Concept
The Mailbox Rule
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
The Mailbox Rule
An acceptance can match the offer's terms, manner, and deadline and still raise one last question when the parties are apart: at what moment does it take legal effect? Face to face, the question never arises, because the words are spoken and heard together. At a distance the message travels for an interval, and two moments compete. One is the moment the offeree sends the acceptance; the other is the moment it arrives. The same choice confronts a revocation that the offeror sends.1 The choice matters because the offeror's power to revoke, the running of a deadline, and the risk of a lost message all depend on whether a contract already exists while the message is in transit.
The common law answers with the mailbox rule, which picks the earlier moment for an acceptance: it takes effect when it leaves the offeree's hands.
The mailbox rule is a default with conditions and limits, and the subsections below take them in order. The first states the dispatch rule and the reasons for it. Two more ask what the offeree must do to earn its protection: send the acceptance properly, and, when the sending was irregular, arrive on time. A fourth shows how the offeror can opt out. Two further subsections cover the settings where the default reverses, options and an acceptance sent after a rejection. The last two define receipt and apply the timing rules to email.
Acceptance Effective on Dispatch
Unless the offer provides otherwise, an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium the offer invited is operative, and completes mutual assent, as soon as it is put out of the offeree's possession, whether or not it ever reaches the offeror.2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63(a) thus selects the earlier of the two competing moments. An acceptance is dispatched when it leaves the offeree's possession and passes into the control of the post office, a telegraph operator, or another third party authorized to receive it,3 and from that moment the contract exists. Delay, loss, and the offeror's ignorance that anything was sent all occur inside a contract already formed.
Revocation runs the other way. At common law a revocation is not effective until the offeree receives it, and nothing justifies placing the risk of delay or loss in transmission on the offeree.4 An acceptance that becomes operative before a revocation arrives therefore forms a contract. The offeror holds the power of revocation only until the offer is accepted and cannot revoke a contract without the other party's agreement.5 The Denver offeror's Tuesday call attempted exactly that: the offeree mailed on Monday, so the contract formed on Monday, and the call tried to revoke an offer that had already become a contract.
Two reasons support giving acceptance the earlier moment. The first is reliance. The offeree who has sent an acceptance is already relying on the deal, while the offeror is only holding an offer open.6 The offeree weighing whether to accept ‘needs a dependable basis’ for that decision, and has one when the offeree knows that, once properly dispatched, the acceptance is binding and the offer cannot be revoked.7
The second reason concerns who can avoid the risk. Only the offeror can require that an acceptance be effective on receipt. An offeror who does not do so assumes the risk of uncertainty, delay, or nonreceipt, and the offeree gains a reliable basis for treating the deal as made.8 Other systems choose the other moment. The CISG adopts a receipt rule for both acceptances and rejections, whereas the common law uses dispatch for acceptances, receipt for rejections, and a limited exception for an overtaking rejection.9
The lost acceptance is where the rule does its hardest work. Suppose an offeror mails an offer on the first of the month and a revocation on the tenth, and the offeree receives the revocation at 2:00 p.m. on the twelfth. At 1:30 p.m. that day the offeree mails an acceptance, and it never arrives. A contract formed at 1:30 p.m., because the revocation had not yet taken effect and the acceptance became operative on mailing. The later loss could not undo it.10 The offeror bears the risk of the lost letter because it authorized the mail, or at least named no other means, and never required receipt.
Formation is a separate matter from performance. An offer's language may be read to make the offeror's performance conditional on receiving the acceptance,11 and a seller who never learns that a buyer accepted cannot be expected to ship. Even so, that condition operates inside a contract that did form. The offeror could not revoke while the letter was in transit, and the fact that the acceptance was never received does not terminate the contract or preclude its enforcement.12
Control is the test, and an acceptance that has been prepared or handed off but not yet put beyond the offeree's reach has not been dispatched. Delivering an acceptance to a messenger with directions to mail it amounts to no acceptance until the messenger actually deposits it in the mail.13 In Gibbs v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, the offeree gave the acceptance to a mail clerk in the offeree's own office, and the court held that acceptance would occur only when the letter was deposited in the U.S. mail. By then the revocation had been received.14 In Morton's of Chicago/Great Neck LLC v. Crab House, Inc., a New York appellate court held that even if an oral acceptance had not sufficed, the acceptor had mailed a written acceptance before the offeror faxed its notice of revocation.15 The two outcomes differ on one fact: whether the acceptance had left the offeree's control when the revocation arrived. Modern channels follow the same test. In United States Life Insurance Co. v. Wilson, the insured's bank sent a check for an overdue premium on July 25, 2007. The court held that at that point the permissible means of acceptance was in motion and beyond the insured's power to stop, so the policy was reinstated effective July 25, three days before he died.16
The offeree cannot take back a dispatched acceptance, because a rule that allowed it would invite speculation. If the offeror could not revoke after dispatch but the offeree could withdraw until receipt, the offeree could wait out a rise or fall in price during transit at the offeror's expense.17 Recapturing the letter does not help either. An offeree who retrieves a posted acceptance from the post office has still formed a contract,18 although, as a practical matter, an offeror cannot enforce an acceptance it never knows about.19
The dispatch rule is a default, which is why § 63 opens with the words ‘unless the offer provides otherwise.’ The offeror may specify when acceptance becomes effective,20 and as master of the offer it may make formation depend on actual communication of the acceptance.21 The default also assumes that the offeree used an invited medium and dispatched the acceptance properly. The next subsections take up those conditions, the offeror's opt-out, and the settings where the default gives way.
On an exam, reduce the analysis to two timestamps: when the acceptance left the offeree's possession, and when the revocation was received. If the offer invited the medium used and did not require receipt, dispatch before the revocation arrives forms the contract, and later loss, delay, or attempted withdrawal changes nothing. For the same reason, an acceptance mailed before the offer's deadline is timely even if it arrives after the deadline or never arrives at all.22
Proper Dispatch Required
An acceptance sent from a distance earns the dispatch rule's protection only if it is properly addressed and the other precautions ordinarily observed to insure safe transmission of similar messages have been taken.24 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 66 thus conditions what § 63(a) grants. An envelope dropped into a mailbox has left the offeree's hands, but if it lacks the address or postage that would carry it, the mailing happened without the safeguards the rule presupposes, and the acceptance does not become operative when mailed.
The condition follows from the reason for the dispatch rule. The rule places the risk of delay and loss on the offeror because the offeror could have required receipt and did not. Having authorized the channel, the offeror accepts the channel's failures, and the offeree gains a dependable basis for treating the deal as made.25 That reasoning covers a letter lost by the post office or delayed by weather. It does not cover a failure the offeree caused, because an unstamped envelope was never entrusted to the channel in the way the offeror authorized. Section 66 therefore measures the sender against what is ordinarily done for similar messages. A sender who addresses the message correctly and arranges its carriage has done all that an offeree can fairly be asked to do.
The unstamped envelope in Casto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. shows the failing side. An insurer had offered to renew a car insurance policy, and the insured tried to accept by mailing a premium check in an envelope that carried no stamp. The court acknowledged that acceptance by mail was authorized, so the mailbox rule would have made acceptance effective on mailing the check. It refused to apply the rule because the insured could not show proper mailing.26 The insured had done everything the offer invited except the one step that made the mailing real, and no acceptance took effect when the envelope went into the box.
The tenant's receipt matters for a further reason: the offeree must prove proper dispatch. The party invoking the mailbox rule carries the burden of showing that the acceptance was correctly addressed, stamped, and otherwise properly prepared for delivery, which is why a careful offeree keeps a record of the mailing.27 The allocation follows the evidence. The offeree who sealed the envelope can keep a receipt, a certified-mail slip, or a copy of the addressed envelope. An offeror who received nothing cannot show how an envelope that never arrived was prepared.
A failure under § 66 costs the acceptance the head start that the dispatch rule gives. An acceptance that never arrives, as in Casto, forms no contract at all, because the dispatch rule cannot stand in for receipt when dispatch was improper. An improperly sent acceptance that does arrive is the subject of the next subsection. The error to avoid on an exam is to treat the word mailed as if it meant properly dispatched: a stem that mentions a missing stamp, a wrong address, or an acceptance handed to someone who never posts it is testing exactly that gap.
Uninvited Means of Transmission
An acceptance sent carelessly, or by a route the offer did not invite, can still be operative on dispatch if it arrives on time. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 67 provides that where an acceptance is seasonably dispatched but the offeree uses means of transmission not invited by the offer, or fails to exercise reasonable diligence to insure safe transmission, it is treated as operative upon dispatch if received within the time in which a properly dispatched acceptance would normally have arrived.29 Seasonably means while the offer is still open, so the rule never revives an acceptance sent after the offer lapsed. Whatever the irregularity, the rule asks a single question after the fact: did the message arrive by the date a proper one would have? If so, the irregularity is forgiven, and the contract dates from dispatch rather than from arrival.
The rule fills a gap that §§ 63(a) and 66 leave. Section 63(a) gives dispatch effect to an acceptance made in an invited manner and by an invited medium,30 and § 66 withholds it from an acceptance that is improperly addressed or lacks the ordinary precautions.31 Read alone, those sections would deny a contract from dispatch to an offeree who chose a slightly irregular route, even though the message reached the offeror on schedule. Section 67 closes the gap, and it depends on receipt: an acceptance that never arrives, like the unstamped envelope in the preceding subsection, gets no help from it.
How often § 67 matters depends on how broadly the law reads an invitation. The general law treats an acceptance as effective on dispatch when it is sent by an authorized means or by any medium reasonable under the circumstances.32 For sales of goods, UCC § 2-206(1)(a) construes an offer, unless its language or the circumstances unambiguously indicate otherwise, as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances. A reply by overnight courier to a mailed offer is therefore an acceptance and not a counteroffer.33 Because so many media qualify, § 67 does its work at the margins, where the route falls outside what the circumstances make reasonable or the sender was careless. An offer that prescribes a method of reply raises a compliance question under § 60 before any question about transmission arises, while an offer that merely suggests a method does not preclude another.34
Arrival time is the test because it measures prejudice to the offeror. An offeror who invites a reply at a distance bargains for ordinary, careful transmission and accepts the risk of delay inside that channel. If an irregular acceptance arrives when a proper one would have, the offeror is exactly where it would have been: it learns of the deal when it would have, and a revocation sent in the interim would have failed against a proper acceptance too. Denying a contract would hand the offeror a windfall. If the acceptance arrives later, the extra delay traces to the offeree's choice of route or lack of care, and the offeror may in the meantime have revoked or dealt elsewhere in reliance on silence. Binding it from dispatch would charge it with a risk it never took on.
Okafor's route is open to challenge on two grounds: a neighbor's car may not be an invited medium, and handing an acceptance to a volunteer may fall short of ordinary precautions. Neither matters. The envelope reached the supplier on Wednesday, a day ahead of normal mail time, so § 67 treats the acceptance as operative on Monday.35 The contract therefore existed when the supplier mailed the Tuesday letter. A revocation takes effect only when the offeree receives it, so the Thursday arrival found nothing left to revoke.36
The manager's route was no more irregular than Okafor's. What differs is the arrival date measured against the mail benchmark: nine days against three. The acceptance arrived after the time a properly dispatched one would normally have arrived, so it receives no dispatch-time effect.37 At best it takes effect on receipt, and only if the offer is still open then. The offer ended when the manager received the revocation on day five, four days before the acceptance arrived, so no contract exists. The benchmark also protects the linen service, which held the offer open through days of silence and withdrew it on the reasonable assumption that no one had accepted.
On an exam, a stem that sends an acceptance by an unusual route, or sends it carelessly, is testing three dates: when the acceptance left the offeree's hands, when it reached the offeror, and when a properly dispatched acceptance would normally have arrived. If the arrival date is no later than the third, the acceptance is operative on the first, and anything the offeror did in between, such as mailing a revocation the offeree has not yet received, comes too late. If the arrival date is later than the third, the dispatch-time effect is lost, and the acceptance counts only if the offer is still open when it arrives. An acceptance that never arrives forms no contract under this rule.
Offeror Opt-Out
An offeror can displace the dispatch rule by saying when its acceptance takes effect. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63 opens with the words ‘Unless the offer provides otherwise,’ so the dispatch rule governs only when the offer is silent about timing.39 The preceding subsections asked what the offeree must do to earn the rule's protection. This one asks who controls the rule itself, and the answer is the offeror: an offer that states how its acceptance becomes effective replaces the default with its own terms.
The offeror holds this power because of what justifies the rule. The dispatch rule puts the risk of delay and loss on the offeror because the offeror could have required receipt and did not, and in return the offeree gains a reliable basis for treating the deal as made.40 Once the offeror speaks, both halves of that justification fall away. The offeror has chosen to keep the risk of transit for itself, and the offer has told the offeree that mailing creates nothing. An offeree who reads a receipt requirement cannot reasonably rely on a contract before the message lands, and can guard against trouble by choosing a faster channel, sending early, or confirming arrival. The power also follows from the offeror's position as master of the offer. In Lewis v. Browning, the court observed that the person making the offer ‘may always, if he chooses, make the formation of the contract which he proposes dependent upon the actual communication to himself of the acceptance.’41
An opt-out takes one of two forms. The express form says that receipt controls: an offer stating that acceptance is effective only on receipt, or that no contract arises until the offeror actually receives a signed acceptance, leaves nothing to interpret. The implied form arises when the offer's terms cannot be satisfied without delivery. An offer that requires acceptance by personal delivery of a signed writing, for example, fixes both the mode of acceptance and the event, delivery, that brings it into effect.42 Because the statement can come from the structure of the offer as well as its vocabulary, the question is what the offer, read as a whole, tells the offeree about the moment of formation.
Moving formation to receipt changes every question the dispatch rule answered. While an acceptance is in transit no contract exists, so the offeror keeps the power to revoke until the offer is actually accepted.43 Had the Denver offer required receipt, the offeror's Tuesday call would have ended the offer before the acceptance arrived on Thursday, and no contract would have formed. A lost or delayed letter likewise leaves the offeree without a deal. Those consequences are the price of the opt-out, and they fall on the offeree because the offeror alone chose to ask for receipt.
The harder exam question is whether the offer opted out at all, because stems like to include a deadline or a named medium and invite the inference that receipt is required. A medium and a moment are different subjects. An offer that names a medium does not by that alone say when acceptance takes effect, since the offeror may not have specified that point.44 A deadline likewise fixes only how long the power of acceptance lasts, and without words tying it to receipt, an acceptance mailed before the deadline is timely even if it arrives afterward.45 An offer that requires acceptance to be received by Friday and one that requires it to be mailed by Friday differ in a single word, and that word moves the analysis from receipt to dispatch.
An offeror who wants the contract to depend on receipt can say so in a single clause, and an offeree who reads that clause must plan around it. An offeror who omits the clause cannot claim the opt-out because the offer happened to mention a deadline or to invite a mailed reply. The dispatch rule also has limits of its own, and the next subsection takes up the first: the Restatement reverses the default for acceptances under option contracts.
Option Contracts
The Restatement reverses the dispatch default for options. Under § 63(b), an acceptance under an option contract is not operative until received by the offeror.47 Subsection (a), developed above, makes an invited acceptance effective as soon as it leaves the offeree's possession,48 and subsection (b) marks the option as the setting where that default reverses. An option is a binding promise, supported by consideration, to keep an offer open for a stated period. Its principal effect is to bind the offeror: the offeree's power of acceptance lasts until the period ends, and the offeror cannot lawfully revoke before then.49 Because the offer is irrevocable, even the death or insanity of a party may not terminate it.50 To exercise the option, the offeree must communicate acceptance to the offeror within the option period.51
The reversal makes sense once you recall what the dispatch rule is for. An offeree weighing an ordinary offer needs a dependable way to know that a deal exists, because the offeror may revoke at any moment before the acceptance takes effect. Fixing formation at dispatch gives the offeree that certainty.52 An option supplies the same certainty by a different route. The offeror has given up the power to revoke, so nothing it does while the acceptance is in transit can defeat the offeree's right to accept, and the offeree does not need an early moment of formation to be safe. With the offeree protected, the offeror's interest decides the question: an offeror bound to hold an offer open has a legitimate need to learn promptly whether the option has been exercised, and the receipt rule serves that need.
Two consequences follow from placing formation at receipt. First, the exercise must be received within the option period, so a notice mailed inside the period but delivered after it arrives too late. Second, until the exercise arrives, no operative acceptance exists, so the offeree may take it back after sending it but before it is received. That reverses the ordinary rule. An offeree who could retract a dispatched acceptance would hold a free option against the offeror, but an offeree under a real option already holds one by agreement.
The reversal applies only to a genuine option, so the first question on any stem is whether the promise to hold the offer open was bought. A promise given for nothing creates none of this protection. In a sale of goods, UCC § 2-205 dispenses with the need for consideration to validate a merchant's firm offer whose prerequisites are met,53 and a firm offer by a merchant is not revocable for lack of consideration.54
Both scenes run on similar mailing and arrival dates. The seller's promise in the first was bought and in the second was a gift, and that difference decides which rule operates: a real option puts formation at receipt, while an unsupported promise leaves the offer revocable and the dispatch rule in charge.
Not every court follows the Restatement on this point. In Worms v. Burgess, an Oklahoma appellate court rejected the receipt rule for options, reasoning that the mailbox rule is so widely known that the parties to an option should be presumed to have contracted against that background unless they expressly provided otherwise. The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed in Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts v. Grant.55 Some courts also see greater value in a single, predictable rule for every acceptance, and in those courts an option exercised by mail takes effect on dispatch like any other acceptance.56 The disagreement has a limited reach, because § 63 yields to contrary terms in the offer, and parties who write down how exercise takes effect get the rule they chose.57
On an exam, run the analysis in this order. Decide whether the promise to keep the offer open is an option because consideration supports it. If it is, find when the offeror actually received the exercise and whether that moment falls within the option period, since a notice that was merely mailed in time does not suffice. Check whether the offeree withdrew the exercise before it arrived, because that withdrawal is effective. Apply the Restatement rule unless the problem signals that the jurisdiction follows the dispatch rule for options, and if the promise was gratuitous, return to the ordinary dispatch analysis.
Rejection Sent First
The dispatch rule assumes an offeree who is simply accepting an offer that is still open.59 It does not govern an offeree who has already mailed a rejection, and for this purpose a counteroffer counts as a rejection.60 When such an offeree changes course and mails an acceptance, the mailbox rule does not apply. The acceptance takes effect only on receipt, so it forms a contract only if it reaches the offeror before the rejection does. If it arrives afterward, it is ineffective.61 A rejection, unlike an acceptance, takes effect on receipt at common law,62 so the contest between the two messages is decided by arrival order.
The limit protects the offeror, who might receive the rejection before the acceptance.63 The dispatch rule places the risk of delay on the offeror because it could have demanded receipt and did not, and the offeree gets a reliable basis for treating the deal as made in return. That bargain assumes an offeror who is merely holding an offer open while the offeree decides. An offeror that has received a rejection stands elsewhere: it has been told the deal is off and may sensibly act on that news by selling to someone else. An acceptance that took effect on dispatch would reach back across those steps and create a contract the offeror had every reason to think was dead. It would also let the offeree mail a rejection, watch the market, and send an acceptance only if conditions improved. Making receipt decisive resolves the contest in favor of the message the offeror sees first. The offeree has little ground to complain, having started the sequence by saying the deal was off and having chosen how fast the acceptance travels. The only way to rescue the deal is to win the race, for instance by sending the acceptance through a faster channel than the rejection used.
Arrival order controls, and mailing order does not. Had the owner sent the Tuesday acceptance by overnight courier, so that it reached the wholesaler on Wednesday morning ahead of the Monday letter, the acceptance would have been effective on receipt while the offer was still open, and the later-arriving rejection would have found a contract already formed.64 Reverse the sequence at the sending end and the analysis changes for a different reason. An offeree who mails an acceptance on Monday and a rejection on Tuesday made an acceptance that became operative on dispatch under § 63(a), provided the offer invited the medium and the acceptance was properly sent, so the contract existed before the rejection was written.65 In that sequence the mailbox rule runs normally, because the acceptance was the first message and there is no earlier rejection the offeror could have relied on.
Because arrival decides the contest, what counts as arrival matters. A written rejection or acceptance is received when it comes into the possession of the addressee or of a person authorized to receive it, or when it is deposited in a place the addressee has authorized for such communications.66 A rejection dropped into a mailroom the offeror has designated for incoming business mail is therefore received at that moment, even if the offeror's decision-maker opens it days later. The next subsection develops the definition.
A stem that sends a rejection or counteroffer and then an acceptance from the same offeree is testing this limit. The usual exam error is to date the contract from the mailing of the acceptance because the facts mention a mailbox. The correct move is to find the receipt time of each message and let the earlier one control. If the acceptance arrives first, a contract forms on its arrival. If the rejection arrives first, the acceptance is ineffective, however promptly it was mailed. And when the offeree sent the acceptance first and the rejection second, the ordinary dispatch rule applies and the contract dates from the first mailing.
When a Writing Is Received
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 68 defines the event that decided the race just described. A written revocation, rejection, or acceptance is received when the writing comes into the possession of the person addressed or of someone authorized to receive it for that person, or when it is deposited in a place the addressee has authorized for such communications.68 The definition gives received a physical meaning: the question is where the writing is, and under whose control, and not whether anyone has looked at it.
Several rules in this chapter turn on that definition. A revocation ends an offer only when the offeree receives it.69 A rejection works the same way, and in a contest with a later-mailed acceptance the earlier arrival wins.70 An acceptance under an option contract is not operative until received,71 so an option deadline is met only by a writing received in time. In each setting a few hours' difference in the moment of receipt can decide whether a contract exists, which is why the definition must be concrete.
Section 68 offers three routes to receipt, and each places the writing under the addressee's control in a different way. The first is the plain case, in which the writing comes into the addressee's own hands. The second runs through someone else: a person the addressee authorized to receive the communication, such as an assistant who handles incoming business mail or a receptionist at the addressee's office. The addressee chose to route communications through that person, so a writing in that person's hands is as available as one on the addressee's desk. The third route needs no person at all. It is deposit in a place the addressee authorized for such communications, such as a mailbox at the business address, a drop slot designated for notices, or a mailroom set up for incoming correspondence. The addressee picked the place, so a deposit there is delivery on the addressee's own terms. The authority must come from the addressee. A neighbor's mailbox, or a stranger who happens to stand near the addressee's office, is not a person or place the addressee selected, and a writing left there has not been received.
The addressee need not read the writing. Receipt turns on possession or deposit, so an addressee who holds the writing through an authorized hand or in an authorized place has received it even if the envelope sits unopened for a week.72 If receipt required reading, an addressee facing an unwelcome revocation or rejection could defeat it by leaving the mail unopened. The opposite extreme fails as well: treating a writing as received while it is still in transit, or sitting with a stranger, would charge the addressee with notice of something it had no means of learning. Possession or deposit at an authorized place marks the moment control passes to the addressee, and what the addressee does with the writing after that is its own business.
What separates the drop slot from the Suite 201 mailbox is who chose the place. The owner designated the drop slot, so the notice was received the instant it fell in, however long anyone waited to open it. No one connected to the seller chose the neighbor's mailbox, so the same act of leaving a writing there accomplished nothing.
On an exam, a stem that says a letter was delivered on Friday and opened on Monday fixes receipt on Friday, provided the delivery was to the addressee, to a person the addressee authorized, or to a place the addressee authorized. A stem that shows a misdelivery, or a writing handed to someone with no authority from the addressee, describes a writing that has not been received, and any rule that depends on receipt has not yet been triggered. Electronic messages raise the same questions in a new setting, and the next subsection applies these timing rules to email and similar media.
Electronic Acceptance
Applying the dispatch rule to email, text messages, and website acceptances starts with a prior question: does the exchange behave like a conversation or like a letter? A conversation needs no timing rule. Where the parties negotiate face to face or are otherwise in instantaneous communication, there is no temporal separation between expression and communication, and acceptance occurs as soon as it is manifested.74 Restatement § 64 extends the same treatment to telephones and other substantially instantaneous two-way devices, which do not resemble communication by mail.75 A message that travels through a server or other third party, with a lag between sending and receipt, falls on the letter side, and the mailbox rule can govern it.76
The dispatch rule exists to settle who bears the risk during an interval in which the offeree has acted and the offeror has not yet learned of it. Where no interval exists, there is no risk to allocate, and the mailbox analysis has nothing to decide.
The same technology can land on either side of the line, because what matters is how the parties actually use it. A message may be capable of being substantially instantaneous and still not be, either because of a disruption or because the parties are not using the medium for real-time exchange.77 A run of text messages exchanged within seconds resembles a call, whereas an acceptance emailed to an inbox the offeror checks the next morning resembles a letter. Once a message passes through a third party, a lag opens between the moment the acceptance is placed under the transmission service's control and the moment it is received. That lag is what made the mailbox rule necessary for letters.
A standard illustration shows the lag at work. Rod's letter offers to buy a car from Carr and asks for a reply by December 20. Carr emails an acceptance on December 20 by the mode the offer specified, but the email server is not operating, and the message does not reach Rod until the next morning, after the offer has lapsed.78 Because the sale is one of goods, § 2-207(1) applies, and a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance.79 Whether Carr's email was seasonable depends on when the acceptance took effect. If it took effect on dispatch, the December 20 email beat the deadline; if on receipt, it missed it. The mailbox rule applies to noninstantaneous communications routed through a third party, so it can apply to email, and if it does, Carr's acceptance is timely.80 Timeliness is only one of two questions, since the reply must also be a definite expression of acceptance, which later sections take up.
The reasons that justify the dispatch rule for letters carry over to email. An offeree who has sent an acceptance has done everything within the offeree's control and cannot see whether the offeror's server or spam filter delivered it, whereas the offeror chose to invite email and is the one positioned to guard against failures in its own system. Above all, an offeror can protect itself by requiring actual receipt of the email or online acceptance before any contract forms, and an offeror that does not do so leaves the equities with the offeree, so the acceptance should be effective when sent.81 The failures that keep this issue alive are mundane ones, such as an outage like the one in Carr's case or an aggressive spam filter, and the dispatch rule is returning to prominence for that reason.82
Courts have extended the rule beyond the post office by analogy. When new media appeared, whether telex, telephone, fax, or email, courts did not create new rules of law. They looked at existing principles, evaluated them in light of the new facts, and reasoned by analogy, and an exam answer should do the same.83 In United States Life Insurance Co. v. Wilson, the court treated acceptance by a check sent by the insured's bank as effective on dispatch, and it said the result would be the same whether the check went through the postal service, a courier service, or otherwise. It distinguished transactions that use substantially instantaneous two-way devices, such as telephones or teletypes, which do not resemble mail.84
The law here is less settled than it is for letters. Some courts have applied acceptance on dispatch to email, while the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) provides that acceptance by email is effective on receipt. A competing argument attacks the footing of the mailbox rule itself: when electronic delivery is nearly instantaneous, the gap that justified dispatch has largely closed, so acceptances should be valid on receipt.85 The Rod and Carr facts supply the reply, because the failures that remain, an outage or a filter, are exactly the cases in which one side must absorb a loss, and the equities still favor an offeree who sent the message correctly over an offeror who could have required receipt. An answer should therefore apply the dispatch rule by analogy to a message that passes through a server, flag the receipt alternative, and let the offer's own terms control if they require receipt.