Concept
Facial Challenges and Overbreadth
Overbreadth
Overbreadth Doctrine
Facial Challenges and Overbreadth
Overbreadth lets a person whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited attack a statute on its face, “because it also threatens others not before the court”: those who want to engage in protected expression but may refrain rather than risk prosecution.1 In Virginia v. Hicks, the Court called this an exception to the normal rule for facial challenges and stated what a successful showing accomplishes. Proof that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” suffices to invalidate all enforcement of the law “until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.”2 The challenger in Hicks claimed that the policy barring him from Whitcomb Court was overbroad and could not be applied to him — or anyone else.3 A litigant who asks a court to void a law for everyone asks for far more than an ordinary challenge allows, and the ordinary challenge shows how much more.
In an ordinary challenge, the defendant argues that whatever the law means for others, it cannot constitutionally be enforced against what the defendant did. A win on that ground leaves the law subject to further as-applied challenges; it does not remove the law from the books.4 A facial challenge claims something larger: “The law I have been charged with is totally invalid, so that it cannot be used to punish anyone, under any circumstances,” even though the defendant’s own words might have been punished consistently with the First Amendment under a better-drafted statute.5 Courts decide both kinds of claim as questions of law; constitutional liberties are not put to a jury.6
The ordinary rules make the larger claim hard to win. A litigant to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied is not heard to argue that the statute might be taken to apply unconstitutionally to other persons or in other situations.7 The restraint rests on prudence. The Court wants to avoid constitutional questions, and it wants the most effective and concerned advocate before it. It has little interest in hearing how a creatively interpreted statute could be applied to some hypothetical case in an unconstitutional way.8
Overbreadth departs from that restraint in two ways. First, it changes who may complain. Ordinarily a challenger may not raise the rights of third parties and can assert only his own interests; in overbreadth analysis, challengers are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties.9 In Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., for example, a professional fundraiser raised the First Amendment interests of charities that were not before the Court.
Second, overbreadth changes what a win accomplishes. The overbreadth litigant argues that a narrowly drawn statute could constitutionally prohibit the activity, but that the challenged statute is overbroad and appears to include protected activity. The litigant is injured because he has a right to be prosecuted only under a statute drawn narrowly.10 When the argument succeeds, the law is not narrowed. It becomes wholly unenforceable until a legislature rewrites it or a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.11 A defendant whose words a better-drafted statute could punish may therefore escape punishment under the statute the state actually used.12
A hypothetical shows both departures at work.
Joan may still attack the ordinance on its face. A ban on “any offensive speech” reaches the protected speech of people who are not in court, and those people are left to ponder what the phrase means and may say nothing out of fear of violating it.13 Joan may raise their interests even though her own speech could be punished. If the attack succeeds, the city cannot enforce the ordinance against her or anyone else until it is rewritten or narrowed. A narrowing construction can change the result. Take a law against showing “dirty movies.” If the state court reads it to mean precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court means by “obscene,” the law is not invalid on its face, because as construed it is clear and narrowly tailored.14
Loose standards produce the same problem in another form. An ordinance requiring three or more people who meet on a sidewalk or street corner not to annoy any passing police officer or other person was held unconstitutionally vague, because it subjects the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad, because it authorizes punishment of constitutionally protected conduct.15 Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, so the ordinance specified no standard of conduct at all.16 The later section on vagueness separates the two defects.
The exception exists because of whom an overbroad law injures most: the people who stay silent rather than risk prosecution. A silent person never becomes a defendant, so if only a punished speaker could object, an overbroad law would suppress speech through deterrence and escape review. Many persons, the Court observes, will choose to abstain from protected speech rather than undertake the considerable burden and sometimes risk of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation. That harms them and society, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas, and suspending all enforcement of the overinclusive law reduces those costs.17 Courts also point to the risk that overbroad laws, like vague ones, will be enforced selectively at the discretion of officials.18 The next two subsections take up these concerns in turn.
The breadth of the remedy is also its cost. A law struck for overbreadth goes unenforced even against people whose conduct the state could validly punish, so the Court requires that the overbreadth be “substantial,” a requirement developed below.19 The doctrine also applies only to freedom of expression. Outside the First Amendment, the ordinary bar on raising the rights of absent third parties remains.20
The owner can argue only that the ordinance is invalid as applied to the tavern. The claim about other businesses belongs to those businesses, and with no expression involved, nothing displaces the usual rule that a litigant may assert only his own rights.