” terms, such as the goods, the quantity, and the price, and they write those terms into the blanks on the forms. Neither side may have noticed the mismatched standard terms, and each assumes it has a deal because the dickered terms agree.7 Almost no one reads the fine print, since the front of each form carries the operative data, yet the printed terms are formally part of the bargained-for exchange.8 The parties then ship and pay, each assuming that its own standard terms are part of the contract.9
A sale of steel shows the collision. Boilerplate Contractors, an Alabama boilermaker, orders two tons of steel from Ironclad Steelworks, a Pennsylvania manufacturer, on a form with a standard clause sending all disputes to arbitration. Ironclad accepts in an acknowledgment that adds a standard clause requiring all disputes to be litigated in Pennsylvania courts. The two forms agree on the core terms of the sale and conflict on how a dispute will be resolved.10
The common law gives Boilerplate and Ironclad different results depending on when anyone asks. Before the steel ships, the mirror image rule applies: any variation makes the purported acceptance a rejection that is also a counteroffer.11 Negotiations are at an end, and the offeror may renew its original offer but cannot have it revived by the offeree’s later tender of acceptance.12 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. is a classic application of that rule. On the paper alone, then, Boilerplate and Ironclad have no contract, although each believes it has one before anyone performs.13
Once the steel ships, the answer flips. If Boilerplate accepts the goods, the common law treats that act as acceptance of Ironclad’s counteroffer by conduct. The contract forms on Ironclad’s terms, Boilerplate’s arbitration clause falls away, and Boilerplate is deemed to agree to the forum selection clause. This result is the “last shot” rule, because the common law tends to find a contract on the terms of the party that sent the last communication before performance.14 After performance begins, mutual assent is usually clear, and the difficulty shifts to identifying the terms to which both parties assented.15 The same paper therefore yields no contract before shipment and a contract on the last sender’s terms after it.
Both results ignore what the parties did and priced. The mirror image rule lets a mismatch that no one noticed or bargained over decide whether a deal exists, which gives an exit to whichever party regrets the bargain. The last shot rule gives terms nobody negotiated to whoever happened to send the final form, so timing decides what agreement should. The drafters of Article 2 considered the last shot rule random and formalistic, especially where standard terms are involved.16 Their answer fits the Code’s basic policy that a contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, whether orally, in writing, or by the conduct of both parties recognizing the contract.17 Article 2 therefore lets the dickered terms carry formation and sorts out the competing boilerplate afterward.
A 2003 effort by the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission to redraft and simplify § 2-207 was never adopted, so the awkward original language remains the law.18 Proposed revisions of this kind would separate the offer-and-acceptance rules from the contract-content rules.19 The text still in force packs both functions into one section.
Statutory Roadmap
Section 2-207 asks three questions in order, and each subsection answers one. Subsection (1) asks whether the parties’ writings form a contract. Subsection (2) asks, when they do, which of the terms added by the reply became part of the contract. Subsection (3) asks, when the writings alone form no contract, whether the conduct of both parties formed one and what it contains.21 The order of the subsections is the order of analysis: terms cannot be sorted until a contract exists, and the conduct question arises only after the writings fail. This part shows what each subsection answers and how the three hand off to one another, and the parts that follow teach the requirements of each in detail.
Subsection (1) decides whether any deal exists. At common law, a reply that varied the offer operated as a rejection and a counteroffer.22 Subsection (1) treats a definite and seasonable reply as an acceptance anyway, so the writings form a contract even though the offeror never agreed to the other side’s fine print.23
The statute keeps one exception. A reply whose acceptance is expressly made conditional on the offeror’s assent to the additional or different terms remains a counteroffer, the familiar qualified or conditional acceptance, and the writings alone then form no contract; as one court put it, the entire transaction aborts at that point.24 An unqualified acceptance that merely comes with a proposal for modification, or for a separate agreement, is still an acceptance. A court may also read language about an added term as only suggestive, or precatory, which leaves a contract on the offeror’s terms.25 Both halves of the rule track the commercial facts: in many cases the parties attach little significance to the printed terms, and in the rest an offeree will deal only on its own terms, which the statute lets it say expressly.26
The same sentence of subsection (1) reaches a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time. A confirmation records a deal already made, so the contract exists before the writing is sent, and the live question is whether the confirmation’s added terms joined it. Suppose Boilerplate orders the steel by phone and Ironclad accepts during the call, and Ironclad then sends an acknowledgment containing the forum selection clause. Formation occurred during the call, so the section’s job is to decide whether the clause became part of the contract.27
Once subsection (1) finds a contract in the writings, subsection (2) takes over. It treats the additional terms of the reply as proposals for addition to the contract and supplies special rules for them, including a provision under which proposals are deemed accepted when the transaction is between merchants.28 A term that materially alters the offer drops out, and many courts ask whether it causes hardship as a result of surprise.29 The text leaves a gap: subsection (1) speaks of additional or different terms, while subsection (2) speaks only of additional ones, so the section gives no direct guidance on a different term, one that conflicts with a term in the offer. Some courts and commentators conclude that different terms knock each other out of the contract, leaving the court to fill the gap.30 Splitting the two inquiries lets the law settle formation on the dickered terms and the fine print afterward.
Subsection (3) catches the case in which the writings fail and the parties proceed anyway. It provides that conduct by both parties recognizing the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale, although the writings do not otherwise establish one.31 A reply can fail subsection (1) because it is not a definite expression of acceptance or because it is expressly conditional, but a seller that ships and a buyer that receives and pays have shown that both believe a contract exists.32 The rule fits Article 2’s liberal formation policy: a contract for the sale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including by conduct, and the exact moment of formation need not be identified.33
The terms of a contract formed by conduct are those on which the writings agree, plus supplementary terms supplied by the Code, with neither form gaining primacy over the other.34 A term that appears in only one form therefore drops out, and the last shot rule does not return. Subsection (2) plays no part, because it governs a contract formed through the writings.35
A problem therefore follows one of three routes, and the route fixes the terms rule. On the first, the reply is an acceptance under subsection (1), the writings form the contract, and subsection (2) sorts the additional terms. On the second, the reply is expressly conditional or lacks a definite expression of acceptance, the writings form no contract, and the transaction aborts unless conduct supplies one. On the third, the conduct of both parties forms a contract under subsection (3), and its terms are the matching terms plus the Code’s supplements.36
The same performance can lead down either path, so a stem built on shipped goods and clashing forms tests whether the first question was asked. The wording of the reply decides the path, because shipment and payment that follow a reply already forming a contract are simply performance of that contract.
The two exchanges match on the dickered terms and on performance. They differ in one sentence of the seller’s form, the one making acceptance expressly conditional. That sentence moves the analysis from subsection (2), where the clause is a proposal tested against the exceptions, to subsection (3), where only matching terms and gap-fillers survive. On an exam, name the route before discussing any single term, then choose between the terms rule for a contract formed by writings and the terms rule for a contract formed by conduct.
When Section 2-207 Applies
Section 2-207 sits in Article 2, so the first scope question is whether the deal is a transaction in goods.38 Goods are movable things other than the money paid and certain intangible rights, and a sale is the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price.39 Steel and flour qualify; repair services do not. Article 2 also excludes a transaction that, although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or a present sale, is intended to operate only as a security transaction,40 and it leaves in place statutes regulating sales to consumers, farmers, and other specified classes of buyers.41 When a deal falls outside Article 2, a varying reply gets the common-law mirror image and last shot treatment described earlier in this chapter. When it falls inside, § 2-207 decides.
The dispute in Princess Cruises v. General Electric Co. falls on the services side of that line. The cruise line sent GE a purchase order for repair and maintenance services at $260,000, and GE answered with a final price quotation at $231,925. The court treated the quotation as a counteroffer that rejected the purchase order, and it held that the cruise line accepted the counteroffer by giving GE permission to proceed, by not objecting to GE’s confirmatory letter, and by paying the quotation’s price.42 At common law, a party who proceeds under a contract after receiving a counteroffer accepts its terms by performance.43 The court reached that result because the predominant thrust of the contract was services, and a contract that mixes labor and materials is classified by its dominant element in the same way.
Article 2 leaves most of the common law of contracts in place. Where Article 2 has a provision on an issue, that provision displaces the common-law rule; where it is silent, § 1-103(b) keeps the general principles of the common law in force.44 The drafters made a limited number of changes to formation rules against a common-law backdrop instead of writing an exhaustive code. Article 2 redefines neither consideration nor offer, so both depend on the state’s common law.45 The missing definition of an offer matters here because subsection (1) measures a reply against the terms offered. No one can say whether a reply varies the offer until common-law principles identify which document was the offer, and in the typical exchange of forms the buyer’s purchase order is the offer.46 The next part of this chapter takes up that task.
The nickname suggests that the section needs two competing preprinted forms, but the text of subsection (1) asks only whether a reply or written confirmation states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon.47 Predrafted standard terms are the typical setting, and the text does not confine the section to them. The medium does not matter either, because modern law treats electronic records as writings. If Boilerplate and Ironclad exchange the same order and acknowledgment by email, § 2-207 still decides whether a contract formed and which clause belongs to it.
Courts divide over whether the section reaches a transaction in which only one party sends a form. The dispute arises in rolling contracts, so called because the buyer receives and pays for the goods before the contract reaches the buyer. A buyer, whether a business or a consumer, orders software by telephone or over the internet and pays by credit card.48 In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., a customer ordered a computer by telephone, and the box that arrived held a list of terms said to govern unless the customer returned the machine within 30 days. The question was whether those terms were part of the contract or whether the contract was term-free because the order-taker never read terms over the phone.49 The court in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg had distinguished the battle of the forms from its own case: “Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”50 The Hill court extended that reasoning to consumers. In its view the question was not whether terms were added after formation but how and when the contract was formed, and a vendor may propose that a contract form after the customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the terms.51 Judge Easterbrook’s opinion also asked directly whether buyers predictably gain from such contracting procedures.52
Other courts have disagreed and hold that the terms packed in the box do not bind the purchaser, and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. is a leading example. Critics of Hill add that the telephone order formed the contract and that the terms in the box were additional terms which, under the Code, do not become part of it.53 Whatever the merits of that debate, the text of § 2-207 requires no second form, and the ProCD line is contrary authority to note, not a starting premise.
The same changed terms therefore lead to different analyses depending on the subject of the deal. Steel ordered and acknowledged by email goes to § 2-207, and the ship repair services in Princess Cruises go to the common law, even though the reply changed the offer’s terms in both.