Concept
Sales of Goods Under the UCC
Acceptance: bilateral versus unilateral contracts and acceptance by promise or performance
Sales of Goods Under the UCC
Article 2 of the UCC changes the common law of acceptance in three places, and each change makes a sale of goods easier to close than a contract outside the Code. Section 2-206 makes all three. It relaxes the common law’s insistence on a particular manner and medium of acceptance, it lets a seller accept an order for prompt shipment either by promising to ship or by shipping, and it addresses the seller who starts work without telling the buyer. Everywhere else, the earlier sections of this chapter still control. Article 2 has only a few sections on offer and acceptance, so the common-law rules apply to a sale of goods except where Article 2 states a variant rule.1 General contract law governs sales unless a Code provision displaces it, and common-law principles continue wherever the Code has no contrary rule.2
The variant rules follow from the Code’s central question, whether the parties in fact agreed. That question leads Article 2 to reject a variety of rigid rules traditionally applied at common law.3 It also lets the parties make a contract through conduct as well as through an exchange of offer and acceptance. A contract for the sale of goods “may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract,” and §§ 2-206(1) and 2-207(3) likewise allow formation partly or wholly on the basis of conduct.4
Any Reasonable Manner
Section 2-206(1)(a) construes an offer to make a contract as “inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances,” unless the language or circumstances unambiguously indicate otherwise.5 The word unambiguously sets the bar for departing from the default. An offeror who wants a single kind of reply must say so in terms that leave no real doubt, and an offer that merely leans toward one reply leaves every reasonable reply open.
The word manner reaches the line between promise and performance that organized the opening sections of this chapter. Before the Code, an offer was classified, except in unusual cases, as inviting either a bilateral or a unilateral contract, and the classification fixed the manner of acceptance. An ambiguous offer was presumed to require a promise. The Code replaced that presumption with the premise that in the vast majority of cases the offeror is indifferent about the manner of acceptance, so the offeree is free to proceed by performance or by promise.6 The premise fits ordinary commerce: a buyer who places an order wants the goods and rarely cares how the seller signals its commitment.
The word medium raises a separate question, which is the channel that carries the reply. Section 2-206 rejects technical rules on the manner and medium of acceptance and reads an offer as inviting any reasonable mode unless the offer or the circumstances make clear that the mode is restricted. When Article 2 was promulgated in the 1950s, that flexibility contrasted with a more rigid approach in common-law cases, though modern cases now adopt the Article 2 principles at common law as well.7 A purchase order sent by mail may therefore be answered by telephone or email, so long as the means are reasonable in the circumstances.
The default puts the burden of clarity on the offeror, who wrote the offer. One sentence is enough to name the required form of reply, and an offeree who finds no such sentence and answers sensibly has accepted. Because the default applies unless the language or circumstances unambiguously indicate otherwise, the offeree need not point to any sign that the offeror was flexible.
Words that actually close a door are rare. The Restatement (Second) furnishes illustrations showing that an unambiguous restriction is the unusual case, and two of them mark the boundary from the safe side. An offer that uses unilateral words such as “deliver” does not prevent acceptance by promise, and an offer that uses the word “promise” does not prevent acceptance by performance.8 Words like these describe what the contract will require and do not say what the offeree must do to form it. An order directing the seller to deliver 200 units by Friday still permits a prompt promise to deliver.
An offer crosses the line when it prescribes an act that fits only one kind of reply. Where a buyer’s order stated that “seller shall mail to purchaser a signed duplicate copy hereof,” a court held that the order unambiguously indicated that a promise by writing was the only manner of acceptance.9 The instruction names a specific act that only a written promise can perform, so a seller who telephoned a promise, or who shipped the goods, would have ignored what the order told it to do.
The Restatement (Second) says the same thing in different words: unless the language or the circumstances indicate otherwise, an offer invites acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.10 Despite the variation in language, it adopts the same basic approach as the Code.11 Learn the two provisions as one idea, but remember which one governs. When goods are sold, Article 2 supplies the rule wherever it speaks, and the common law fills only what Article 2 leaves open.12 The section also controls only how an offer may be accepted. Whether a communication is an offer at all remains a question for the common-law rules of the earlier sections.
Prompt Shipment Offers
Section 2-206(1)(b) addresses the most common commercial offer to buy. An order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment is construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but a shipment of non-conforming goods is not an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.14 The sentence has two halves. The first applies the general default to a particular kind of order. The second sets a rule for goods that do not match the order, and its accommodation exception lets the seller avoid that rule by speaking up in time.
The first half applies the default where it fits comfortably. A buyer who orders widgets for prompt shipment wants the widgets on the stated terms, and an “indifferent” offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment invites acceptance either by promise or by performance.15 A seller who promptly promises to ship forms a bilateral contract before any goods move. A seller who ships accepts by performing.
Shipment is performance, and not merely a beginning of it. Loading goods onto the seller’s own truck is not shipment, although it may be a beginning of performance, and subsection (2) rather than subsection (1)(b) governs the beginning of performance.16 A seller who accepts by shipping must also give prompt notice of shipment under § 2-504(c), but failure to give it is a ground for rejection only if shipment was materially delayed or the buyer suffers a loss. The Restatement (Second) treats such notice as ordinarily unnecessary, and the UCC prevails when the offer is to buy goods.17
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. shows how much can turn on the default. The Hills telephoned an order for a computer, and the question was whether formation was postponed until 30 days after the computer was delivered to them. Under § 2-206(1)(b), the Hills’ version of offer and acceptance was correct unless the language of the contract or the circumstances showed unambiguously that formation was postponed. At the time of the telephone order, the parties likely gave little thought to when their contract was formed, because they were concerned with the procedure for ordering and delivering the computer. The section therefore appears to favor the Hills’ version of the facts.18
The second half of the provision reverses a common-law result. At common law, a shipment of non-conforming goods in response to an offer to buy was only a counteroffer, so a seller who shipped the wrong goods could argue that no contract had formed. Hawkland calls this maneuver the “unilateral contract trick,” and § 2-206(1)(b) was designed to prevent it.19 Under the Code, a seller who ships non-conforming goods in response to an offer has made a contract, and the shipment is both an acceptance and a breach.20 Each half of that result does separate work. Treating the shipment as an acceptance gives the buyer a contract to sue on, and treating it as a breach holds the seller answerable under that contract for the mismatch.
The exception protects a seller with an honest reason to ship something different. A shipment of non-conforming goods is no acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation, and in that event the shipment is a counteroffer.21 The buyer may then reject it or take it up on the seller’s terms. The notice must be seasonable because the buyer has to be able to tell, when the goods arrive, whether a closed bargain has been breached or a new proposal has been made. A seller that stays silent when it ships has given no notice at all.
A tempting error reasons from the mismatch: the goods are wrong, so the shipment cannot be the requested performance and cannot accept. That is the common-law instinct, and the Code displaces it for orders for prompt or current shipment. The mismatch goes to breach, and only a seasonable accommodation notice keeps a non-conforming shipment from being an acceptance in the first place.
Beginning Performance Under the UCC
Section 2-206(2) governs the seller who has started work on an order but has not yet shipped. Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.23 The subsection fills the gap the shipment rule leaves. Shipment is performance and accepts a prompt-shipment order, while loading goods onto the seller’s own truck is not shipment, though it may be a beginning of performance, which subsection (2) addresses.24 The sentence has a threshold and a consequence. The threshold asks whether starting the work is a permitted way to accept at all, and the consequence allocates the burden of telling the offeror once the work has begun.
The threshold is easy to meet in the ordinary case. Section 2-206(1) construes an offer as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances unless the language or circumstances unambiguously indicate otherwise, so an order that is silent about the form of reply leaves the seller free to answer by starting the work.25 If beginning performance is not a reasonable mode of acceptance, as where it is unambiguously clear that an express promise is sought, subsection (2) does not apply and the common law supplies the solution.26 The reason lies in what the buyer asked for. A buyer who demands a signed acknowledgment has said what signal it will look for, and subsection (2) would let silent activity in a factory form a contract that the buyer asked to have formed another way.
Once the threshold is met, the offeree is bound by starting. The Restatement (Second) reaches the same place for an offer that invites a choice between promising and performing: the tender or beginning of the invited performance is an acceptance by performance, and such an acceptance operates as a promise to render complete performance.27 The net result is that bilateral contracts are favored over unilateral ones. Even if the offeree is bound by starting to perform, the offeror is not bound to perform unless the offeree gives notice of beginning performance within a reasonable time.28
The duty to speak falls on the offeree because the offeree alone knows that work has begun. A buyer who hears nothing cannot tell whether its order is being filled or ignored, and it cannot arrange another source of supply. One sentence from the seller removes that uncertainty. While the reasonable time for notice runs, the offeror is not free to revoke.29
Lapse is the offeror’s option and never happens on its own. If timely notice is not given, the offeror, although not bound to perform, may waive the notice requirement and enforce the contract.30 The notice requirement protects the offeror, so the offeror may give it up, and a seller that started work and stayed silent cannot use its own silence as an exit. If lapse were automatic, a seller watching the market turn against it could claim that no contract ever formed. The basic notion is that the offeror is not bound unless given notice, but the offeree is bound by beginning performance.
Outside the Code, the common-law counterpart is Restatement (Second) § 54. For a contract for services, it discharges the offeror’s contractual duty for lack of notice of the performance unless (a) the offeree exercised reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of acceptance, (b) the offeror learned of the performance within a reasonable time, or (c) the offer indicated that notification of acceptance was not required.31 The text of § 2-206(2) states only the reasonable-time notice rule. An answer about a sale of goods therefore starts from § 2-206(2) and uses § 54 as a comparison, while the same silent start by a service provider is analyzed under § 54.