Concept
Source of the Right
Freedom of association
The Right of Association
Source of the Right
The First Amendment protects speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition. It never mentions association. Yet the Supreme Court treats association as a protected freedom, and NAACP v. Alabama gives the clearest account of why. The Court called it “beyond debate” that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is “an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”1 That one sentence answers two questions. The right comes from the expressive freedoms the Amendment does name, and it reaches state governments through due process liberty.
The text is silent, so the right has to be implied, and the Court has reached the implication from several directions. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court described association as a form of expression of opinion and said that, although the First Amendment does not expressly include it, its existence is necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful.2 Roberts v. United States Jaycees generalizes the point: each activity the First Amendment protects carries a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of it, whether the end is political, social, economic, educational, religious, or cultural.3 The closest textual anchor is the Assembly and Petition Clauses, from which the right derives in part, while the Court reads the free speech guarantee to entail a right to associate for expressive purposes.4 The result is the group counterpart of an individual freedom: the right to join with others in a common undertaking that would be lawful if pursued individually.5
A state is bound by this freedom through the Fourteenth Amendment. Each First Amendment guarantee has been held a fundamental right and made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause, and association, though unmentioned, is implied by those provisions and analyzed the same way.6 NAACP v. Alabama shows the route. The Court there reviewed a state contempt judgment that grew out of a production order, and it tested that judgment against the liberty due process assures. Alabama had taken no direct action to restrict its members’ freedom to associate, but the Court held that this did not end the inquiry, because governmental action can abridge these liberties even when the abridgment is unintended.7
The Court applied the principle again in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, which held that jailing an NAACP official who refused a legislative committee’s demand for a local branch’s membership list violated the First Amendment.8 Gibson insists that the State’s subordinating interests survive exacting scrutiny and that a substantial relation exist between the governmental interest and the information demanded.9 That scrutiny applies even when the deterrent effect on First Amendment rights comes not from direct government action but as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.10 A later section develops the disclosure cases in full.
Protecting groups, and not only lone speakers, follows from how expression works. A group pools human capital and money that a single speaker lacks, its very existence conveys a message, and an individual’s freedom to speak and to petition for redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected without a correlative freedom to engage in group effort for those ends.11 Political parties and interest groups are likewise vital in pursuing political objectives and checking political power.12 The protection matters most to dissenters, because shielding collective effort preserves political and cultural diversity and keeps the majority from suppressing dissident expression.13
The right also has a negative side. Freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate, because a regulation that forces a group to accept members it does not desire may impair the original members’ ability to express only the views that brought them together. Roberts calls such a regulation the clearest example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association.14 Later sections follow the negative side into antidiscrimination law and compelled funding, and into the question of whose account of a group’s message controls. In one such case the Court deferred to an organization’s own assertion about its message and about whether a particular individual’s presence would interfere with it.15
Association is protected for what it does, and that function gives the right its boundary. The Court protects the right to associate for First Amendment purposes, and social association in its generic form falls outside the implied right.16 In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, an ordinance limiting adult entry to teenage dance halls affected the associational rights of neither minors nor adults, because coming together in a dance hall was neither intimate association nor expressive association.17 The line keeps the doctrine tied to expression. If every social gathering carried constitutional protection, ordinary regulation of conduct in public places would draw First Amendment scrutiny.
Economic purposes fall on the same line. The right extends to associations pursuing economic ends, along with political, social, educational, religious, and cultural ones, so long as the activity is the kind the First Amendment protects.18 Lawyers who organized a boycott to win higher pay for representing indigent defendants received no protection in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n: the boycott violated the antitrust laws, and its expressive dimension was insufficient to invoke First Amendment protection.19 Where economic activity carries no protected expression, the Court does not sit as a super-legislature over laws that touch economic problems and business affairs.20 Later sections divide the protected functions into intimate association and expressive association and apply them to membership, disclosure, and funding.