Concept
Contemplated Written Memorials
Offer: what counts, preliminary negotiations, and who may accept
Contemplated Written Memorials
Parties often say they will put their deal into a formal document, and the saying raises a question of timing: are they bound now, or only when someone signs? Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 answers in two parts. Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract keep that force even though the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial; but the circumstances may show that the parties have reached only preliminary negotiations.1 The first part says a plan to sign a document does not by itself postpone the contract. The second says the same plan may mean that no contract exists until signing.
The preceding section asked whether a proposal's terms are definite enough to enforce, and the disputes there most often concerned price or subject matter.2 Here the terms may be fully settled; what is uncertain is when the obligation begins. The answer matters because a contract that already exists makes a refusal to sign a breach, while a deal that is still preliminary lets either party withdraw.3
The inquiry is objective, as it is for offers under § 26: it asks what each party knew or had reason to know about the other's intent.4 That intent is often a question of fact, and the bare fact that a writing is planned cannot answer it, because both outcomes begin there.5 The first subsection takes deals that are complete before any document exists. The second takes deals in which signing is the moment of commitment. The third collects the circumstances courts weigh to choose between the two.
Contract Before the Writing
Section 27 holds that manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract are not prevented from doing so by the parties' further intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial.6 A memorial is a written record of an agreement, and the section treats the plan to make one as separate from the agreement it will record. The analysis can follow that separation. Ask first whether the offer, the acceptance, and the terms they settle would form a contract if no one had mentioned a document; then ask whether anything about the planned writing changes the answer. If the first answer is yes, the writing is a record and the contract exists from the moment of agreement, unless the circumstances show that the parties were only negotiating. The next subsection takes up those circumstances.
Parties who plan a final instrument necessarily discuss its terms first, and they often settle every term they mean to include before anyone drafts a word, whether orally or through an exchange of writings.7 The agreement itself may then include a promise to sign a final writing that contains particular provisions. When the parties have definitely agreed to do that, and that the writing will contain those provisions and no others, they have concluded the contract.8
Parties want the formal document for ordinary reasons. A signed contract can lessen the risk of later misunderstanding about what was agreed, and a third party such as a lender may require documentary proof of the deal.9 Each reason assumes that an agreement already exists to be documented, so neither shows that the obligation waits for the signature.
The rule takes this shape because the alternative would turn a convenience into an exit. If every mention of a formal document delayed the contract until signing, a party who had agreed to every term could withdraw on the eve of closing, and the other side, which may already have turned away competing buyers or arranged financing, would have no remedy. The law asks instead whether the parties manifested assent to be bound currently or only upon signing. If they meant the contract to exist now and the signed writing to memorialize it, the contract dates from the initial agreement.
Suppose a seller offers in writing to sell a store, and the buyer replies in writing that the offer is accepted and that the contract should be reduced to writing and signed by both. The offer is in one writing, the acceptance is unqualified, and nothing in the exchange suggests terms still to be negotiated, so the buyer's reply shows assent to be bound now and the signed document is a formality.10 The common error is to read the request for a signed writing as a reservation of further decision. The request reserves nothing unless something else in the exchange says so, and something else can. When significant terms remain to be negotiated, or the parties would struggle to state exactly what they agreed, the same request may signal that a further and final assent is still to come.11 The next subsection develops those facts.
When the parties make clear that the writing is merely a convenient memorial of their agreement, the agreement binds even if the memorial is never adopted, and a party who refuses to execute it breaches the contract.12 The document stops being a precondition and becomes a record. Whether a contract that exists must also appear in a signed writing to be enforced is a separate Statute of Frauds question, so the existence of the contract and the form it needs should be analyzed apart. The earlier agreement can take any form. It may be oral, partly oral and partly written, or contained in a series of correspondence, and the parties may still intend to draft and sign a memorial later. Such arrangements breed uncertainty about whether a contract was formed at all and, if so, on what terms.13
Because the contract comes first, the later writing records terms already fixed, yet it may still change them. Even though a binding contract is made before the memorial is prepared and adopted, the later document may bindingly modify the terms previously agreed.14 A party who wants the original deal enforced as made should therefore read the final writing before signing, since signing it manifests assent to whatever it says.
Long negotiations raise a further problem of timing, because it may be hard to say when the contract formed. For sales of goods, UCC § 2-204 answers that "an agreement sufficient to make a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined."15 A court applying the section need not pinpoint the exchange that formed the contract, but it must still find that the parties manifested assent to be bound before the closing.
No Obligation Until Signed
Comment b to § 27 states the other side of the rule. If either party knows or has reason to know that the other regards the agreement as incomplete and intends that no obligation will exist until other terms are assented to or until the whole has been reduced to another written form, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract.17 The closing clause of § 27 itself carries the same qualification.18 The previous subsection asked when a planned writing merely records an existing deal. This one asks when the writing is the deal, so that neither party is bound until it is signed or the remaining terms are settled.
Comment b names two kinds of unfinished business, and either keeps negotiations from ripening into a contract. A party may regard the agreement as incomplete because other terms still need assent, or because the whole is to take another written form before anyone is committed. In both situations the missing step is a further manifestation of assent, the step § 26 identifies: a manifestation of willingness to enter a bargain is not an offer when the addressee knows or has reason to know that the maker does not intend to conclude a bargain until making a further manifestation of assent.19 Section 27 applies the same idea to agreements already partly reached. Price and delivery may be settled, yet each side understands that commitment awaits a signature or further terms.
The standard looks to intent that was communicated or reasonably knowable, and its rationale shows in who is harmed under a contrary rule. A party who has said, or whose conduct has shown, that nothing binds until signing has told the other side not to count on a deal. Holding that party to the agreement would impose an obligation never undertaken, and the other side, having heard the reservation, cannot claim surprise. A reservation kept private works differently. The other side has nothing to read, so it may reasonably treat the agreement as complete, because the appearance a party creates usually prevails over the intent the party silently holds.20
A planned document reserves nothing by itself, so what matters is what the parties communicated about its purpose. When parties have agreed on every term and want a formal writing only so that a lender has documentary proof, the writing records an existing agreement and holds back no assent.21 Both the equipment sale and the lender case involve a planned writing. The difference is whether anyone has said or shown that signing is the moment of commitment. In the lender case, a refusal to sign breaches the contract already made; in the equipment sale, a refusal breaches nothing.
An express reservation is the clearest way to give the other side reason to know. When the parties make clear that they intend no legal consequences until a final record is executed, there is no contract until then.22 Drafting practice builds on this rule. A preliminary document is captioned a letter of intent and carries a disclaimer that it is neither a contract nor the memorial of an oral contract and that the parties do not intend to be bound until the designated formalities are completed, although even with these safeguards letters of intent are a minefield for the unwary.23
Large transactions show the pattern at scale. In big deals the businessmen who negotiate often consciously refrain from making a binding offer, because lawyers must formulate the terms of a complex transaction before it becomes enforceable.24 In such a deal neither side can be called the offeror or the offeree, and each knows from the start that nothing is done until signed copies are exchanged, so neither can later claim that an offer was accepted along the way.25
A signed preliminary letter can still carry a narrower duty. One court has reasoned that a letter signed by both parties may amount to a contract to negotiate the terms of an agreement, so that a party who refuses to negotiate breaches that contract.26 A duty to negotiate is narrower than a duty to perform the deal under negotiation.
A request that a complete writing be drafted and signed settles little when nothing else is open. If further terms remain to be negotiated, or it would be hard to sort out exactly what was agreed, the same request may signal that a final assent is still needed.27 The Uniform Commercial Code does not change this analysis for sales of goods: if a party has manifested a desire not to be bound until a formal document is signed, there is no contract yet.28 The error to avoid is treating any mention of a formal document as proof of either result. The question remains whether a reasonable person in the other party's position would understand that no commitment exists yet, and when the parties never spoke to the point, the circumstances in the next subsection decide it.
Weighing the Circumstances
Comment c to § 27 lists the circumstances a court consults when the parties planned a formal writing and never said whether signing is the moment of commitment. They are the extent to which express agreement has been reached on all the terms to be included; whether the contract is of a type usually put in writing; whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression; whether it has few or many details; whether the amount involved is large or small; whether it is a common or unusual contract; whether a standard form is widely used in similar transactions; and whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during the negotiations.30 The list is needed because both outcomes under § 27 begin with the same fact, a planned writing, and courts have not settled on a single presumption. Some cases presume that the record is merely a convenient memorial, while others hold that an understanding to reduce the agreement to writing raises a presumption that the parties did not intend to be bound.31 The governing standard remains whether the other party knew or had reason to know that no obligation was meant to exist until the whole was reduced to a formal writing, and the circumstances are the evidence that answers it.32
No circumstance decides the question alone. Each is a proxy for what a reasonable party in the other side's position would take the formal document to be, so a court weighs them together. They fall into three groups. The first, the extent of express agreement and the number of details, measures how finished the bargain already is. When every term the parties mean to include is settled, nothing remains for a document to decide, and a signing looks like a record. When significant terms remain open, the document is where the deal will be completed, and neither party has reason to think the other is bound to terms never agreed.
A complete agreement still leaves the inquiry open, because comment b recognizes that parties may settle every term and yet intend that no obligation will exist until the whole takes another written form, so long as the other side knows or has reason to know it.33 Settled terms make a present contract more probable without proving it.
The second group asks how much writing a deal of this kind ordinarily calls for: whether the contract is of a type usually put in writing, whether it needs a formal writing for its full expression, whether the sum is large or small, whether the contract is common or unusual, and whether a standard form is widely used. Parties to a large, complex, or unusual transaction normally expect to read and sign a full document before they commit, because the document is where terms with no conventional answer get fixed, and a reasonable counterparty knows it. A small, routine transaction involves terms everyone already understands, and a widely used form adds only a familiar record of what was said. These circumstances are measured against ordinary commercial expectations, which is why the same planned writing can mean different things in different deals.
A problem on the sale of a business shows the first two groups pointing toward signing. Molly and Faith settle orally everything that appears material, but they deliberately leave open the salary Molly will receive for six months after the sale, and they expect Faith's attorney to raise further issues when drafting a comprehensive writing. A sale of a business is a complex and valuable exchange of the kind parties would normally expect to sign a full memorandum before being bound, and some of the open issues could prove significant and contentious, so the circumstances suggest that the writing was meant to be the closing step.34 The suggestion is not conclusive, because oral agreement on the apparently material terms supports the opposite argument.35
The café sale and the business sale differ on every circumstance in the list, and the outcomes follow those differences. The open salary and the anticipated drafting issues make the lawyer's document the place where the business deal is finished, while the dealer's invoice finishes nothing and records what was already agreed.
The last circumstance, action in preparation for performance, concerns the parties' conduct rather than the kind of deal they made. A party who begins to prepare is treating the deal as made, and the other side can see it, which is why the dealer's servicing and tagging of the machine counts for the café. Courts also look to the course of performance to find the parties' intentions as to terms, so that an agreement too indefinite when made may become enforceable after the parties render and accept some performance.36 All of these circumstances may be shown by oral testimony or by correspondence and other preliminary or partially complete writings.37 Correspondence carries added weight, because when the parties reach their agreement by letters it is likely that they intend to be bound when they reach it.38
Because the circumstances are evidence of what the other party knew or had reason to know, one clear signal may outweigh several weaker ones. A draft that states that nothing binds until it is signed gives the other side reason to know that, however routine the deal, while silence on the point leaves the court to the circumstances above.39 The inquiry asks only whether the parties were bound at all. Whether an agreement that does exist must also appear in a signed writing to be enforced is a separate question, taken up with the Statute of Frauds.