Concept
Substantial Overbreadth Standard
Overbreadth
Substantial Overbreadth Standard
A speech law does not fall to a facial attack merely because it reaches some protected expression. In Virginia v. Hicks, the Court insisted that a law’s application to protected speech be “substantial,” not only in an absolute sense but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applications, before a court may use the “strong medicine” of overbreadth invalidation.1 The insistence follows from what invalidation costs. A successful facial challenge usually invalidates the law entirely,2 so the law stops applying even to unprotected speech and, especially, to unprotected conduct. Hicks treats those losses as substantial social costs that must not swallow the benefits of declaring a law overbroad.3 Substantiality is how the Court keeps the costs from outweighing the benefits.
Hicks therefore sets two measures, and a law must satisfy both. The absolute measure asks whether the law’s protected applications are substantial standing alone. The relative measure sets those applications against the law’s plainly legitimate sweep, meaning everything the state may validly punish under it, so that the larger the legitimate sweep, the more a facial ruling would destroy. Courts enforce both halves vigorously.4 A law that fails either measure keeps its force, and any improper application can be challenged in the case where it arises. That outcome differs from facial invalidation, which removes the law entirely instead of holding it unconstitutional as to certain applications.5
The overbreadth doctrine lets a challenger attack a speech law with “no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity,” because of the “transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.”6 The 1973 decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma narrowed that permission by requiring that overbreadth be “substantial” before facial invalidation is appropriate.7 Broadrick also suggested that overbreadth analysis was less applicable when the challenged statute affected conduct rather than speech, a point a later section takes up.8
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus traced the substantiality requirement to the Court’s recognition that overbreadth is “manifestly, strong medicine.”9 The Seventh Circuit draws the practical lesson: courts should employ the doctrine with hesitation, and then only as a last resort.10
Substantiality also demands realism. A facial challenge must show a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.11 A standard that imagination could satisfy would filter out nothing, since almost any broadly worded law can be pictured reaching some protected expression. The cases show what realism excludes. A separate opinion in Virginia v. Black called “fanciful” the notion that the cases in which the plurality thought convictions might improperly be obtained were numerous enough to make a statute substantially overbroad. It classed them as “marginal applications” in light of which “facial invalidation is inappropriate.”12 A separate opinion in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union found the universe of speech protected as to minors but banned by the Communications Decency Act “a very small one,” and noted that the challengers cited no examples within it and did not try to explain why it was substantial “in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”13 The same reasoning reaches a law whose unconstitutional applications are only a handful of circumstances.14 United States v. Hansen later restated the demand as a ratio between a law’s realistic unconstitutional applications and its lawful sweep.
The standard works differently at the two ends of its range. At one end, a law has no legitimate sweep to weigh. The resolution in Jews for Jesus declared the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Airport “not open for First Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity.”15 It therefore reached more than leafleting: it prohibited even talking and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing, so that virtually every person entering the terminal might violate it by some expressive act.16 The Court thought it obvious that no conceivable governmental interest would justify so absolute a ban, even if the terminal were a nonpublic forum.17 Because the ban covered nothing but First Amendment activity, no legitimate sweep stood on the other side of the scale, and no counting was needed. A standardless criminal ordinance presents the concern in another form. One that required any three or more people meeting on a sidewalk or street corner to conduct themselves so as not to annoy any police officer or passerby was held unconstitutionally broad because it authorized punishment of constitutionally protected conduct, and because conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, it specified no standard of conduct at all.18
Between the ends, the count itself can divide the Court. In United States v. Stevens, which involved a seller of videos of pit bulls engaged in dogfights, a dissenting opinion would have rejected the facial attack. It reasoned that the statute validly reaches at least two broad real-world categories of expression, crush videos and dogfighting videos, and so has a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applications. The challenger, it added, had not met his burden of showing that impermissible applications were “substantial” in relation to the statute’s “plainly legitimate sweep.”19 The majority counted differently, a disagreement a later section examines.
At the other end sits the law whose legitimate reach dwarfs its edge cases. In Broadrick, the challengers had solicited money among their co-workers for the benefit of their superior, and they conceded that § 818 could constitutionally reach that conduct. They pointed instead to possible applications to wearing political buttons or displaying bumper stickers, activity in which they had not engaged.20 Justice White’s majority opinion, which devoted most of its focus to overbreadth, sustained the statute against the attack.21 New York v. Ferber, which sustained a child pornography law against an overbreadth challenge, became the standard picture of a statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications. Hicks falls on the same side of the line. The trespass rules there applied to everyone who entered the streets of Whitcomb Court, including strollers, loiterers, drug dealers, roller skaters, bird watchers, and soccer players, a group that would seemingly far outnumber First Amendment speakers, and Hicks had not shown that the policy as a whole prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications.22 What separates these three from the airport resolution is the denominator: each carried a large legitimate sweep that facial invalidation would have destroyed, while the airport resolution carried none.
The second step is where the analysis most often fails. A student who lists protected applications and stops has measured only one side of the comparison, yet Broadrick and Hicks came out as they did because the other side was so large. The steps also contain no numerical cutoff. The decisions quoted here frame substantiality as a comparison and a realistic danger, not as a percentage, so a sound answer states the comparison in words, naming what the law mostly reaches and concluding that the protected applications either dominate it or form a marginal remainder. The challenger carries the burden of making that showing, as the Stevens dissent put it,24 and the effect of the line between speech and conduct is covered later in the chapter.