Concept
Overbreadth Versus Vagueness
Overbreadth
Overbreadth Versus Vagueness
A law can reach too much without being unclear, and it can be unclear without reaching too much. Challengers usually plead vagueness and overbreadth together, but the two are different defects, and a careful answer treats them as separate questions.1
Overbreadth turns on what a law covers once its words are understood. In the Court’s formulation, a governmental purpose to control activities that are constitutionally subject to regulation “may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”2 The law is not narrowly tailored to its legitimate concerns, and that remains true even when it also reaches speech the state may punish, which is why a speaker whose own expression is unprotected can still attack it.3
Vagueness turns on whether anyone can tell what the law covers. A law is unconstitutionally vague when a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted, and because the defect is one of due process, it exists whether or not the law regulates speech.4 In Coates v. Cincinnati the Court described the failure at its starkest: conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, so no standard of conduct is specified at all, and “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”5 Notice is only half the concern. The ban on vagueness also protects equality and the separation of executive from legislative power by preventing selective enforcement, and the Court has called the requirement that legislatures set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact the more important aspect of the doctrine.6
The two doctrines overlap because they share a worry. An unconstitutionally vague statute, like an overbroad one, creates a risk of a chilling effect on protected speech and produces a ruling of facial invalidity.7 A speaker unsure where a vague line falls will stay well clear of it, and the speech that disappears is the same protected speech an overbroad law would suppress. For that reason a First Amendment vagueness finding has greater bite than a due process vagueness finding: the first typically produces facial invalidation, while a statute found vague as a matter of due process is typically invalidated “as applied” to the particular defendant.8 A successful facial challenge usually means the whole law falls, not just some applications.9
Each defect can nonetheless appear alone. A law forbidding “the display of a nude human body on a motion picture screen” is quite specific, because anyone can tell what it covers, yet it is overbroad because its clear terms reach protected films.10 A law forbidding “all unprotected speech” runs the other way. It cannot be overbroad, since it reaches only expression the state may regulate, but it is vague, because a reasonable person cannot tell where prohibited speech ends and permitted speech begins.11 Put the clarity question and the reach question side by side, and a statute can be clear and broad, unclear and narrow, unclear and broad, or clear and narrow, with only the last combination free of both defects.
The airport resolution in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus is the standard clear-but-overbroad example. It was a state rule that closed the airport’s central terminal area to First Amendment activity by anyone, and nobody reading it would have wondered what it forbade; the trouble was how much it forbade.12 The airport’s fallback position shows how the two defects interact. When the airport urged that the rule be read to cover only “expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes,” the Court found that reading itself overbroad and vague. It also declined to wait for the state courts to supply a narrowing construction, because so many readings were possible that a clear one could not emerge without a whole series of cases.13 A cure for overbreadth that shrinks a law by an unclear criterion can import the second defect.
Two cases sit at opposite ends of the range. In City of Chicago v. Morales, an ordinance let police order dispersal of persons reasonably believed to be gang members who remained in one place with no apparent purpose. The Court rejected a First Amendment overbreadth challenge because the ordinance did not bar conduct aimed at delivering a message, and overbreadth analysis distinguishes expressive conduct, such as demonstrating, from conduct, such as trespassing, that is not inherently expressive.14 The Court nonetheless held the ordinance facially void for vagueness, because it gave police too much discretion and gave citizens too little notice.15 The ordinance defined neither the loitering it prohibited nor the way to avoid a dispersal order, so there was no protected message-bearing conduct to weigh and no standard to apply.
Coates shows both defects in a single law. The ordinance required three or more people meeting on a sidewalk or street corner to conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or other person who happened to pass by. The Court held it “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.”16 The vagueness was complete, since no standard of conduct was specified at all, and because liability turned on the reaction of whoever passed by, the ordinance necessarily swept in protected assembly.17 What separates Chicago’s ordinance from Cincinnati’s is whether the law, once its terms are fixed, reaches protected expression. Chicago’s did not, and Cincinnati’s did.
The doctrines also differ in who may raise them. Overbreadth supplies an exception to the usual limit on asserting other people’s rights: because a law can be challenged even though it reaches unprotected speech, a person whose own expression the state may punish can attack the law for what it does to speakers who are not in court.18 Vagueness has no comparable exception. A defendant whose conduct falls plainly within what any reading of the law would cover has received all the notice due process requires, and cannot rest a vagueness claim on uncertainty at the law’s edges. The one qualification is a law that is vague in all of its applications, as the Cincinnati ordinance was, because such a law has no clear core and the challenger’s own conduct lies inside the uncertainty.19
A frequent exam error is to treat the two labels as interchangeable, for instance by calling State A’s law vague because it is harsh, or State B’s law overbroad because it is uncertain. The clarity question and the reach question are separate, and a full answer asks each one.
The fourth step decides how the challenger may argue, and it is the step most often skipped. Both inquiries are conducted by the court, since constitutional limits on a statute are treated as questions of law for the courts rather than for a jury, an allocation Justice Douglas disputed in his dissent in Dennis v. United States.21