Concept
Hicks: Overbreadth Fails
Overbreadth
Hicks: Overbreadth Fails
Virginia v. Hicks shows what a rejected overbreadth challenge looks like. The test is the one the preceding sections developed: a showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected speech, “judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep,” suffices to invalidate all enforcement of the law until a limiting construction or partial invalidation narrows it.1 The challenger bears the burden of making that showing, and Hicks did not make it.2 The ratio of protected applications to legitimate ones decided the case, so an answer applying Hicks should say what the policy mostly reaches before it says what the policy might improperly reach.
The Barment Policy
The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA) owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a housing development for low-income residents.3 Until June 23, 1997, the city of Richmond owned the streets within it. The city council then decided to “privatize” them in an effort to combat rampant crime and drug dealing, much of it committed by nonresidents.4 The trespass policy worked through notice. A “no-return” notice was served on nonresidents who had no “legitimate business or social purpose” in Whitcomb Court,5 and Hicks’s own notice told him he was not welcome on any RRHA property and would be “subject to arrest by the police” if seen or caught on the premises.6 The crime was defined by a Virginia statute, § 18.2-119, which makes it a Class 1 misdemeanor to go or remain on another’s premises after the owner or other person lawfully in charge has forbidden it, orally or in writing.7
Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, had been convicted twice of trespassing at Whitcomb Court and once of damaging property there; those convictions were not at issue.8 While the property-damage charge was pending, the RRHA gave him written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, and he signed it in the presence of a police officer. Twice afterward he asked the housing manager for permission to return, and twice the answer was “no.” In January 1999 he came back anyway and was arrested and convicted under § 18.2-119.9 He was not arrested for leafleting or demonstrating without permission. He had violated the RRHA’s written rule that a person who receives a barment notice must not return.10
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the en banc Court of Appeals, but for different reasons. Without deciding whether the streets were a public forum, it held the policy overbroad: although the policy was “designed to punish activities that are not protected by the First Amendment,” it also prohibited “speech and conduct that are clearly protected.”11 The court’s objection centered on an “unwritten” requirement that demonstrators and leafleters obtain advance permission from Gloria Rogers, the housing manager. On that basis it declared the entire policy void, including the written rule that those who return after a barment notice are subject to arrest.12 It also held that the policy’s invalidity entitled Hicks to vacatur of his conviction under the unquestionably valid trespass statute, a result the Supreme Court did not decide whether federal law compels.13
Because the Virginia court struck the entire policy, and because severability is a matter of state law, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the entire policy is substantially overbroad.14 That question involves not standing but “the determination of [a] First Amendment challenge on the merits,” so the Court proceeded to the merits. It left for another day whether the ordinary rule against resting a claim on third parties’ legal rights would exclude a case such as this one from initiation in federal court.15 Nothing forced that issue, because the Court was reviewing a state supreme court. Federal standing rules limit only the federal courts’ jurisdiction; state courts are not bound by case-or-controversy limits or other federal justiciability rules even when they address federal law; and whether Virginia’s courts should have entertained the overbreadth challenge was entirely a matter of state law.16
Hicks thus explains how an overbreadth claim by someone punished for nonexpressive conduct reached the Court from a state court, and it leaves the federal-court version unanswered. Do not cite it for the proposition that a litigant with no expressive activity may always invoke overbreadth in federal court.
Why the Challenge Failed
The Court reversed because the Virginia Supreme Court never asked the proportionality question. Its opinion contains no comparing of valid and invalid applications at all; that side of the doctrine is simply ignored.18 Asked directly, the question has a clear answer. The claimant must show “from the text of [the law] and from actual fact” that substantial overbreadth exists,19 and Hicks did not make that showing for the policy taken as a whole, even assuming the unwritten permission rule was unlawful.20 Three observations explain why.
First, Hicks failed to show that the no-return notice would go to anyone engaged in protected speech. The notice is served on nonresidents with no “legitimate business or social purpose” in Whitcomb Court, and Hicks did not demonstrate that any First Amendment activity falls outside the purposes that permit entry.21 As far as appears, entering for a First Amendment purpose is not a trespass until the person receives a barment notice.22
Second, the barment rule punishes entry, not speech. Punishing a person who wishes to speak for violating it no more implicates the First Amendment than punishing a person who was lawfully banned from a public park after vandalizing it and who ignores the ban to join a political demonstration. In both cases the person is punished for nonexpressive conduct, entering in violation of the notice, and not for speech.23
Third, the rules apply to everyone who enters, so protected speech is a small fraction of what they reach. Both the notice-barment rule and the “legitimate business or social purpose” rule govern all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not only those who seek to express themselves. They reach strollers, loiterers, drug dealers, roller skaters, bird watchers, soccer players, and others not engaged in protected conduct, a group that would seemingly far outnumber First Amendment speakers.24 Against that denominator, even an invalid permission rule for leafleters leaves Hicks short. He did not show, on this record, that the policy as a whole prohibits a “substantial” amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications.25
The airport resolution in Jews for Jesus sits at the opposite pole. It closed the terminal to all First Amendment activities, so it reached expression as a category and left no legitimate sweep to weigh against the protected speech. Whitcomb Court’s policy governed who may be present on property, and speech was only an occasional reason for being present. The standard is the same in both cases, and the ratio of protected to legitimate applications produces opposite results.
The Court also tied the result to the kind of law under attack. The doctrine’s concern with “chilling” protected speech “attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct.”26 That idea traces to the 1973 requirement that overbreadth be substantial, and to the suggestion that overbreadth analysis applies less readily to laws affecting conduct than to laws affecting speech.27 A trespass policy governs presence on property, which people seek for many reasons, so few speakers have cause to fall silent because of it. A speaker actually barred for an expressive purpose keeps an as-applied claim: applications that violate the First Amendment can still be remedied through as-applied litigation, and the Virginia court should not have used the “strong medicine” of overbreadth to invalidate the entire policy.28 The Court left open on remand whether Hicks may challenge his conviction on other grounds and whether those claims were preserved.29
Which unit a court measures also matters: a challenged provision may be analyzed alone or as one element of a combined scheme.30 In Hicks the state court’s own action settled it. Because Virginia had struck the entire policy, the entire policy was the measure.31 The later discussion of choosing the measured law returns to this point.
Students often stop the analysis once one component of a policy proves defective. The Court in Hicks assumed that the unwritten permission rule was invalid and held that the challenge failed anyway, because facial invalidation depends on the policy as a whole being substantially overbroad. The sound answer asks what the law mostly reaches, who receives the notice or is subject to the rule, and whether the sanction falls on speech or on nonexpressive conduct. It then sends any leftover improper applications to as-applied challenges.