Concept
Contract, Promise, and Agreement
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
Manifestation of Mutual Assent
Contract, Promise, and Agreement
A contract, in the Restatement’s formulation, is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.1 The definition puts the legal system’s response at the center: a promise becomes a contract when the law will answer its breach with a remedy or treat its performance as owed. People promise constantly, and only some promises draw that response, so the law keeps three words apart. A promise is the raw material, an agreement is a shared commitment between two or more people, and a contract is the finished legal product. Treating the three as synonyms skips the question each one asks.
Each word rests on a manifestation, meaning what a party outwardly expressed in words or conduct rather than what the party privately felt. A promise is a manifestation of intention so made as to justify the promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made, and an agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more persons.2 A court cannot read minds, and a person dealing with a stranger can rely only on what the stranger said and did. A rule keyed to outward expression gives the relying party something to point to, and it warns the speaker that words and conduct may be read as a commitment.
These definitions supply the vocabulary for the first question in any formation problem: did the parties manifest assent to a bargain, usually through offer, acceptance, and consideration? If no contract appears, the alternative analysis asks whether a promise that induced reliance is enforceable under promissory estoppel.3 Consideration and promissory estoppel are taught elsewhere, and this unit covers only the terms that come first. The terms come from the Restatement. Commentators often describe the original Restatement of Contracts, adopted in 1932, as the embodiment of classical contract law, a system of abstract, formal rules.4
Contract Defined
A contract is a promise or set of promises for whose breach the law gives a remedy, or whose performance the law in some way recognizes as a duty.5 The definition offers two routes, joined by or. Under the first, a court answers breach with a remedy. The simplest remedy would be specific performance, an order that the defendant exchange performances as originally agreed, but that relief is often unavailable, sometimes because the defendant simply cannot perform.6 Under the second route, the law in some way recognizes performance as a duty. A promise that satisfies neither route is left to operate outside the law.
Your Aunt Lilly promises to bake cookies for your birthday and forgets. The disappointment is real, but the law will not let you sue her for breach of contract.7 What the law requires before it will back a promise belongs to the formation rules. Now suppose a seller promises to deliver 100 widgets and a buyer promises to pay $5,000 for them. If the seller fails to deliver, the law gives the buyer a remedy, and the exchange of promises is a contract.8 Aunt Lilly and the seller both made promises, and both could break them. The law stands behind only one of the two.
The line exists because no legal system enforces every promise made. Each one sets standards for deciding which promises it will enforce.9 Those standards tell a promisee which commitments can be relied on in court, and they keep courts out of birthday cookies and carpool arrangements.
The label contract therefore answers one question: will the legal system stand behind this promise? The formation rules supply the criteria. A sincere, clearly worded promise is not automatically a contract, however much its breach hurts the person relying on it.
Promise Defined
A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.11 Three parts do the work. The speaker must manifest an intention, outwardly, through words or conduct. The manifestation must describe an act or a forbearance in a specified way, so that something definite is to be done or held back. And it must be made so as to justify the promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made. A statement that lacks any one part may be sincere, informative, or friendly, but it is not a promise.
Two labels attach to the people involved, and every later rule uses them. The person manifesting the intention is the promisor, and the person to whom the manifestation is addressed is the promisee.12 The labels describe roles in a single exchange, so one person can be promisor in one sentence and promisee in the next. The promisor is the one who spoke or acted, and so the one who may be bound. The promisee is the one addressed.
The words “manifestation” and “justify” carry the definition, and you will meet them repeatedly in first-year Contracts.13 The promisee plans around the promise and may spend money on it, yet can see only what was communicated, never what the promisor privately resolved. If the test asked about secret intent, a promisor who changed course could escape by announcing that no commitment was meant, an assertion the promisee cannot check. A person must generally answer for behavior that signifies assent, and cannot escape by claiming that assent was not intended, because that would let a party disappoint reasonable expectations through a self-serving and unverifiable assertion.14 “Justify” supplies the other half of the safeguard. A promisee’s hopeful hearing does not turn a loose remark into a promise, because the question is whether the understanding of commitment was reasonable given what was said and the surrounding circumstances. Manifestation also reaches conduct, and courts applying the definition look at what a party did as well as what the party said, as in Harvey v. Dow.
The definition separates a commitment from its look-alikes. A prediction says what the speaker expects, a hope says what the speaker wants, and a plan says what the speaker presently means to do. None of them tells the listener that the speaker has taken the act on as owed. The requirement of a specified act does related work: a statement that never identifies what is to be done or held back gives the listener nothing definite to understand as a commitment.
A decided case shows the failing side. In Norton v. McOsker, a woman’s claims against a man rested on two alleged undertakings: his promise to divorce his wife and marry her, and his undertaking of lifetime support. The court of appeals upheld summary judgment against her. The promise to divorce and marry was void as against public policy, and the undertaking of lifetime support was too general and nonspecific to qualify as an enforceable promise.15 Support for life leaves open the amount, the form, and the circumstances in which it would end, so a listener could reasonably hear devotion or good intentions rather than a duty with identifiable content.
A commitment can also be plain from the words and the surrounding facts. In Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., an advertiser promised to pay £100 on a specified event and stated that £1000 was deposited with a bank, “shewing our sincerity in the matter.” The court asked whether the advertisement was a mere puff that meant nothing, and answered no: the deposit was there to negate that suggestion, so the court was “not inferring a promise; there is the promise, as plain as words can make it.”16 The advertiser specified the payment and the event and put money in a bank to show it meant the words, while the undertaking of lifetime support was too general to carry that meaning. In both cases the test is what a reasonable person in the promisee’s position would take the manifestation to mean.
Agreement Versus Bargain
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3 defines two terms together: an agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons, and a bargain is an agreement to exchange promises, to exchange a promise for a performance, or to exchange performances.18 The terms nest. Every bargain is an agreement, because both sides must manifest assent. A bargain adds an exchange structure: each side gives something in order to get something from the other. An agreement without that structure is still an agreement, but it is not a bargain, and many formation questions are decided in the gap between the two.
Standing alone, agreement is too broad to carry legal weight. In its colloquial sense it covers any arrangement between two or more persons intended to affect their relations, whether legally or otherwise. An accepted invitation to dinner is an agreement in that sense, yet it neither is intended to create nor does create any legal obligation between the parties. Even an agreement intended to affect legal relations does not necessarily amount to a contract in the strict sense.19 Every contract is therefore an agreement, but not every agreement is a contract. The bargain sits between the two, and it matters because the basic test for formation requires a bargain, meaning mutual assent to an exchange, together with consideration, a separate requirement taught elsewhere.20
Suppose Sidney promises to sell Blackacre to Bertram for $6,000, and Bertram promises to buy at that price. Each manifested assent to an exchange of one promise for another, so the arrangement is an agreement and also a bargain.21 The other two forms of exchange in § 3 change only what each side hands over. A promise can be traded for a performance, as when a promise of payment is given for work actually done. Performances can be traded for performances, as when a customer lays cash on a counter and takes goods in the same moment. In each form, one side’s giving is tied to the other’s.
The Restatement’s treatment of offers follows the same logic: a proposal of a gift is not an offer, because there must be an element of exchange. A proposal does not become an offer merely because it promises something on a contingency. It must specify a promise or performance by the offeree as the price or consideration to be given. So if A promises B $100 if B goes to college, and the circumstances give reason to know that A is promising a gratuity rather than paying B to go, there is no offer.22
The word bargain does not mean negotiation. It means reciprocal inducement: each side is willing to give what it has because, in exchange, it wants what the other has, the this-for-that idea that lawyers call a quid pro quo.23 Nothing in the definition requires offers and counteroffers, dickering over price, or any back-and-forth at all.
Two opposite instincts produce errors here. A student who hears bargain and looks for haggling will deny a bargain in every posted-price sale. A student who hears agreement and sees mutual assent will treat every accepted gift as a contract. The first confuses the structure of the deal with the manner in which it was reached. The second skips the exchange that a bargain requires. The bargain is the central concept in the basic test for formation,24 and when no bargain can be found, the alternative analysis asks whether promissory estoppel supplies enforcement.25
Terms of an Agreement
A term of a promise or agreement is the portion of the intention or assent manifested that relates to a particular matter.27 The definition lets you divide a deal by subject. Price is one matter, the quantity of goods a second, the date of delivery a third, and the part of the parties’ manifested assent that speaks to each is the term on that matter. The division is useful because disputes seldom concern a deal as a whole. Buyer and seller usually agree that a sale happened and fall out over what was said about one subject, so the analysis asks, matter by matter, what the parties actually manifested.
A second definition widens the lens. A term of a contract is the portion of the legal relations resulting from the promise or set of promises that relates to a particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an intention to create those relations.28 The first definition looks at what the parties expressed. The second looks at what the law makes of the transaction once a contract exists, and its closing phrase reaches consequences the parties never mentioned. The $2 million price in the Bleakacre sale is a term of the agreement and also a term of the contract, but the contract can contain terms that the agreement does not.
A sale of goods by a merchant shows such a term. A standard contract may not state whether the goods are warrantied, yet absent contrary provisions, UCC Article 2 implies a warranty that a merchant’s goods are at least fit for their ordinary purpose.29 That warranty is a term of the contract, because the legal relations resulting from the sale include it. It is not a term of the agreement, because neither party manifested assent about warranties. An examinee who asks only whether the parties discussed a matter will overlook the warranty, and one who treats every contract term as something the parties agreed to will credit them with assent they never gave.
The gap between the two definitions explains why the law has terms implied by law at all. Construction, properly speaking, is the implication of a term in law. It comes into play when the parties plainly made a contract but did not address a particular issue, and no factual evidence shows how they meant it to be handled. The court then decides, from what it knows of the contract and its context, how the parties would have dealt with the issue had they thought of it. Construction is sometimes used interchangeably with interpretation, but the two differ.30 The Restatement (Second) speaks of courts supplying terms, and supplied terms come in two kinds. Default rules can be varied by an express clause. Immutable rules cannot be varied by consent and override any contrary clause, so only the terms that come from immutable rules are imposed without the parties’ consent.31
The two definitions in this section thus raise two questions: did the parties assent to this matter, and does the law attach consequences to the transaction anyway? Gap-filling is taught elsewhere, and this section supplies the vocabulary it uses.