Concept
Express and Implied Promises
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
Express and Implied Promises
A promise can reach the other party in two ways. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 says it may be stated in words, either oral or written, or inferred wholly or partly from conduct.1 Both channels carry the same thing, a commitment that one party communicates and the other interprets, because parties form contracts by signaling intent through words, conduct, or both, and each side gives meaning to what it observes in the other.2 The phrase “wholly or partly” matters because words and conduct often work together, so a spoken request and the actions that follow it may together supply a promise.
The two channels yield two kinds of real contract and a third label for something else. A contract whose promises are stated in words is an express contract, and one whose promises are inferred from conduct is a contract implied in fact. Courts enforce both, and the distinction based on how the promise was created has no legal significance.3 The third label, contract implied in law or quasi-contract, names an obligation the law imposes without finding any promise, and it is not a contract at all but a legal fiction.4 The word implied appears in both of the last two names and invites students to treat them as cousins. They are not, because a contract implied in fact is an actual contract with the same effect as an express one, while an implied-in-law obligation is a contract only in name. The three subsections below take the labels in that order.
Promises in Words
A promise made in words is the plainest case, and the medium does not matter. The Restatement treats oral and written words alike, and the contract that results can take almost any shape. It may be entirely oral. It may live in a series of letters or other interrelated documents. It may be made orally with the intention of drafting and signing a written memorial later, or it may be partly written and partly oral.5 Arrangements like these can leave doubt whether a contract was formed at all and, if so, which terms became part of it.6 That doubt concerns proof and interpretation; the rule itself asks only whether the words communicated a commitment.
When the parties articulate their agreement in written or oral words, they create an express contract.7 The adjective describes how the agreement is shown and adds nothing to its force, since an express contract and a contract implied in fact have the same legal nature and effect and differ only in the manner and evidence of formation.8 The law does not ask for ceremony either. An older account of the “consensual” contracts makes a similar point, observing that no formalities are required to create them out of the pact, because the obligation is annexed at once to the consensus.9
The error to avoid is reasoning that because nothing was signed, nothing was promised. Whether some other rule demands a writing before a court will enforce a particular kind of contract is a different question from whether a promise was made, and a spoken commitment is still a promise.
The ambulance illustration used to teach contracts implied in fact removes those words. A fully conscious person slips on a staircase, calls an ambulance, and is rushed to a hospital, and the caller never discusses payment with the dispatcher or the paramedics.10 With nothing said, the stated-in-words route of § 4 has nothing to work with, and any contract has to come from conduct, which is the subject of the next subsection. The first question on an exam is therefore whether the facts contain spoken or written words that state the commitment. If they do, the promise is made, and any resulting contract is express.
Promises from Conduct
The second half of § 4 reaches promises that nobody put into words. A promise may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct,12 and a contract formed that way is a contract implied in fact. The parties do not express agreement in words, but a reasonable interpretation of their conduct, viewed in context, shows that they intended to make a contract.13
A contract implied in fact is a real contract. Implied-in-fact contracts, like express contracts, are “true” contracts,14 and both kinds are enforceable.15 The label offers no shortcut around the formation rules, however. A claimant who relies on an implied-in-fact contract must still demonstrate the elements of a binding contract, including mutual assent and enough certainty about the critical terms.16
The standard illustration shows the inference working. A fully conscious person slips on a staircase, calls an ambulance, and rides to a hospital, and no one discusses payment with the dispatcher or the paramedics.17 No words of agreement pass, yet a contract implied in fact exists, because ambulances are generally understood not to operate for free, so the caller and the company must both reasonably have understood that the caller would pay.18 Because the parties never fixed a fee, the court reads the contract in context to find the price. It may conclude that the caller implicitly agreed to the company's usual or customary fee, and if there is none, or it is unclear whether the parties meant it to apply, the court may use the market value of the service, the measure called quantum meruit.19
Context often turns on whether the recipient asked for the performance. When a person requests another to perform services or transfer property, the law infers a bargain to pay, and whether the recipient requested the benefit is often the crucial factor separating an implied-in-fact contract from a restitution claim.20 A request carries that weight because it marks the performance as something the recipient wanted, not something that merely happened to him.
The same facts can point the other way when the setting suggests a gift. Assume that street musicians who play on sidewalks with an open case on the ground are not generally expected to be paid in a given town. A passerby who stops, listens, and calls for an encore has done nothing a reasonable person would read as a promise to pay, because the playing is freely offered and the open case invites a tip, not a price. If the passerby instead asks the musician to come to his picnic and play for his friends, the request changes the reading. A reasonable person would now expect payment, a contract implied in fact becomes the most plausible account, and the price is her usual fee or the market value of her services.
A claimant's own words can also defeat the inference. Elmer, an electrician, introduces an investor, Irwin, to a developer, Dom, and helps their negotiations along by arranging meetings and acting as a go-between. When Irwin and Dom ask what he expects for his efforts, Elmer says he hopes to do the electrical work on the project, and he then retires before construction begins.21 Elmer himself described his hoped-for return as the electrical work, so the evidence does not support an implied-in-fact claim for a finder's fee.22 In a second version of the facts, Elmer performs management work for Dom, work not ordinarily done for free by a friend, and Elmer then has a strong implied-in-fact claim.23
The method extends well beyond services. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., the California Supreme Court asked whether employment-security terms could be implied in fact, so that evidence of contrary implied terms might overcome the presumption of Labor Code section 2922. The court began from the principle that implied-in-fact terms ordinarily stand on equal footing with express terms.24 Whether the parties acted in a way that provides the foundation for an implied contract is a question of fact, and the other side may offer evidence of another explanation for the same conduct.25 Oblique language standing alone will not establish the promise. The totality of the circumstances decides, and agreement may be shown by the parties' acts and conduct, interpreted in light of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances.26 In Watts v. Watts, a court held that a plaintiff who alleged many facts independent of the parties' physical relationship stated a claim that, if proven, would establish an express or implied-in-fact contract to share the property accumulated during that relationship.27
Conduct also has a limit as a manifestation of assent, which is that it answers a promise only if the actor knows of it. Answering a certified question in a reward dispute, the Texas Supreme Court held that a reward offer may be accepted by anyone who performs the service called for when the acceptor knows that it has been made and acts in performance of it, but not otherwise.28 Authorities divide over the timing when a performer learns of the offer only after starting. The First Restatement requires that the whole consideration requested be given after the offeree knows of the offer, while the more modern view is satisfied if the offeree completes performance with knowledge, and the question arises only for unilateral contracts.29 The later section on performance as assent returns to this problem.
Step two matters most in close cases, because a request is often the factor that separates a bargain from a benefit that was merely conferred. Where the request is missing and the setting points to a gift, the analysis ends with no contract, and any claim that remains rests on restitution.
Implied-in-Law Obligations
A contract implied in law, or quasi-contract, shares the word implied with the contract implied in fact and little else. A quasi-contract is not a contract at all but a legal fiction.31 It is an obligation the law infers from the acts and conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances as a matter of reason and justice, and it is imposed to bring about justice without reference to the parties' intentions.32 In an implied-in-fact contract the parties' conduct supplies a promise, and in an implied-in-law obligation the law supplies the duty and there is no promise to find.
A standard illustration shows the problem this fiction was built to solve. Gilford conferred benefits on Edward, who made no promise at all, so the parties did not form a contract. The question that remains is whether Edward gets to keep those benefits for free.33 Both halves of the answer appear in those facts: there is no manifested assent, and an obligation is still thought to exist.
Courts answered that kind of case by coining a label that made the situation seem like a contract, the implied-in-law contract, or quasi-contract. They also borrowed the Latin terms quantum meruit (“as much as was earned”) and quantum valebat (“as much as it was worth”), which masked what was happening.34 The older action of assumpsit shows the same pattern. Its nonconsensual basis in some situations was eventually recognized and expressed, as when Lord Mansfield, in Moses v. Macferlan (1760), faced the question whether assumpsit could be used for money had and received where no express agreement had been made and none could be implied.35 About a century ago, courts began to see that all this was a new, separate body of law, Restitution. A Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment now states its rules, and its section 2 says that a person unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.36 Do not be surprised if judges confuse these terms or use them loosely.37
For formation purposes, then, the question of what the parties manifested gives way to a different question. A quasi-contractual obligation is imposed only if the circumstances make it unjust to let the recipient keep the benefit without compensating the one who conferred it.38 That inquiry belongs to restitution, and what matters here is that no manifestation of assent is needed to reach it.
The dividing line between the two implied labels runs between an agreement manifested through conduct and a benefit conferred without one. In the ambulance illustration, the caller's own call is a request, and the setting lets both sides reasonably understand that payment will follow, so conduct supplies the promise.39 A doctor who comes upon an unconscious stranger on the street, treats him, and later demands a fee presents the other pattern. The doctor has a legal claim,40 but not on a promise, because an unconscious stranger cannot ask for treatment or assent to pay, and the claim rests on an obligation the law imposes. The medical help is the same in both scenes, and what differs is whether the recipient communicated anything. Kenji's phone call in the plumbing hypothetical is the fact that the unconscious stranger could never supply.
A later promise to pay is a different thing from an implied-in-law duty. Suppose that after Gilford's help, Edward says he will reimburse Gilford and then refuses. That is a stated promise, not a duty the law supplies. Whether it is enforceable although Gilford gave no consideration for it is the subject of the moral obligation doctrine, a discrete set of exceptions that permit enforcement of a promise made in recognition of a previous benefit that the promisee conferred on the promisor and that unjustly enriched the promisor.41
The two routes can diverge even within one dispute. In T. Musgrove Construction Co. v. Young, a towing company sought recovery for its services, and the court found that the owner had benefitted from the company's storing and preserving the truck, so restitution could properly be awarded in an amount not to exceed the truck's salvage value.42 The characterization of the claim can also change the measure of recovery. Where quantum meruit is viewed as a type of implied-in-fact contract, the measure is often the reasonable value of the goods and services rendered, while for implied-in-law contracts, unjust enrichment damages follow the value of the benefit the recipient retained. Other courts treat quantum meruit as a fiction implied by law to prevent unjust enrichment, and that view can change the measure.43
The routes also follow different rules of proof. A claimant on an implied-in-fact contract must establish the requisites of a binding contract, including mutual assent and certainty of terms, while a quasi-contractual duty may be imposed without regard to the parties' intent.44 Many procedural and evidentiary rules written for contract claims also fail to apply when restitution is the basis for recovery.45
The Latin label is no help in sorting the two. Quantum meruit is commonly associated with quasi-contract, yet it can also fix a missing price in an actual contract,46 and courts differ over whether it is an implied-in-fact device or an implied-in-law fiction.47 A student who sees the phrase and concludes that no contract exists has skipped the question the doctrine asks, which is whether the recipient's conduct manifested a promise.