Concept
Jews for Jesus: A Total Ban
Overbreadth
Jews for Jesus: A Total Ban
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus presents overbreadth in its simplest form. The Court struck down a rule closing a public airport terminal to all First Amendment activities, and it needed only one step to do so: the rule reached virtually every kind of expression, and no conceivable governmental interest could justify a prohibition so absolute. The substantiality test from the last section sets the protected speech a law reaches against the law's plainly legitimate sweep. In most disputes both sides of that comparison carry weight, and a court must weigh them. Here one side was nearly empty, which makes this the cleanest overbreadth holding in the area.
The case also shows what overbreadth lets a court skip. Challenges to speech restrictions on government property ordinarily begin by classifying the forum, because the classification sets the standard the government must meet. The Court never classified this terminal. The ban failed even on the assumption most favorable to the government, so the forum question could not change the result.
The Airport Resolution
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners adopted a resolution declaring that the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) "is not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity."1 Anyone engaging in such activity was to be treated as acting contrary to Board policy.2
The Ninth Circuit held the resolution unconstitutional on its face, concluding that "an airport complex is a traditional public forum."3 The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds.4
That reasoning put the forum question at the center of the dispute. The Board argued that LAX is neither a traditional public forum nor a forum opened by government designation, so the standard for a nonpublic forum should govern. Respondents answered that LAX is a public forum subject only to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.5 The Court sidestepped the argument. Because the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine regardless of the proper standard, the Court did not decide whether LAX is a public forum.6
The text of the resolution explains why the Court could do that. It reached the universe of expressive activity and, by prohibiting all protected expression, created what the Court called a virtual "First Amendment Free Zone" at LAX. It did not merely regulate expression that might cause congestion or disrupt the activities of airport users. It prohibited even talking, reading, and wearing campaign buttons or symbolic clothing, so that virtually every person entering the terminal might violate it.7 The Court found it obvious that no conceivable governmental interest would justify so absolute a prohibition of speech, even if LAX were a nonpublic forum.8
That finding made the forum question irrelevant to the outcome. The Board had urged the nonpublic-forum standard, and respondents the public-forum standard. A ban that fails the one more favorable to the government necessarily fails the other. Overbreadth also spared the Court a second hard question. Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court relied exclusively on the resolution's spectacular overbreadth, which let it avoid both the question whether respondents' own behavior was constitutionally protected and the then-unsettled public-forum status of an airport terminal.9
Justice White joined the opinion but cautioned that it should not be taken as indicating that a majority of the Court considers LAX a traditional public forum. The forum question was one on which the Court had granted certiorari, he said, and the Court should not have postponed it for another day.10 His separate writing marks the limit of the holding. The forum status of an airport terminal stayed open, and the case establishes only that a ban this total fails under any forum standard. A student who writes that the Court held airports to be public forums has credited it with a conclusion it declined to reach.
A narrower airport rule produces a different analysis. The overbreadth doctrine lets a challenger attack a law that reaches unprotected speech because it also reaches protected speech: the government may not pursue a legitimate purpose by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and invade protected freedoms.11 In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, the Court upheld a more narrowly drawn airport regulation designed to prevent solicitation, though it invalidated the restrictions on distribution of publications.12 A rule aimed at one activity leaves other expression alone, so a court has a legitimate sweep to weigh and must then confront the forum question. The Jews for Jesus resolution offered nothing to weigh. When an exam stem describes a public facility that bars all speech, ask first how much expression the rule leaves untouched. A rule that leaves almost none is overbroad without any forum analysis.
Refusing a Narrowing Construction
A court facing an overbroad law looks first for a reading that confines it to constitutional applications, because that reading keeps the lawmaker's work in force. But the words must permit it. In Jews for Jesus the Court found no apparent saving construction: the resolution expressly applied to all "First Amendment activities," and its words "simply leave no room for a narrowing construction."14 A narrowing construction gives a law less reach than its literal terms suggest, and it works only when the terms can bear the smaller meaning. A resolution that names the whole category of expression leaves nothing smaller to retreat to, so any limit would be a rewrite.
The Board's other route was delay. Abstention, in which a federal court postpones its decision so a state court can interpret the law, and certification, in which the federal court asks the state's highest court to answer the question, are devices the Court has sometimes used when state courts have had no chance to give a challenged law a definite construction.15 Neither suited this case. California had no certification procedure, and the resolution was not "fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question."16 Because the rule came from a state government rather than the federal government, the state courts would have the last word on its meaning, and the Court considered waiting for them. It rejected the idea. With so many possible interpretations, the Court doubted that the state courts could adopt a clear one without deciding a whole series of cases.17
The Court reasoned, as it had in Baggett v. Bullitt, that the resolution could hardly be limited by anything less than a series of adjudications, and that the chilling effect on protected speech in the meantime would make case-by-case adjudication intolerable.18 Every month of waiting is a month in which people with something to say stay silent rather than test the rule, so the harm that overbreadth addresses accrues during the delay. Dombrowski reached the same result in broader terms: abstention serves no legitimate purpose where a statute regulating speech is properly attacked on its face and the conduct charged is not within the reach of an acceptable limiting construction readily to be anticipated from a single criminal prosecution.19
The Board then offered a limit of its own, urging that the resolution be read to cover only expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. That construction was itself overbroad and vague.20 It was overbroad because much nondisruptive speech, such as wearing a T-shirt or button with a political message, is not airport related yet remains protected even in a nonpublic forum.21 It was vague because the line between airport-related and other activity was murky, and the result would be to give LAX officials alone the power to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is airport related.22 A law that "confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation" is unconstitutional, because "[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident."23 That is the selective-enforcement risk in concrete form: the proposed limit would have traded overbreadth for unguided discretion. The Court therefore held the resolution substantially overbroad, not fairly subject to a limiting construction, and in violation of the First Amendment.24
The refusal reflects a general limit on narrowing. In a facial challenge a court may impose a limiting construction only if the law is "readily susceptible" to one, and the Court "will not rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional requirements."25 It has declined to draw new lines between categories of speech when the legislature sent inconsistent signals about where they belong, because doing so "involves a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain."26 A rule that bans every kind of expression offers no line to follow. The later sections on limiting constructions and cures take up who may supply a narrowing, what follows when it arrives after the conduct, and how courts cut away invalid terms.
A narrowing that does succeed shows what the airport resolution lacked. In Osborne v. Ohio, the state's highest court construed a broadly worded nudity statute to reach only lewd exhibitions or graphic focus on the genitals, and the statute as narrowed was no longer substantially overbroad.27 Two things distinguish the cases. The Ohio statute's words could carry the narrower reading, and the court with the last word on the statute's meaning supplied it. The airport resolution's words allowed no such reading, and no authoritative construction existed or could be expected without a string of cases.
An exam stem built on this holding usually offers two rescue routes, a narrowing reading and a wait for the state court. The efficient answer tests each against the text.