Concept
Defining an Offer
Offer: what counts, preliminary negotiations, and who may accept
Offers and Preliminary Negotiations
Defining an Offer
An offer is the first move in forming a contract, and the law defines it by what the offeror outwardly showed, not by what the offeror privately meant. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 calls an offer the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.1 A manifestation is an outward sign, such as words or conduct. The willingness it expresses must invite a reply, and the reply must close the deal.
Courts decide whether a manifestation meets that standard objectively. They do not ask what each party thought or believed it was agreeing to; they ask how a reasonable person would perceive the intent conveyed by the party's words or actions.2 Lucy v. Zehmer shows the test at work. By his own account, Lucy scurried about the next day, arranged with his brother to put up half the purchase price, engaged an attorney to examine title, and wrote Zehmer that he was ready to close. The court held the mutual promises enforceable, because Lucy reasonably thought Zehmer was serious and the contract's language was plain and unmistakable, despite Zehmer's undisclosed intention to regard the whole business as buffoonery.3
Applying § 24 means asking three questions. Did the manifestation reach the person who is supposed to respond, and did that person respond to it? Did it express a willingness that assent will conclude? Does it propose an exchange? The subsections below take these questions in order, and each applies the objective standard to a different part of the definition.
Manifestation and Communication
A bargain has two halves, and § 23 ties them together: each party must manifest assent with reference to the manifestation of the other.4 The offer is one party's manifestation, the acceptance is the other's, and an acceptance counts only when it answers the offer. An offer therefore has to be communicated, which means received and known to the offeree when the offeree purports to accept.5 A proposal that never arrives, or that the offeree does not know of, cannot be answered.
Contract law protects the reasonable expectations that one party's promises create in another, and an offer cannot create an expectation in someone who does not know it exists.6 A person who acts in ignorance of an offer relies on nothing the offeror said, so the act cannot be an assent to the proposal.
Crossed offers show the requirement operating between two parties who want the same bargain. Suppose Y mails X an offer to sell at a stated price, and X, not yet having Y's letter, mails Y an offer to buy at that price. When both letters arrive, two offers are outstanding and no contract exists, because neither letter was written with reference to the other.7 Matching terms cannot supply the missing link. But either party may now accept the offer received, and conduct can do it: if the parties go ahead with performance on the strength of the letters, a court will find acceptance by conduct and a contract exists.8
Reward offers test the requirement most often. In Glover v. Jewish War Veterans of the U.S., an association published a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the murderer of one of its members. Glover gave the police information that led to the murderer's capture and conviction, but she learned of the reward only afterward. The court denied her the reward, because she could not have intended to accept an offer of which she was unaware.9 The Texas Supreme Court reached the same result in Broadnax v. Ledbetter, where a sheriff offered $500 for the capture of an escaped convict and the bounty hunter who captured him sued for the reward. A reward offer, the court said, may be accepted by anyone who performs the service called for when the acceptor knows the offer has been made and acts in performance of it, but not otherwise.10 A performer who learns of the offer partway through the job fares better under the more modern view, which holds it enough that the offeree completes performance with knowledge of the offer; the older view required knowledge before the offeree began.11
Two qualifications soften the knowledge rule. Its principal purpose, on one account, is to keep a person from being trapped into an inadvertent acceptance, so it should not apply when the offeree, on discovering the offer, wants the acceptance to count; that was Glover's position, yet the court denied her claim.12 And rewards posted by governmental entities create rights in persons who perform the requested acts without knowing of the reward, because those rights are properly characterized as bounty rights or statutorily or administratively created entitlements rather than contract rights.13
The sender's side raises a related point. If an offeror inadvertently but volitionally communicates an offer, it is effective so long as the offeree is unaware of the offeror's lack of intent. A seller who signs a letter offering goods, decides against mailing it, and then mails it by mistake has made an offer when the offeree receives it, because contract law protects the reasonable expectations created by objectively manifested words or actions.14
Willingness That Concludes the Bargain
The first element of an offer is a manifestation of intent to be legally bound currently, and § 24 adds that the manifestation must be made so as to justify the recipient in understanding that assent is invited and will conclude the bargain.16 Three questions follow from those words, and a communication must satisfy all of them to be an offer.
The third question carries the most weight, because it separates an offer from preliminary talk. An offer is a communication that creates in the offeree the power to form a contract by an appropriate acceptance.17 A request for information that may lead to an offer does not create that power, and neither does a proposal that reserves to the proponent the final say on whether to be bound.18 The recipient's 'yes' to such a proposal concludes nothing, because the proponent still has to decide. How long the power lasts once it exists is a separate question, taken up in the section on the offeree's continuing power.
The line matters because recipients act on it. A buyer who accepts what he believes to be an offer will assume that his economic position has changed materially, and he may borrow money, sell property of his own, or reject other opportunities in reliance on what he thinks is a binding agreement. He is seriously disadvantaged if the communication he confidently regarded as an offer was really, or at least legally, just a feeler.19
The three questions are answered from the recipient's side: would a reasonable person in the recipient's position understand the sender's words and conduct to reflect an intent to be bound? An offer is, in that sense, the first objective manifestation of intent of the two that mutual assent requires.20 The word 'offer' does not settle the answer. A seller of salt circulated a notice stating that it was 'authorized to offer' a type of salt at a stated price, and a buyer declared an acceptance. The court held the notice was no offer, because it left out terms commonly included in contracts in the salt industry and expressed a need to 'discuss this proposal.'21
The label is not required, either. Kay's email to Doug communicates her willingness to enter into a contract, sets out the essential terms, indicates that nothing is left for negotiation, and conveys the reasonable understanding that a contract will come into being on Doug's assent. It appears to be an offer even though it does not prescribe a method and time of acceptance, which a communication need not do.22
Wording that falls between a clear offer and a clear invitation causes the trouble. Take an owner who writes, 'I am willing to sell my farm Bleakacre to you for $2 million cash. If you are interested, please let me know as soon as possible.' That flabby language obscures the owner's intention and could lead the addressee to understand the letter as an offer, whether or not the owner meant it as one.23 An owner who writes instead that she will consider offers of not less than $2 million has kept the final say and has made an invitation only.
Context breaks the tie in the middle cases. If two parties have bargained over a farm for six months, steadily trading proposals and counterproposals to find a mutually acceptable price, a statement that one would not take less or would not pay more might well be taken as an offer. With no prior bargaining, a different inference seems plausible, since a seller's constant aim is to get the highest price he can.24
Where the transaction is a sale of goods, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs. Goods are movable things other than money and various intangible rights, and a sale of goods is the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price. If Article 2 has a provision on the issue, that provision displaces the equivalent common-law rule. Because Article 2 does not deal comprehensively with every issue in a sale of goods, UCC § 1-103(b) applies the general principles of common law when it is silent.25 The § 24 definition is a common-law definition, and it supplies the rule unless Article 2 has a provision on point.
Exchange Rather Than Gift
The word 'bargain' in § 24 does the work in this step. An offer manifests willingness to enter into a bargain, and a bargain is an exchange, so a proposal is an offer only if it asks something of the recipient in return for what the sender puts forward.27 The earlier steps asked whether the message reached the recipient and whether assent would conclude the matter. This step asks what that assent would conclude. If the answer is a gift, the proposal fails at the threshold, however definite the sender's words, because there is no bargain for the assent to complete.
The exchange may take several forms. An offer may propose an executed sale or barter, an exchange of a promise for a performance, an exchange of promises, or some combination of these, together or in the alternative.28 The Second Restatement's definition omits the word 'promise', apparently so that it reaches the first form, an executed sale or barter in which neither party makes a promise.29 In the normal case of an exchange of promises, or of a promise offered for an act, the offer is itself a promise, revocable until the offeree accepts.30 Acceptance then transforms the offeror's conditional promise into a contract.31 A promise made as part of an offer may itself be a contract, commonly called an option, a subject for later.32
The Restatement's first illustration shows the ordinary case. A tells B, 'That book you are holding is yours if you promise to pay me $5 for it.' A has named B's return promise as the price, so the statement is an offer that empowers B to become the owner by making the promise.33
A proposal of a gift is not an offer, and attaching a promise to it does not change that. Whether or not the proposal is a promise, it is an offer only if it specifies a promise or performance by the offeree as the price the offeree is to give; a promise performable on a certain contingency is not enough.34 The second illustration marks the line. A promises B $100 if B goes to college, and if the circumstances give B reason to know that A is promising a gratuity rather than undertaking to pay B to go, there is no offer.35 Going to college is the event on which payment depends, yet A is not buying it. Because the result turns on the circumstances, the same words support an offer when B has reason to understand that A wants B's attendance and is paying for it. The inquiry therefore returns to the objective standard: what would a reasonable person in B's position understand A to be seeking?
The insistence on exchange reflects what contract law will enforce. A gratuitous promisor receives nothing for the promise, and the promisee loses nothing by nonenforcement except the prospect of a gift, so the promisor should be able to recant without legal liability. That policy protects the promisor from improvidence and indirectly protects the promisor's heirs and creditors, whose claims against the promisor's assets take priority over a promise to donate them.36 Assent to a proposed gift therefore concludes nothing, and the definition of an offer keeps it that way by requiring the proposal to name a price.
A dispute over a promise to transport beets shows the line between gift and bargain. De Los Santos's promise was an unenforceable gift promise because Great Western had not committed itself to do anything in return. Once Great Western loaded some beets, a contract would be formed, but only for that quantity.37 Great Western's performance supplied the return that the bare promise lacked.
Conditional wording alone settles nothing, since gift promises and bargains are both commonly phrased with an 'if' or a 'when.' The decisive question is whether the speaker specifies the recipient's promise or performance as the price. When the answer is yes, the proposal is an offer, and in the normal case the offeror's own promise stays revocable until accepted. When the answer is no, the recipient has been told of a gift and has no power to conclude anything by assenting. What counts as a price, how much it must be worth, and the exceptions that enforce some promises without a bargain go beyond this unit, which asks only whether the proposal calls for something in return.