Concept
Punishing Group Membership
Freedom of association
Punishing Group Membership
Many countries have banned the Communist Party, the Nazis, and other groups, and have made membership in them a crime. The Supreme Court has never had to rule on a ban that total, but it has repeatedly confronted government measures that severely burden such organizations.1 Out of those cases comes a demanding rule: government may punish membership only if it proves that the person was actively affiliated with the group, knew of its illegal objectives, and specifically intended to further them.2
The rule has three elements because each screens out a different innocent member. Active affiliation excludes the person whose tie to the group is merely nominal. Knowledge excludes the person who has no idea what the group's illegal aims are. Specific intent excludes the person who knows of those aims and does not share them. Belonging to the group, standing alone, proves none of the three.
Two decisions announced on the same day in 1961 show how much turns on the government's proof. In Scales v. United States, the Court sustained a conviction for Communist Party membership where the proof met the test.3 In Noto v. United States, it reversed a conviction for membership in the same party because “illegal advocacy” was absent: the evidence showed advocacy of abstract ideas and no proof that the defendant specifically intended to further any illegal activity.4 The party was the same, and so was the day; the proof differed.
Government cannot sidestep the limit by acting as employer rather than prosecutor. It may not condition employment or other aspects of its largesse on the surrender of First Amendment rights, and the older distinction between rights and privileges, which once let it do so, has been generally abandoned.5 A public employer may therefore deny a job, or require an oath about group affiliation, only where the restriction reaches those who were actively affiliated with the group, knew of its illegal activities, and specifically intended to further its illegal goals.6
Consider a county clerk dismissed for belonging to a neighborhood association, a faction of which, unknown to her, plots violence. The county has proved membership and nothing more. She did not know of the illegal aims and did not intend to further them, so the dismissal fails. Only if the county could prove all three elements would it clear the hurdle.
The Cold War cases applied this limit statute by statute. In that era the Court balanced the government's interest as employer against the burden on associational rights, and it held that loyalty programs could not be so sweeping as to undermine the basic right of association.7 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Court held unconstitutional a loyalty program that punished knowing membership in a seditious organization without requiring specific intent. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in this area only with narrow specificity.8 In United States v. Robel, the Court invalidated a federal ban on members of Communist-action organizations working in defense facilities. The ban applied regardless of the sensitivity of the job, so the cryptographer and the cook were treated alike, and the Court held the law overbroad instead of balancing the interests. The lesson is general: absent scienter and specific intent, civil penalties cannot be imposed solely because a person exercised the right of association.9
Government also may not demand a roster of everything a person has joined. In Shelton v. Tucker, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute that conditioned every teacher's employment in a state-supported school or college on an annual affidavit listing every organization to which the teacher had belonged or regularly contributed money in the previous five years. The Court conceded that fitness to teach depends on many factors, including conduct outside the classroom. Even so, compelling a teacher to list every association, without limit, violates freedom of association.10
Loyalty oaths draw the same line. In Elfbrandt v. Russell, the Court struck down an Arizona oath that threatened public employees with discharge and prosecution for knowing membership in subversive organizations, because nothing in the oath excluded membership by someone who did not share the group's unlawful ends.11 In Cole v. Richardson, by contrast, the Court upheld an oath to uphold the constitutions and to oppose violent overthrow, because such a promise adds no obligation beyond the existing duty to uphold and defend.
Bar admission applies the same principle to the wording of a single question. The Court held early on that a state could not refuse admission solely because of past Communist Party membership. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, it later allowed a state to deny admission to an applicant who refused to answer questions about political associations, finding the state's interest in lawyers devoted to the law sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect of disclosure in those circumstances. In 1971 the Court sorted bar questions by how closely they tracked the elements of the Scales test. In Baird v. State Bar and In re Stollar, it invalidated questions asking whether the applicant was or had ever been a member of the Communist Party or of any organization advocating violent overthrow, along with requests for general lists of memberships.12 In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, it upheld a two-step screen: first, did the applicant join a group knowing that it advocated overthrow by force; and, only if so, did the applicant specifically intend to further that aim?13 The cases differ in the specificity of the question. An inquiry survives when it is narrowly focused on active affiliation, knowledge, and specific intent.14
Punishment can also follow a refusal to name members. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, the Court held that imprisoning an NAACP official for failing to give a legislative committee the local branch's membership list violated the First Amendment.15 A showing of some legitimate governmental interest was not enough. The state's interest had to survive “exacting scrutiny,” and there had to be a “substantial relation” between that interest and the information demanded. The same scrutiny applies when the deterrent effect on association is an unintended but inevitable result of the government's demand rather than direct government action.16
Outside the punishment cases, the Court today generally applies heightened scrutiny to government burdens on the right to associate for political expression. It tolerates infringements only when they serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.17 The sections that follow take up that standard. They also turn the question around, asking what a group may do about its own membership and message rather than what government may do to its members. The cases separate according to what is really at issue. In the Jaycees and Rotary cases the sole issue was membership. In Hurley, the sponsors had no desire to exclude individual gay people but objected to an explicitly gay contingent, so the real question was not who marched but what message the contingent would convey.18